Kenneth Bernard Moore v. Richard L. Dugger, Secretary, Florida Dept. Of Corrections, Respondent

Citations: 856 F.2d 129; 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 13304; 1988 WL 92476Docket: 87-5346

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; September 28, 1988; Federal Appellate Court

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Kenneth Bernard Moore was convicted of second-degree murder in a non-jury trial in Florida and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison, a decision upheld by the Fourth District Court of Appeals. Subsequently, he filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the Southern District of Florida, but the district court dismissed the petition following the magistrate's recommendations. Moore's girlfriend, Veronica Wilcox, was murdered on June 5, 1982. He lived with Wilcox and her mother, who found her body upon returning home early Sunday morning after spending the night at a local establishment. 

Moore first spoke with Detective Rein around 7:00 a.m. on the day after the murder, suggesting that the murderer would either turn himself in or commit suicide. This conversation led to a formal interview at the sheriff's office starting at approximately 8:00 a.m., during which Moore was read his Miranda rights. He denied involvement in the murder and reiterated his belief that the actual perpetrator would either confess or take his own life. The interview lasted about one hour before Moore left for his mother's house.

At noon, officers located the petitioner at his mother's house and requested he return to the sheriff's office for questioning. After denying responsibility for a murder during an initial interview with a detective, the petitioner later confessed to Detective Rein, detailing the act and citing jealousy and mistreatment as motives. Discrepancies arose regarding whether the petitioner requested to speak with Detective Rein and the timing of his confession. During the confession, he illustrated the murder method and later claimed self-defense, which differed from his earlier motive but was not entirely inconsistent. After requesting an attorney, he initially ceased further discussion but subsequently decided to provide a recorded confession, stating he had killed the decedent and had disposed of the murder weapon.

The confession was the sole direct evidence of guilt. Despite significant blood evidence at the crime scene, no blood was found under the petitioner’s nails, and his clothing bore minimal stains. The petitioner presented an alibi concerning his whereabouts during the crime, though there was contention over the timing of his departure from The Shop.

The petitioner argued that his confession was involuntary and violated his rights under Miranda v. Arizona. However, the burden of proof rested on him to demonstrate that he was entitled to relief, which he failed to do. The court concluded that the confession was voluntary after a thorough examination of the circumstances, affirming the district court's denial of relief and noting that the federal courts independently review the voluntariness of confessions without presumption of correctness from state courts.

Petitioner has an IQ of 62, functions at an intellectual level equivalent to that of an eleven-year-old, and is classified as educable mentally handicapped. He claims that his confession was coerced due to being deprived of food and sleep for 25 to 30 hours. Although mental limitations must be considered when evaluating the voluntariness of a confession, they alone do not render it involuntary; the petitioner must also demonstrate police coercion. He argues that he believed he could go home if he confessed, citing a conversation with Detective Rein as evidence of this supposed promise. However, the trial court rejected this theory, and the factual determinations made by the state court are presumed correct, although this presumption does not extend to the conclusion of voluntariness. Even under independent federal review, the petitioner fails to prove the existence of a police promise. The possibility of going home could influence any suspect, independent of any police statements. Furthermore, the petitioner provides no additional evidence of coercion, leading to the conclusion that his claim of an involuntary confession is unsupported.

Regarding the Miranda claim, testimony from Detective Rein and the petitioner indicates that the petitioner requested an attorney during questioning but later withdrew that request, choosing to continue speaking with law enforcement. The detective indicated he would obtain an attorney, but the petitioner opted to finish telling his story, which included a confession to the crime. The exchange highlights the complexity of the petitioner’s understanding of his rights and choices during the interrogation process.

Petitioner claims that Detective Rein violated his Miranda rights by not stopping the interrogation after he requested a lawyer. However, it is determined that Detective Rein did not fail to "scrupulously honor" petitioner's rights under Miranda. The state argues that the petitioner initiated further conversation with the detective after requesting a lawyer. This case is distinguished from Christopher v. State, where the police continued questioning despite the suspect's invocation of the right to remain silent. In the current case, the petitioner voluntarily chose to continue the dialogue after having received Miranda warnings and acknowledging his awareness of his right to counsel. Thus, the court concludes that because the petitioner withdrew his request for an attorney on his own, the request is no longer in effect.

Petitioner asserts he was not readvised of his Miranda rights before further questioning, citing Oregon v. Bradshaw, where the Supreme Court found that a suspect who had invoked his right to counsel could still waive that right after being advised again of his Miranda rights. Petitioner claims additional warnings were essential for his confession's admissibility, contrasting it with Edwards v. Arizona, where he argues no such warnings were given, leading to the confession's exclusion. However, this assertion is incorrect; additional Miranda warnings were indeed provided in Edwards. The key distinction lies in police misconduct in Edwards, as officers interrogated the suspect without counsel after he invoked his right to an attorney. Although it would have been preferable to renew Miranda warnings before petitioner's confession, he had previously received them and demonstrated understanding of his rights. Notably, he had already confessed before requesting an attorney, leading to the conclusion that renewed warnings were not necessary to protect his constitutional rights. Furthermore, the court does not accept petitioner's characterization of his initial statement as an invocation of his right to remain silent, noting that his inquiry about leaving did not equate to refusing to talk. The court affirms that petitioner's waiver of his Miranda rights was a knowing and intelligent relinquishment, supported by the magistrate's findings that he understood his rights and acknowledged them by signing a verification card.

The petitioner was calm, responsive, and coherent during questioning, demonstrating an understanding of the inquiries. He recounted how he killed the victim and articulated his motive. Although he had a low IQ, he was considered an educable mentally handicapped student and had successfully completed up to the eleventh grade with commendable work, according to a former teacher. The petitioner acknowledged during his trial testimony that he had been informed of his right to legal representation. Consequently, despite his mental limitations, there is substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that his waiver of Miranda rights was both intelligent and voluntary. The district court's dismissal of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus has been affirmed by Honorable Horace T. Ward, U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Georgia.