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Gillett v. State
Citations: 56 So. 3d 469; 2010 Miss. LEXIS 337; 2010 WL 2609432Docket: No. 2008-DP-00181-SCT
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; July 1, 2010; Mississippi; State Supreme Court
Roger Gillett was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death by lethal injection for the murders of Linda Heintzelman and Vernon Hulett during a robbery. Gillett appealed the convictions and sentences, but the court found no reversible error and affirmed them. The investigation began when Gillett’s aunt, Debbie Milam, reported to the Russell County Sheriff's Department that Gillett had been manufacturing illegal narcotics and had stolen a pickup truck at his grandfather's farm in Russell County, Kansas. Subsequently, narcotics investigator Agent Matthew Lyon obtained search warrants for Gillett’s residence and the Gillett farm. During the execution of the warrant at his residence, officers discovered illegal narcotics and arrested Gillett and his co-defendant, Lisa Chamberlin. After being transported to the jail and read his Miranda rights, Gillett initially requested an attorney but retracted that request to inquire further about the charges. During the interview, he claimed he had recently hitchhiked from Mississippi and had not visited the Gillett farm in months. Meanwhile, the search at the Gillett farm revealed a stolen white pickup truck registered to Heintzelman and equipment used for methamphetamine production. Officers found a freezer bound with tape, which contained the bodies of Heintzelman and Hulett. The search was temporarily halted until a homicide search warrant was obtained to investigate the bodies further. Gillett was not further interviewed about the bodies found in the freezer, but Chamberlin provided a statement to police, leading them to a landfill where they retrieved seven trash bags containing items linked to murder victims Vernon Hulett and Linda Heintzelman. The bags included Hulett’s and Heintzelman’s wallets, Hulett’s work clothing, a blood-stained crocheted pillow matching those in their home, a phone book, and blood-stained New Balance shoes. Evidence prompted Kansas police to alert Hattiesburg authorities, who searched the victims' residence at 908 South Gulfport Street, uncovering rolled-up carpeting, blood-like stains, a pried-open safe, and a shoe print matching one of the recovered shoes. The Mississippi Crime Laboratory confirmed the blood on the shoe belonged to Heintzelman. Gillett and Chamberlin traveled from Kansas to Mississippi in February 2004, staying with Hulett and Heintzelman. Following a car accident allegedly caused by Heintzelman, Gillett expressed anger toward her. Hulett and Heintzelman were last seen alive on March 19, 2004. On subsequent visits to the victims’ home, Hulett's nephew found only Gillett and Chamberlin, with Gillett claiming Hulett had requested the carpeting be removed due to plans for new flooring. Gillett and Chamberlin were later seen in Hattiesburg and then returned to Kansas, driving Heintzelman’s pickup truck, which contained a covered rectangular object. Gillett confessed to friends in Kansas about killing the victims and suggested their bodies were in the truck. A friend later noticed a freezer at Gillett’s farm that resembled what was under the tarp. Hulett’s mother identified the freezer as belonging to them, and forensic analysis found Gillett’s fingerprints on it and on the tape sealing it shut. Heintzelman suffered a minimum of sixty-nine injuries resulting from blunt-force trauma, cutting, stabbing, and suffocation, with fatal sharp-force injuries predominantly to the torso and blunt-force injuries primarily to the head. Hulett also sustained numerous facial and head injuries, with his death attributed to severe blows that fractured his skull and damaged his brain; he was found in a freezer, with his arms and head severed from his body. Gillett was indicted for the capital murders of Hulett and Heintzelman. During pretrial proceedings, he filed four motions to suppress evidence related to his arrest, statement, and searches of his residence and farm, all of which were denied. A motion to prevent the introduction of victim photographs was also denied. A Daubert hearing confirmed the reliability of DNA testimony from the State’s witness, William Jones. Gillett did not present evidence during the trial, which lasted four days, after which the jury found him guilty of two counts of capital murder. In the penalty phase, the jury unanimously identified four aggravating factors for each victim, resulting in a death sentence for Gillett. His motion for a new trial or sentencing hearing was denied on January 25, 2008, leading him to appeal. The appellate court applies heightened scrutiny in reviewing capital murder convictions and death sentences, resolving any doubts in favor of the accused. Gillett seeks clarification on whether Kansas or Mississippi law governs his first four claims related to suppression motions, arguing that there is no precedent in Mississippi for this issue. He references cases from other jurisdictions, noting a division on whether to apply the law of the transaction's location (Kansas) or the forum state's law (Mississippi). Gillett asserts that his motions to suppress are valid under both Kansas and Mississippi law, as well as federal law, but advocates for using Kansas law as the more logical choice. However, the parties agree that applying either state's law would yield the same outcome for Gillett’s motions, indicating that the choice-of-law issue may not need resolution. Gillett's first claim of error contests the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence from his warrantless arrest. On March 29, 2004, Sergeant Schneider, after interviewing Gillett's relatives, learned of Gillett's threats and illegal activities. Following this, KBI agent Lyon obtained a search warrant for his aunt's residence where Gillett was staying, citing probable cause for multiple felony offenses related to methamphetamine. Though Gillett was