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Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Skinner
Citations: 119 So. 3d 294; 2013 WL 3945902; 2013 Miss. LEXIS 391Docket: No. 2012-JP-01745-SCT
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; August 1, 2013; Mississippi; State Supreme Court
Judge William L. Skinner, II of the Hinds County Youth Court faced judicial misconduct allegations after taking actions in cases from which he had recused himself. The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance and Judge Skinner jointly recommended a public reprimand, a $1,000 fine, and $100 in costs. However, the Court imposed a thirty-day suspension without pay, along with the public reprimand and financial penalties. The Court also modified previous rulings to focus on whether Judge Skinner’s conduct was willful and exploited his judicial position. The facts reveal that from January to February 2011, Judge Skinner presided over cases involving the Cooper children, where he issued a no-contact order against Mr. Cooper. On February 25, 2011, he recused himself due to a conflict of interest related to an employee of the court. Despite this recusal, on March 21, 2011, Judge Skinner issued bench warrants for the Coopers' arrest for contempt, leading to their detention without bond or a hearing for approximately seventy-two hours. The Commission received citizen complaints prompting a formal investigation, resulting in charges against Judge Skinner for misconduct, including violations of due process and ex parte communications. Following procedural developments, the case was set for hearing on August 10, 2012. On September 19, 2012, the Commission and Judge Skinner reached an Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendations to avoid a hearing. Key facts include: Judge Skinner recused himself from cases involving the Cooper siblings on February 25, 2011, followed by the appointment of a special judge on March 3, 2011. On March 21, 2011, Judge Skinner issued bench warrants for Mr. and Mrs. Cooper's arrest for contempt of court due to a no-contact order violation, mandating their detention without bond. They were arrested and held for several days without due process, contrary to procedural safeguards established in Cooper Tire & Rubber Company v. McGill. As a result, Judge Skinner acknowledged violations of Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution and specific Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, while ex parte communication charges were dropped. The proposed disciplinary measures included a public reprimand, a $1,000 fine, and $100 in costs, which the Commission unanimously accepted with minor amendments on October 12, 2012, and officially filed on October 23, 2012. A Joint Motion for Approval of Recommendations was submitted on November 21, 2012, noting Judge Skinner's prior four disciplinary actions without detailed context. To resolve the case appropriately, this Court ordered access to the prior disciplinary files, which it reviewed. The Court possesses the authority to discipline judges for willful misconduct or conduct prejudicial to justice, including wrongful use of judicial power or actions demonstrating moral turpitude or bad faith. The Court serves as the final arbiter in cases involving judicial performance, determining the appropriate actions when a judge exhibits willful misconduct or conduct that undermines the integrity of the judicial office. It conducts an independent review of the record, giving careful consideration to the findings and recommendations from the Commission on Judicial Performance, though it is not obligated to adhere to those findings and may impose additional sanctions. In the case of Judge Skinner, both he and the Commission acknowledged that he violated specific Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, with the Commission finding these violations based on clear and convincing evidence. The determination of whether Judge Skinner's actions were willful is irrelevant to the fact that he violated the Code; even negligent or ignorant behavior can damage the reputation of the judicial office. Judge Skinner committed misconduct by recusing himself from cases and then, aware of his recusal, taking further action in those cases, which is strictly prohibited. Additionally, he misused his contempt powers by issuing arrest warrants for indirect criminal contempt, resulting in individuals being held without bond for 72 hours without notice or a hearing, contravening due process protections. These actions were knowingly improper, leading to his violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and constituting willful misconduct that brings the judicial office into disrepute. Sanctions for judicial misconduct must be proportional to the offense, guided by six factors: 1) the judge's length and character of service, 2) relevant prior case law, 3) the severity of the offense and resulting harm, 4) whether the conduct is isolated or a pattern, 5) involvement of moral turpitude, and 6) the presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. The aim of sanctions is to uphold the dignity of the judicial office and protect the public, rather than to punish the individual. Judge Skinner served as a Justice Court Judge for one term and has been