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Doe v. Jameson Inn, Inc.
Citations: 56 So. 3d 549; 2011 Miss. LEXIS 27; 2011 WL 103543Docket: No. 2009-CA-00722-SCT
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; January 12, 2011; Mississippi; State Supreme Court
Jim and Barbara Doe appeal a summary judgment granted in favor of Jameson Inn, Kitchin Hospitality LLC, and Erica Covington by the Rankin County Circuit Court. The court, presided over by Judge William E. Chapman, ruled that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding Ann Doe's status upon entering Jameson Inn. On March 1, 2003, Kelvin Washington rented a room at the Inn, later giving keys to a group of teenage boys celebrating a birthday. Ann Doe, age thirteen, and her twelve-year-old friend visited the Inn after meeting a man at a nearby movie theater. They left to smoke marijuana in the rented room, where Ann was subsequently raped. Following the incident, Ann did not report it immediately but later disclosed it while being apprehended for theft. The Does filed a complaint against the defendants, which was transferred to Rankin County Circuit Court. The court determined Ann was a 'licensee' because she was on the premises to engage in illegal activity. Consequently, the court found that the defendants had not breached any duty to her and granted summary judgment. The Does raised three consolidated issues on appeal: whether their claims should be treated as a single premises liability action, the appropriateness of classifying Ann as a licensee, and whether common-law distinctions between invitees, licensees, and trespassers should be abandoned, or minors should be exempt from such classifications. The appellate court reviews summary judgment grants de novo, affirming that no genuine material facts were in dispute. The trial court's classification of the Does' claims solely as premises liability was upheld, as the Does argued the case also involved simple negligence. They referenced precedents from Keith v. Peterson and Presswood v. Cook, which draw on Hoffman v. Planters Gin Co. to delineate when a higher standard of care is owed to a licensee. The Hoffman exception, however, applies only in specific premises liability cases and does not alter the fundamental classification of the claims. Ann Doe's injury, occurring in a private room at the Jameson Inn, was linked to a dangerous condition on the premises, justifying the trial court's treatment of the claim under premises liability. Regarding Ann Doe's status, the trial court classified her as a licensee, while she contended she was an invitee. The court noted that the determination of her status was a legal question due to undisputed facts, particularly her admission of leaving a movie theater to smoke marijuana. Although the dissent suggested that her reasons were disputed, the evidence indicated that Ann's actions in leaving were clear and uncontested. Thus, the trial court's classification of Ann as a licensee was deemed appropriate. The Hoffman exception was reiterated as applying only in cases involving active negligence by landowners in the operation of their business, rather than conditions of the premises. Ann entered the Jameson Inn with a group but claims it was through the side entrance, while a cleaning attendant testified that they entered through the front. This discrepancy raises questions about the Inn's knowledge of Ann’s presence during the incident. However, for the Hoffman exception to apply, there must be evidence of active negligence causing injury to Ann, which is absent in this case. There is also no indication of an unusual danger on the premises. The classification of Ann’s status is crucial: as she entered to smoke marijuana, she cannot be considered an invitee, as there was no mutual benefit. Instead, she may be viewed as a licensee, which entails a lower duty of care from the defendants, limited to avoiding willful or wanton injury. The record lacks evidence of any intentional harm or willful negligence by the defendants. Arguments of passive negligence, based on the defendants' alleged inaction, do not change this duty, as the standard remains the same. The dissent suggests Ann could be seen as an invitee due to her association with a hotel guest; however, this is not applicable as the room was registered to someone other than her alleged attacker. Therefore, Ann's status is confirmed as a licensee, and the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment for the defendants is upheld. The Court addressed whether to abandon the common-law distinctions among invitees, licensees, and trespassers in assessing a landowner's duty of care. The appellants, referred to as the Does, advocate for a shift to a reasonable-care standard and argue for the exemption of minors from these classifications. However, the Court reaffirmed its previous stance from 2003, emphasizing the importance of maintaining these distinctions to balance the interests of injured parties against landowners' rights and to prevent jury discretion from undermining legal predictability. Regarding the Does' alternative argument about minors, the Court noted that in Mississippi, contributory negligence and the attractive nuisance doctrine consider a minor's ability to perceive danger. Minors aged seven to fourteen are presumed to lack sufficient judgment, although this presumption can be rebutted. The attractive nuisance doctrine does not apply to obvious dangers, and landowners can assume guardians will warn children of apparent hazards. In this case, Ann Doe was found to have recognized the potential risks of entering a hotel room with unknown individuals, as confirmed by her deposition. Consequently, the defendants were only required to avoid willful or wanton harm towards her. Given Ann's acknowledgment of the dangers, the Court concluded that her argument lacked merit. Ultimately, the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed, with the Justices concurring and one dissenting. The appellants’ identities were changed for privacy, and witnesses provided limited observations about a group involving Ann.