not found at the residence, officers later located him at a park and arrested him without a warrant, acting on the probable cause established by the narcotics found and the threats made. He was informed of his arrest for narcotics violations and subsequently shown the search warrant detailing the charges against him. On March 30, 2004, a warrant for Gillett’s arrest was issued, citing specific charges. Kelly Ralston, a Special Agent with the Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI), indicated that in Kansas, it is common for law enforcement to arrest individuals based on probable cause before completing formal documentation, as permitted by Kansas Statutes Section 22-2401. This statute outlines several circumstances under which an officer may make an arrest without a warrant, including having probable cause to believe that a person is committing or has committed a felony or misdemeanor that poses an immediate risk to safety or evidence. Gillett contends that his arrest was unconstitutional and violated the statute because the arresting officer did not clarify whether the narcotics violation was a misdemeanor or felony, and because no narcotics were present during the arrest. He argues that, due to the alleged unlawfulness of the arrest, any items seized and his custodial statement should be suppressed. The court's review of a motion to suppress is conducted under a mixed standard, assessing reasonable suspicion and probable cause de novo while reviewing historical fact findings for clear error and giving deference to local law enforcement inferences. The standard of review for the admission or exclusion of evidence is for abuse of discretion. The U.S. Supreme Court has established that the standard for arrest and detention is based on the Fourth Amendment, specifically requiring probable cause, which is defined as facts and circumstances that would lead a prudent person to believe that a suspect has committed or is committing a crime. This standard balances individual liberty against the state's responsibility to maintain public order. In Mississippi, probable cause is assessed using the "totality of the circumstances," focusing on practical and common-sense considerations that inform a reasonable person's belief in the occurrence of a crime. In this case, the record demonstrates that there was probable cause to arrest Gillett. Consequently, the items seized during his arrest and his custodial statement were deemed lawful and not subject to suppression. The trial court's refusal to suppress these items was affirmed as neither clearly erroneous nor unsupported by substantial evidence. Gillett argued that the trial court's denial of his suppression motions lacked sufficient detail for appellate review, claiming the court failed to make necessary historical fact findings as required by Ornelas v. United States and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(d). However, it was clarified that Ornelas does not mandate explicit on-the-record findings for suppression motions, and Mississippi courts are not bound by the federal rule, as there is no equivalent in state law. Regarding the denial of Gillett's motion to suppress his custodial statement, he was interviewed shortly after his arrest. Agent Lyon informed Gillett that the interview was being recorded, presented him with a search warrant, and read him his Miranda rights, ensuring Gillett understood them before proceeding. Lyon questioned Gillett about his willingness to answer questions, referring to the Miranda Card, to which Gillett marked an 'X' in an ambiguous position. Lyon sought clarification, and Gillett responded with "Maybe." After further prompting, Gillett signed the card but inquired about the nature of the questioning. Their conversation revolved around Gillett's recent travels and belongings, while Lyon informed him about police surveillance and a search warrant related to a suspected stolen vehicle at Gillett's farm. Upon learning about the charges against him—manufacture of methamphetamine and related offenses—Gillett requested an attorney. Lyon acknowledged this request and stated he could not discuss further details. After some back-and-forth, Gillett indicated he was withdrawing his request for an attorney, prompting Lyon to continue the interview. Gillett later asked for an attorney again, leading Lyon to terminate the session. Gillett contends that his entire statement is inadmissible due to an alleged failure to waive his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, arguing the trial court wrongly denied his motion to suppress the statement, particularly after he explicitly invoked his right to counsel. A trial court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence faces a significant burden for overturning, as established in Taylor v. State, 789 So.2d 787 (Miss.2001), where deference is given to the trial court's findings on the admissibility of incriminating statements. The defendant must demonstrate a heavy burden to reverse a ruling on suppression, as noted in Hunt v. State, 687 So.2d 1154 (Miss.1996). The trial judge serves as the finder of fact regarding the admissibility of confessions, which can only be overturned if an incorrect legal standard was applied or if there was manifest error or overwhelming contrary evidence, as indicated in Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731 (Miss.1992) and others. Miranda rights must be read to a suspect before custodial interrogation, and if the suspect wishes to remain silent or requests an attorney, questioning must cease. A waiver of these rights can be indicated by an express willingness to talk, as established in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Gillett's case, he was read his rights and marked an ambiguous response on the Miranda Card. Despite this ambiguity, he did not assert his right to silence, and the interrogation continued until he requested an attorney after being informed about a pending search warrant. Upon invoking this right, questioning stopped immediately. Afterward, Gillett explicitly withdrew his