a County Court Judge since January 2007, though the record lacks details on the nature of his public service. Past cases illustrate the consequences of judicial misconduct, particularly focusing on judges who acted in matters after recusal. For instance, Judge Osborne, despite recusing himself, took further actions in a case, leading to his removal and a cost assessment. Judge Roberts faced various offenses across multiple cases, resulting in a public reprimand, a suspension, a fine, and costs. Judge Thompson's actions, while inappropriate, did not constitute formal misconduct since he did not take decisive actions or formally recuse himself, resulting in a lesser sanction of public reprimand and costs. Ample case law highlights the abuse of the contempt process by judges. In Darby, a court found a public reprimand, a $500 fine, and $100 in costs appropriate when a judge held a party in criminal contempt based on verbal instructions without notice or recusal, violating Canons 1, 2A, and 3B(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Similarly, in Byers, the judge was reprimanded for improperly imposing sentences, misrepresenting her actions under oath, revoking probation without proper procedure, and citing a journalist for contempt without following necessary safeguards. The court described the abuse of contempt powers as "the most troubling and serious" charge, ultimately sanctioning Judge Byers with a public reprimand, a $1,500 fine, and costs of $2,023.59, while noting her removal by electoral defeat rendered further removal unnecessary. In another case, Sanders, the court ruled that even provocation does not excuse a judge's misuse of contempt powers, which led to a $500,000 bond and sanctions against Judge Sanders for expunging convictions improperly. These cases illustrate that Judge Skinner’s actions—acting post-recusal and issuing contempt bench warrants without procedural safeguards—constitute misconduct, violating the Mississippi Constitution and the Code of Judicial Conduct. The consequences of Judge Skinner's actions included the arrest of Mrs. Cooper in front of her six minor children, who were subsequently taken into custody by DHS, and both Coopers being incarcerated for seventy-two hours without due process. The lack of information about public awareness of Judge Skinner's actions suggests potential harm to the judiciary's reputation. Judge Skinner has faced disciplinary actions, including a private admonishment and three informal admonitions from the Commission due to prior complaints. His disciplinary history includes discussions about recusal in a specific case, where he demonstrated an understanding of the Osborne case, which mandates that a judge must not participate further in a case after recusal. The Commission's claim that Judge Skinner's past disciplinary record is "dissimilar" to his current actions is contested, as his history suggests he was aware of the recusal rules when he acted in the Cooper case post-recusal. The concept of "moral turpitude" is defined variably, generally referring to acts that violate community moral standards or are contrary to justice and honesty. Legal ethics categorize offenses involving moral turpitude, such as fraud and breach of trust, as making individuals unfit to practice law. The Court has had inconsistent applications of the term, recognizing it includes actions that interfere with justice or undermine the judiciary's integrity. Recent judicial misconduct cases illustrate varying determinations of moral turpitude, with some cases affirming its presence in actions like improper case dismissals and ex parte communications, while others found no moral turpitude in attempts to influence unrelated cases. Overall, the interpretation and application of moral turpitude in judicial conduct remain contentious. In various cases reviewed by the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance, the concept of moral turpitude has been applied inconsistently among judges. Notable cases include: - **Bustin**: A judge was found to have committed moral turpitude for signing an arrest warrant based on an ex parte affidavit from her former client, which disrupted justice. - **McGee**: Moral turpitude was determined due to a judge's interference in a criminal prosecution involving a relative. - **McKenzie**: The court found moral turpitude for a judge involved in ticket-fixing and ex parte communications, emphasizing that such actions undermine justice. - **Dearman**: In Dearman I, no moral turpitude was found despite improper actions like changing bonds and presiding over a relative’s case. In Dearman II, similar conduct also did not result in a finding of moral turpitude. - **Littlejohn**: The judge's contempt ruling against an attorney for not reciting the Pledge of Allegiance was deemed not to involve moral turpitude, as it did not constitute misuse of the legal system. - **Boone**: Moral turpitude was found for engaging in ex parte communications and lying to investigators. Additionally, distinctions in the application of moral turpitude were highlighted in the case of Judge Smith, who abused the judicial process without providing due process. Although a divided court found his actions constituted moral turpitude, Justice Randolph disagreed, stating no evidence of deceit or inappropriate