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Moss Point School District v. Stennis
Citations: 132 So. 3d 1047; 2014 Miss. LEXIS 137; 2014 WL 793649Docket: No. 2012-IA-00997-SCT
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; February 26, 2014; Mississippi; State Supreme Court
Zachariah “Zai” Stennis filed a lawsuit against Moss Point School District (MPSD) and several officials for injuries sustained in an off-campus assault by a fellow student, Shakara Davis, and Davis’s mother, Regayla Woods. MPSD's motions for summary judgment and dismissal were denied by the circuit court, leading to an interlocutory appeal after a reconsideration motion was also denied. The incident began when Davis, upset over a shared romantic interest, confronted Stennis in July 2008. Tensions escalated after Woods sent a threatening text message to Stennis in September 2008, which was reported to school authorities. Following a meeting with law enforcement, Stennis was advised against fighting with Davis. On October 2, 2008, after a school pep rally, Woods blocked Stennis’s car and handed Davis a knife and box cutter, leading to a violent confrontation where Stennis was stabbed and struck with a tire iron. Stennis sought medical treatment for her injuries, while Davis was expelled. Stennis’s lawsuit, filed under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA), alleged that MPSD failed to provide adequate supervision and security, thus breaching its duty to ensure a safe environment for students. MPSD, in its legal defense, claimed immunity under the MTCA and argued that it had no duty to protect Stennis since the assault occurred off school premises after school hours. On December 14, 2011, the circuit court denied MPSD's motions for summary judgment and reconsideration, prompting MPSD to file an interlocutory appeal. The appeal challenges the court's decisions, focusing on three primary issues: the defendants' duty of care to the plaintiff during the incident, whether their actions were discretionary functions that would grant them immunity under Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1)(d), and whether their alleged lack of student control and discipline related to immunity under Section 11-46-9(1)(x). The court determined that the first issue regarding the existence of a duty of care is dispositive and will be addressed first. The standard for reviewing the denial of summary judgment is de novo, meaning the court will reassess the case anew without deference to the lower court's decision. Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine disputes of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party. In negligence claims, establishing a duty owed by the defendant is essential, as it is a legal question. The Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) provides that governmental entities like MPSD are not liable for claims arising from acts or omissions of their employees performed within the scope of their duties, unless the employee fails to exercise ordinary care in executing a statute, ordinance, or regulation. The MTCA serves as the exclusive remedy against governmental entities for actions leading to the lawsuit, confirming that MPSD is classified as a governmental entity under this statute. Mississippi Code Section 37-9-69 mandates that superintendents, principals, and teachers in public schools must enforce school regulations and hold students accountable for misconduct both on school grounds and during school-related activities. The courts have interpreted this statute as establishing a ministerial duty for schools to ensure a safe environment by exercising ordinary care to minimize foreseeable risks to students. However, the circuit court's application of this duty was erroneous, as previous cases indicate that such responsibilities apply only when incidents occur on school property. The current case involves an incident that took place off school grounds after dismissal, distinguishing it from previous rulings. In the case of Gammel v. Tate County School District, the Court of Appeals ruled that a school’s duty of care under Section 37-9-69 does not extend beyond school property. When Gammel left the school parking lot and was struck by a vehicle on the public street, he was deemed a trespasser, and the school had no duty to protect him at that moment. This precedent reinforces that schools are not liable for incidents involving students off school premises. The analysis also considers whether the MPHS Student Handbook imposes a duty on the school to notify law enforcement about threats made against a student. The school argues that the handbook does not constitute a statutory or regulatory obligation under Section 11-46-9(1)(b), which would require the school to demonstrate ordinary care. The court has yet to determine if a student handbook can create such a ministerial duty. The Legislature grants school boards the authority to create and enforce rules for school governance, as outlined in Miss.Code Ann. 37-7-301(2). When a school board imposes a regulation that creates a duty, Section 11-46-9(1)(b) mandates that the school exercise ordinary care in adhering to that regulation. Additionally, Section 37-9-69 requires superintendents, principals, and teachers to enforce relevant statutes and rules. A provision from the student handbook states that any threats of violence must be reported to authorities, and serious threats will be escalated to campus security and law enforcement. The Court notes that while it reviews the case de novo, it lacks sufficient information to determine if the handbook required the reporting of a specific threat, as only a partial excerpt of the handbook is available. The trial court did not reference the handbook when establishing the duty of ordinary care owed by the school. Consequently, the Court cannot ascertain if the handbook explicitly imposed a duty to report the threat mentioned. The case is remanded to the Circuit Court of Jackson County to further examine the record and establish whether the student handbook indeed imposed a reporting duty. The Court finds that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the school district's duty of ordinary care applied without sufficient evidence from the handbook, leading to a reversal of the lower court's decision. Stennis is defending against claims with defendants including Kim Staley (MPSD superintendent), David Rubenstein (MPSD CFO), and Pamela Perkins (Moss Point School Board president). Stennis provided testimony regarding an incident involving Davis, stating she was unaware of Davis's actions as she did not exit her vehicle and was not sure of her origin. Stennis contends that MPSD controlled the area where the attack occurred, raising a factual question about whether it took place on school property. The law defines 'school property' to include public school facilities and areas under the superintendent's charge, but Stennis acknowledged the attack happened on a public street, which is not classified as 'school property.' Despite the school using the street for bus operations, it remained accessible to the public, and policing authority lay with the Moss Point Police Department, negating any material factual dispute regarding the property status. Stennis distinguishes the case of Gammel, arguing that his status as a trespasser differs from that of a student, but acknowledges that Gammel's status is irrelevant to the appellate court's ruling, emphasizing that he lost any status when leaving school property. The court previously established that regulations from the Mississippi High School Activities Association imposed a duty on Pearl High School, aligning with similar obligations recognized in the Department of Human Services’ policy manual related to child protection.