request for an attorney, and the interrogation resumed for a short duration until he invoked his right to counsel again, prompting the end of the interview. In Smith v. Illinois, the standard for admitting an accused's responses after invoking the right to counsel requires that the accused (a) initiates further discussions with law enforcement and (b) knowingly and intelligently waives the previously invoked right. Gillett did so by asking about additional charges and subsequently waiving his right to counsel. He contends that Lyon’s statement regarding the charges constituted continued interrogation, but this argument lacks merit. According to Rhode Island v. Innis, interrogation is defined as actions by police likely to elicit incriminating responses. Lyon's disclosure of the charges did not meet this standard, as Gillett had previously reviewed the search warrant that contained the charges. At the time, Lyon was unaware of any murder having occurred, reinforcing the trial court's decision to deny Gillett's motion to suppress his custodial statement as neither manifest error nor contrary to the evidence's overwhelming weight. Additionally, Gillett challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress items seized from a warranted search of 606 North Ash Street, where he was staying with his aunt, Patty Hulett. On March 29, 2004, Agent Lyon obtained the search warrant, supported by an affidavit detailing his twenty years of narcotics investigation experience and the specific knowledge gained during that time. At approximately 11:15 a.m. on March 29, 2004, SSA Lyon and SA Sherri Moore interviewed Debbie Lynn Milam at the Russell County Sheriff's Office. Milam stated she was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, having last used methamphetamine six years prior. She is the aunt of Roger Lee Gillett, who traveled to Russell, Kansas, on March 26, 2004. On the evening of March 28, 2004, Milam drove Gillett and his girlfriend, Lisa Jay Chamberlin, to an abandoned farm owned by her uncle. She witnessed Gillett place a white pickup truck in a shed and later observed him with a trash bag and firearm, threatening her life if she disclosed his activities. Milam drove Gillett and Chamberlin on back roads to dispose of the trash bag, which Gillett ultimately threw in a dumpster at the Russell City swimming pool. Gillett informed Milam he needed a storage unit for the stolen truck from Mississippi and mentioned his criminal activities, including an active felony warrant in Oregon for multiple counts of forgery, theft, identity theft, and computer crimes. Deputy Kelly Schneider confirmed that items Milam noted at the farmhouse were consistent with a clandestine methamphetamine lab. Previously, on February 17, 2004, a traffic stop involving Chamberlin revealed possession of hazardous chemicals and drug paraphernalia. Milam consented to a search of her vehicle, which yielded a propane tank and chemicals associated with methamphetamine production. Information from a neighbor indicated the presence of the white pickup at the farm shortly before. SSA Lyon requested the issuance of a search warrant for the items mentioned, as per legal provisions. Gillett contends that the affidavit supporting the search warrant was conclusory, lacking sufficient particularized facts to establish probable cause. He argues that the items seized from 606 North Ash Street should be suppressed due to reliance on uncorroborated, unreliable informant information, claiming the seizures violate constitutional protections. The court reviews the issuance of a search warrant by determining if there was a substantial basis for probable cause, adhering to a "totality of the circumstances" analysis. The magistrate's role is to assess if, based on the affidavit’s circumstances, there is a fair probability of finding evidence of a crime. The court finds there was a substantial basis for the magistrate's probable cause determination. Key evidence included Debbie Milam’s report of witnessing Gillett involved in illegal narcotics and possessing a stolen vehicle, along with threats against her. Milam's reliability was supported by corroborative details, such as observations from neighbors regarding the stolen vehicle and physical evidence from discarded items linked to methamphetamine manufacturing. Additional corroboration included the discovery of a propane tank in Milam's vehicle and an active felony warrant for Gillett related to computer crimes in Oregon. Ultimately, the court upheld the trial court's decision, finding no error in denying Gillett’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of 606 North Ash Street. Gillett asserts that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the warranted search of his farm at 5482 190th Street, Russell County, Kansas. Agent Lyon obtained a search warrant on March 29, 2004, supported by an affidavit with information also used for a prior search warrant. The court found that the affidavit provided a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed for issuing the warrant. Gillett challenges the validity of the search warrant, claiming it failed to describe the premises with particularity and that the search exceeded the warrant's scope. He argues that only a shed on the farm should have been subject to search and that the search was improperly broad. The warrant specifically authorized searches of the farmhouse and associated outbuildings, including any individuals or vehicles present on the property. The description was deemed sufficiently detailed in compliance with legal standards. Testimony described the farm as having multiple structures, including a metal shed and an abandoned farmhouse, all of which fell within the warranted search parameters. There was no indication from Milam that methamphetamine-related activities were limited to a single structure. Consequently, the court concluded that the warrant was based on probable cause, adequately detailed the locations to be searched, and was properly executed, affirming the trial court's decision to deny Gillett’s motion to