motives existed, while Justice Kitchens dissented, arguing that Judge Smith did not commit misconduct. The overall inconsistency in applying the moral turpitude standard indicates a lack of clarity and consensus among justices regarding its definition and implications. Judge Darby was found to have abused her contempt powers by incarcerating an individual for indirect criminal contempt without ensuring due process rights, but the Court disagreed with the Commission's argument that this constituted moral turpitude. The Court maintained that her actions did not disrupt the administration of justice or involve deceit, fraud, or similar misconduct, although it agreed with the recommended sanction despite not finding moral turpitude. In contrast, in Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Cowart, moral turpitude was established due to Judge Cowart's ex parte communications and personal bias, though Justice Kitchens concurred in part, asserting her actions did not reflect extreme moral depravity. Similarly, in Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Patton, moral turpitude was found for wrongful incarceration and other judicial misconduct, with Justice Kitchens dissenting on the moral turpitude aspect, arguing it requires evidence of inappropriate motives and should reflect actions contrary to societal expectations of judges. The varying interpretations of "moral turpitude" in judicial misconduct cases create confusion regarding appropriate sanctions. States have implemented specific factors to guide these determinations, as evidenced by the Washington Supreme Court's ten nonexclusive factors, including the extent to which a judge exploited their position for personal gain. Other states have adopted similar frameworks, emphasizing different aspects of misconduct, such as the distinction between spontaneous and premeditated actions. Mississippi law will now replace the traditional view of "moral turpitude" with a focus on the willfulness of the conduct and whether it exploited the judge's position for personal desires or public detriment. The assessment of willfulness will consider the judge's state of mind—whether the actions were taken in bad faith, good faith, intentionally, knowingly, or negligently. Conduct viewed as deliberate or knowing, but not premeditated, will be evaluated between spontaneous and planned misconduct, with the severity of sanctions reflecting this spectrum. In the case of Judge Skinner, the record indicates that his actions were deliberate and he was aware they were wrong, particularly regarding due process and recusal principles. However, there is no evidence of provocation, premeditation, or personal gain from his actions. Judge Skinner has accepted responsibility for his improper actions and reached an agreement with the Commission without a hearing. Despite this acknowledgment, he has a prior disciplinary history and knowingly violated fundamental judicial standards by taking action in a case after recusal, which undermines due process protections in contempt cases. Consequently, to uphold the dignity of the judiciary and protect the public, the Court imposes sanctions that include a public reprimand, a thirty-day suspension without pay, a $1,000 fine, and $100 in costs, asserting that the Commission's recommended sanctions were insufficient given the misconduct's gravity. The public reprimand will be read in open court during the next jury term. The Court also requests the Commission to provide comprehensive records of judicial misconduct cases and individual histories for future recommendations. The opinion references various Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct that emphasize the importance of judges maintaining high standards of integrity, complying with the law, and being competent in their duties. Justice Randolph's views are supported by relevant case law. An action must exhibit immorality to be classified as moral turpitude, as established by the Court. Notably, actions that interfere with the administration of justice do not automatically equate to moral turpitude. The Court clarified that willful misconduct may involve moral turpitude, but this is not always the case. Procedural matters or ignorance of the law do not inherently rise to moral turpitude. The Court outlines several factors to consider in assessing misconduct: 1. Whether the misconduct is isolated or part of a pattern. 2. The nature, extent, and frequency of the misconduct. 3. The context of the misconduct (in or out of the courtroom). 4. Whether it occurred in the judge's official capacity or private life. 5. Whether the judge acknowledged the misconduct. 6. Any efforts by the judge to change their behavior. 7. The judge's length of service. 8. Prior complaints against the judge. 9. The impact of the misconduct on the judiciary's integrity and respect. An example is provided that ticket-fixing constitutes moral turpitude, as it deprives the public of due funds, regardless of personal gain. Although the moral turpitude factor is replaced for clarity and consistency, concerns previously associated with it will still be evaluated under different factors regarding the offense's magnitude and any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. This change aims to enhance the clarity of judicial standards.