suppress. Additionally, Gillett contends that the indictment for capital murder of Vernon Hulett should not have proceeded because the alleged stolen white pickup truck was solely owned by Linda Heintzelman. He argues that for him to be guilty under Mississippi law, Hulett must have held an interest in the vehicle in question. Mississippi Code Section 97-3-19(2)(e) defines capital murder as the unlawful killing of a human being committed during the commission or attempted commission of certain felonies, including robbery, without requiring that the victim had an interest in the property taken. This interpretation is supported by case law, including Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Mississippi Public Service Commission and Grant v. State, which confirm that even a coconspirator involved in the crime does not need to possess a valid interest in the property to be classified under the statute. The court upheld the trial court's decision to deny Gillett's motion for a directed verdict on Count II of the indictment, concluding that Gillett's arguments lacked merit. Regarding jury instructions S-5 and S-6, Gillett contended that they improperly allowed for a conviction without establishing that the intent to rob was formed before the victims' deaths. The court reiterated that jury instructions are at the discretion of the trial court, referencing past rulings. Instruction S-5 clarifies that the victim's death does not affect the robbery conclusion if the murder and theft form a continuous chain of events. S-6 mirrors S-5, substituting another victim's name but maintaining the same legal principle. A continuous chain of events between a murder and the subsequent taking of property can result in a defendant being charged with capital murder, even if the victim is deceased at the time of property theft. In the case of Roger Lee Gillett, if it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he murdered Vernon Hulett and then took property belonging to Linda Heintzelman, the continuity of events supports a capital murder charge. Mississippi law follows the "one-continuous-transaction" rationale, which holds that connected crimes occurring as part of the res gestae can sustain a capital murder charge. The intent to commit robbery, as part of the underlying felony, can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the crime, including possession of the victim's belongings at the time of arrest. In Gillett's case, evidence of his possession of a stolen vehicle and a witness testimony of his confession suggest intent to rob, justifying the jury's consideration of this intent. Gillett's argument that intent must be established prior to the killing is unsupported by precedent. Pickle establishes that capital murder charges can arise when two crimes are interrelated within a chain of events and form part of the res gestae. The trial court acted within its discretion by permitting the jury to consider instructions S-5 and S-6. Gillett's assertion that instruction S-6 was improper due to Vernon Hulett's lack of property interest in the truck was deemed meritless. Gillett challenged the admissibility of expert DNA testimony from William Jones of the Mississippi Crime Laboratory, citing a Daubert objection. A pretrial hearing revealed that DNA evidence linked to Linda Heintzelman was obtained from a shoe found in a landfill. The controversy centered around the use of red-top tubes for storing blood samples, as opposed to the preferred purple-top tubes, which contain preservatives. Jones defended the use of red-top tubes, stating they are standard practice when purple-top tubes are unavailable and affirming the reliability of his testing methods. Conversely, Gillett's expert, Dr. Peter D’Eustachio, criticized the use of red-top tubes, claiming their testing was unvalidated and produced unreliable results, though he admitted no studies specifically addressed this issue. Ultimately, the trial court ruled that the DNA evidence would be admissible, allowing the jury to determine its weight, and noted that while red-top tubes are not ideal, the State's witness met the necessary reliability criteria for the evidence to be presented. Gillett contends that the trial court erred by admitting the State's expert testimony, arguing that the State did not prove the scientific reliability of the methodology used to link blood on the shoe found in the Russell, Kansas, landfill to Linda Heintzelman, while excluding Vernon Hulett. The trial court's decision regarding expert testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion, as established in Miss. Transp. Comm’n v. McLemore. The court's ruling will only be overturned if deemed arbitrary and clearly erroneous. In McLemore, the Mississippi court adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s Daubert/Kumho standard for evaluating the reliability and admissibility of expert testimony, emphasizing the importance of Rule 702 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. This rule allows expert testimony if it is based on sufficient facts, employs reliable principles and methods, and the expert applies these methods reliably to the case facts. The McLemore court highlighted that trial courts have a gatekeeping role, requiring a two-part assessment: ensuring expert testimony has a reliable foundation and is relevant. Specifically, the reliability of the testimony must be founded on scientific methods rather than subjective beliefs. The Daubert ruling provides a non-exhaustive list of factors for assessing reliability, which includes the testability of the theory, peer review status, potential error rates, operational standards, and general acceptance in the scientific community. The admissibility of expert testimony is contingent upon the specific issue, the expert's qualifications, and the testimony's subject matter. The evaluation process is flexible, concentrating on the principles and methodologies employed rather than the conclusions drawn. The trial court serves as a gatekeeper but should not replace the adversarial system; traditional methods like cross-examination and presenting contrary evidence are appropriate for challenging admissible evidence. If the evidence is insufficient for a reasonable juror to find it more likely true than not, the court may direct a judgment or grant summary judgment. Expert testimony is generally admissible if it is relevant and reliable, assuming no other grounds for exclusion exist. In the case at hand, the trial court's decision to permit Jones to testify on DNA evidence was upheld, as his testimony was deemed based on adequate data and reliable methods. The defense's failure to cross-examine Jones or object to his testimony at trial weakened their position. Gillett argued the trial court erred by excluding several of his culpability-phase jury instructions. The court emphasized that jury instructions fall within the trial court's discretion and should be considered collectively rather than individually. Defendants are entitled to jury instructions that reflect their case theory, yet the court can reject instructions that misstate the law, are adequately addressed elsewhere, or lack evidentiary support. Gillett specifically contested the exclusion of instructions D-42, 44, and 45, which asserted that the prosecution's investigative evidence was flawed and urged the jury to evaluate its credibility alongside other evidence. A credible investigation is characterized by thoroughness and good faith, whereas investigations that are incomplete, negligent, or conducted in bad faith are considered less credible or valueless. The credibility of witnesses and the weight of prosecution evidence should be assessed based on the quality of the investigation. If the State is found to have inadequately investigated one aspect, it may suggest similar inadequacies in other areas, potentially leading to reasonable doubt regarding the defendant's guilt. Additionally, the loss of evidence creates a rebuttable presumption that such evidence would have favored the defendant. Gillett argues that the prosecution's investigation was negligent and distorted, citing specific instances: Milam, Thacker, and Ploutz did not initially inform police of their pre-dawn visit to the farmstead on March 29, 2004. Items collected by KBI Agent Butler, including a cigarette butt, a chewed plastic straw, and a cigarette lighter found near the bodies, were not analyzed for biological or fingerprint information despite the availability of Gillett's biological samples. Furthermore, a handsaw scabbard was seized, but no cut-margin analysis was performed to link it to the injuries sustained by the victim. On April 2, 2004, police executed a search warrant at 440 15th Street, where they photographed a hammer linked to the case but failed to process it for evidence despite findings indicating that blunt-force trauma caused the victim's death. While biological information was obtained from Gillett for forensic comparisons, the police did not seek such information from Milam, Thacker, or Ploutz, despite their deceptive actions. Additionally, the Hattiesburg police lost a videotape of their initial entry into Gillett's home, further compromising the investigation's integrity. Officer Byrd identified a videotape related to the crime scene at 908 South Gulfport Street, noting that while some items were not collected or tested by the State, there was no evidence of negligence, distortion, or bad faith from law enforcement. Although a videotape was misplaced during an office move, still photographs taken during the investigation were entered into evidence. Consequently, the trial court correctly denied instruction D^2 due to a lack of supporting evidence. Regarding instruction D-44, Gillett's cited cases are not binding and do not support the proposed instruction, with no evidence indicating inadequate investigation by the State. Instruction D^5 was also denied because there was insufficient evidence suggesting the lost video would contain information favorable to Gillett. The trial court's exclusion of jury instructions D-42, D-44, and D-45 was deemed appropriate. Gillett argued against the exclusion of jury instructions D-53 and D-60, which related to lesser-included offenses or manslaughter. These instructions required a finding that Gillett caused serious bodily harm without intent to kill, but the court found no evidentiary basis to support this claim. Gillett did not present an alternative scenario consistent with manslaughter, leading to the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to support the proposed jury instructions D-53 and D-60. Gillett contends the trial court erred by excluding jury instruction D-19 concerning reasonable doubt, which stated that jurors should individually determine what constitutes reasonable doubt and that a single juror’s reasonable doubt mandates an acquittal. Gillett argues this instruction was necessary to emphasize the requirement of conviction beyond a reasonable doubt for each juror. However, the trial court had already provided a similar instruction, C-2, emphasizing that reasonable doubt must benefit the defendant, and that mere probability of guilt is insufficient for conviction. Thus, the court found that the substance of D-19 was adequately addressed in C-2, and did not abuse its discretion in its exclusion. Additionally, Gillett challenged the trial court's exclusion of jury instruction D-25 regarding witness impeachment, which stated that jurors could discredit a witness by showing inconsistencies with prior statements. Gillett referenced Ellis v. State as supporting authority, but the prosecution objected, arguing that D-25 lacked necessary language present in Ellis regarding the materiality of prior statements and the proper use of such statements in determining witness credibility without inferring guilt. The trial court refused D-25, noting that the defense did not provide further explanation or authority for the instruction's relevance or accuracy during the proceedings. A trial court is not obligated to draft or provide all possible jury instructions in a capital case, as it is the defendant's responsibility to submit desired instructions. Even if an instruction is partially valid, the trial court is not required to amend it based on objections from the State or to present it if deemed improper. In this case, there was insufficient evidence to support an impeachment instruction concerning witness Debbie Milam, as she did not make any pre-trial statements inconsistent with her testimony. The trial court acted within its discretion in excluding instruction D-25. Additionally, Gillett challenged the trial court’s refusal of instruction D-41, which addressed a witness’s unsolicited prejudicial statements. Gillett argued the instruction was warranted due to perceived discrepancies in testimony from Agents Lyon and Moore regarding an undercover operation. However, the court found no inconsistency in their testimonies, as both agents indicated danger as a factor for not proceeding with the operation. Gillett did not raise this discrepancy during the trial as justification for the instruction. The defense's objection to Agent Lyon's testimony was noted, but the court ultimately denied the request for instruction D-41. Gillett's appeal does not support the appropriateness of instruction D-41, which concerns Lyon's remark about Gillett bringing a gun to high school. There is no evidence indicating that Lyon made prejudicial statements about Gillett persistently, which is a requirement for the instruction. Gillett cites United States v. Andrea as authority for D-41; however, this case is not binding and does not support the instruction, as the Sixth Circuit deemed similar prejudicial statements as harmless error. Lyon's mention of gun possession was not a deliberate action akin to the FBI's conduct in Andrea. Gillett's trial objection to the gun statement was merely that it was a "narrative response." Consequently, the trial court did not err in excluding D-41. Gillett also contends that the trial court wrongly denied instruction D-20, which states that guilt by association is unacceptable in criminal law. The content of D-20 was sufficiently addressed in other jury instructions (S-7, D-8, and D-21), which clarified that mere presence or knowledge of a crime does not imply guilt. Given the comprehensive jury instructions, the trial court was justified in denying D-20. Furthermore, Gillett argues that the State failed to prove venue, a point raised for the first time on appeal. Venue is jurisdictional and must be established, as affirmed in Crum v. State, and the State must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, as explained in Hill v. State. Venue can be established through direct or circumstantial evidence. The State bears the burden of proving venue beyond a reasonable doubt, which is a standard applicable to the jury, not the trial judge. Sufficient evidence must support a reasonable conclusion that the crime occurred, at least partially, in Forrest County. Relevant Mississippi statutes, specifically Sections 99-11-19 and 99-11-3(1), establish that jurisdiction can be in any county where the offense was committed, and doubts regarding jurisdiction do not benefit the defendant. In this case, evidence presented at trial indicated that the victims, Vernon Hulett and Linda Heintzelman, were last seen at their home in Forrest County on March 19, 2004. Gillett, who stayed with the victims, later claimed they had gone to the Coast. He was subsequently seen in Kansas, where he confessed to killing the victims, whose bodies were later found in a freezer on Gillett's property. This freezer belonged to the victims and had last been seen at their residence. The bodies showed signs of trauma, and evidence, including a blood-stained shoe found at a Kansas landfill and blood-like stains at the victims' home, further linked Gillett to the crimes. The jury, therefore, had sufficient evidence to conclude that the crimes occurred in Forrest County, establishing venue. Additionally, Gillett's objection to hearsay testimony by Detective Terrell Carson was overruled by the trial court, which Gillett argues was an error. During the trial, Officer Terrell Carson testified that on March 29, 2004, he received a call from his dispatch at approximately 10:45 p.m. instructing him to contact the Kansas Bureau of Investigation and speak with Agent Mellor. Carson relayed that Agent Mellor asked him to check on a welfare concern at 908 South Gulfport Street, which Carson subsequently did. The defense, represented by Mr. Farris, objected to this testimony as hearsay, arguing it was based on what Agent Mellor had told Carson. However, the court allowed the testimony, stating it was admissible to explain Carson's actions and location at that time, referencing prior case law that supports this interpretation of hearsay. Additionally, the defendant Gillett argued that his convictions were unsupported by the evidence and contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, claiming the State failed to prove each element of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Gillett contended that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a directed verdict and new trial, but he did not provide specific reasons for the alleged insufficiency of evidence. The court's standard for reviewing such claims is to accept the evidence supporting the verdict as true, reversing only if it finds the trial court abused its discretion in denying the new trial motion. A new trial will only be ordered if the verdict is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, which would result in unconscionable injustice. The trial court's denial of a new trial is presumed correct, placing the burden on the appellant to prove reversible error. Evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and a new trial should be granted only in exceptional circumstances where evidence heavily favors the opposing party. The court assesses whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, accepting as true all evidence favorable to the State. If reasonable, fair-minded individuals might reach different conclusions based on the evidence, the evidence is deemed sufficient. Only if evidence for at least one element of the crime clearly supports a not guilty finding will the court reverse the decision. The jury is responsible for determining the weight and credibility of witness testimonies. In this case, the court found that Gillett’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence, including witness testimonies of Gillett's confessions regarding the theft of a truck and the murder of its owners. The trial court found that the conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, thus rejecting claims of unconscionable injustice. Gillett challenged the jury instructions regarding aggravating circumstances under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-101(5), specifically whether the capital offense was committed to avoid arrest and whether he had a previous violent felony conviction. The court reviewed the decision to allow jury instructions for abuse of discretion, concluding that if there is reasonable evidence suggesting that the killing was intended to conceal the identity of the perpetrators and evade arrest, it is appropriate for the jury to consider this aggravating factor. Gillett argued there was no evidence linking the murders to an intention to avoid arrest, but the State contended that the jury could reasonably infer that the murders were committed to prevent investigation into a robbery. Additionally, Gillett contested the inclusion of his prior conviction for attempted aggravated escape as a violent felony. The State presented a complaint and judgment of conviction to support this aggravating factor, which Gillett opposed on the grounds that the complaint included allegations for which he had not been convicted. The court ultimately upheld the trial court's discretion in these matters. The trial court decided that the complaint could not be entered into evidence for jury review but would inform the jury of Gillett's conviction for attempted aggravated escape from custody in Kansas. Gillett appealed, arguing three main points: 1) that under the precedent set by Hansen v. State, an escape does not qualify as a violent felony under Mississippi law; 2) that the State failed to provide a factual basis for the aggravating circumstance concerning a prior violent felony; and 3) that the State must demonstrate that the Kansas conviction qualifies as a violent felony under Mississippi law. The court noted that escape convictions do not inherently involve violence, as illustrated by Kansas Statutes Section 21-3810, which allows for convictions based on non-violent escapes. The State acknowledged that not all escape cases are considered violent. The court emphasized that the State bears the burden of proving aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The State attempted to argue that even non-violent escapes pose risks to public safety, but did not cite relevant Kansas case law to support this claim. The court concluded that the State failed to provide adequate evidence for the jury to consider a conviction as a violent felony. Therefore, the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider Gillett's prior conviction under the assumption it involved violence. Additionally, Mississippi law stipulates that if certain aggravating circumstances are invalidated on appeal, the Supreme Court must assess whether the remaining circumstances outweigh mitigating factors or if the inclusion of invalid circumstances was harmless error. Mitigating evidence presented at Gillett's sentencing hearing included testimonies from a pastor, a retired pastor, and an inmate who attested to Gillett's transformation into a devout Christian while incarcerated, leading Bible studies and assisting fellow inmates. A landscaping business owner spoke to Gillett's work ethic and quality of work during his employment in 1997 or 1998. A friend from 2001 to 2003 recounted Gillett's heavy drug use. Gillett's grandfather's companion described him as respectful, friendly, and helpful throughout his teenage years. His mother and aunt discussed Gillett's unstable childhood marked by frequent moves and a loving but unstable family life, influenced by his father's alcoholism and subsequent divorce. After reconnecting with his sober father, Gillett faced tragedy when his father died unexpectedly, an event he responded to by calling for help. Gillett later obtained his GED, attended college, and got married, but he began using drugs after his wife requested a divorce. Despite this mitigating evidence, it was determined that it did not outweigh three aggravating circumstances: avoiding arrest, the heinous nature of the capital offense, and felony murder, all supported by evidence. The mention of an invalid "previous violent felony" aggravator was deemed a harmless error. Gillett also challenged the constitutionality of instruction S-4-S regarding the "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravator, claiming it was vague. However, the court referenced prior cases, affirming that similar instructions had been upheld as constitutionally sufficient. The instruction clarified that "heinous" denotes extremely wicked, "atrocious" means outrageously wicked, and "cruel" signifies actions intended to inflict severe pain with indifference to the suffering of others, establishing criteria for distinguishing particularly egregious capital offenses. The excerpt addresses the legal standards for identifying aggravating circumstances in capital cases, specifically focusing on the criteria for determining whether a crime is "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" under Mississippi law. The court outlines that evidence of serious mutilation, dismemberment before death, inflicted physical or mental pain, or a lingering death can qualify as aggravating factors. It affirms the constitutionality of the relevant statutory provision, rejecting claims of vagueness and overbreadth based on prior case law, including Stevens v. State and others. The defendant's challenge references the U.S. Supreme Court case Shell v. Mississippi, arguing that certain language from an instruction was deemed unconstitutional. However, the court distinguishes between the rulings in Shell and Clemons v. Mississippi, asserting that the contested instruction has been consistently upheld as constitutionally sufficient in Mississippi jurisprudence. The court declines the defendant's invitation to overturn established precedent regarding the constitutionality of the jury instruction in question. It also addresses another argument concerning the allowance of the “felony murder” aggravating circumstance related to the commission of a robbery, referencing the implications of the Supreme Court cases Ring v. Arizona and Apprendi v. New Jersey, indicating that these issues are similarly without merit. The argument against presenting the aggravating circumstance of “committing the offense while engaged in robbery” during the penalty phase of a capital murder trial is rejected. The defendant contends that this aggravator should not have been introduced since the robbery allegations were integral to the capital murder conviction in the guilt phase. However, the court maintains that prior rulings allow the underlying felony to be used both to establish capital murder and as an aggravating factor. Citing several precedents, the court confirms that evidence of the underlying crime can appropriately serve dual roles in sentencing. The U.S. Supreme Court also supports this position, stating that using the underlying felony as an aggravator does not constitute constitutional error. Additionally, the defendant claims a constitutional right to have the aggravating circumstances included in his indictment, but this argument has been previously addressed and rejected by the court. The court explains that an indictment's purpose is to inform the defendant of the charges, and it need only clearly state the crime's elements. Relevant case law establishes that the death penalty statute provides guidance on aggravating circumstances, which the defendant was made aware of when charged with capital murder. Consequently, the court concludes that the jury was correctly instructed regarding the aggravating circumstance of robbery, and the defendant's assertion lacks merit. Gillett contends that the trial court erred by denying his proposed jury instructions that specifically outlined nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. He asserts that the trial court's refusal to provide these instructions, which included DA-30 through DA-59, undermined his defense theory during the penalty phase. Instead, the court offered a general “catchall” instruction allowing the jury to consider any aspect of the defendant’s character or the circumstances of the offense as mitigation, which the court has previously deemed sufficient in similar cases. The court cited precedents indicating that as long as a catch-all instruction is provided, specific instructions on nonstatutory mitigating factors are not required. The jury was instructed to consider any mitigating evidence presented during the trial, which the court found adequately communicated what could be considered for mitigation. Consequently, the trial court's refusal to provide Gillett's specific instructions was deemed not to constitute an error. Gillett also argued that the trial court improperly accepted or denied various other penalty-phase jury instructions, particularly objecting to instruction S-1-S, which cautioned against being influenced by sentiment or public opinion while weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Gillett claimed this instruction conflicted with legal standards allowing for jury sympathy. However, the court referenced prior rulings affirming the validity of similar instructions, indicating they were appropriate and consistent with the law. The Court upheld the jury instruction stating that jurors must consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances but should not be influenced by sentiment, sympathy, or public opinion. This aligns with precedents that deny defendants the right to a sympathy or mercy instruction, as it could lead to verdicts based on emotion rather than evidence. The trial court correctly denied Gillett's instruction DA-61, which would have allowed jurors to disregard sympathy in their deliberations. Gillett also contested instructions S-2-S and S-7-S, claiming they were contradictory. S-2-S clarified that the jury must determine the existence of mitigating circumstances, while S-7-S emphasized that individual jurors must weigh mitigating circumstances even if others do not agree. The trial court found that both instructions, when considered together, accurately reflected the law, as instructions should be read holistically. Furthermore, the phrasing in S-2-S did not imply the need for unanimous agreement among jurors regarding mitigating circumstances. In the case of Evans v. State, the court addressed multiple claims of error made by Gillett regarding jury instructions. The court upheld the trial court's decisions to provide instructions S-2-S and S-7-S, finding them consistent and appropriate. Gillett's argument for additional instructions to remedy alleged inconsistencies was rejected, as the court confirmed that S-2-S and S-7-S were not inconsistent. Gillett also contended that the trial court erred in denying instruction DA-13, which stated that the death penalty is not mandatory and that life imprisonment could be an option. The court found that this point was adequately covered in instruction DA-37, which allowed the jury discretion to impose life imprisonment regardless of specific findings. Furthermore, Gillett's request for "presumption-of-life" instructions (DA-10, DA-11, DA-19, DA-39) was denied. The court reiterated its stance from prior cases that a defendant is not entitled to such presumption during the sentencing phase. Despite this, the jury was informed of the possibility of life sentences through instructions DA-37 and DA-65, which clarified that the jury could choose life imprisonment based on their findings, thus effectively conveying the essence of Gillett's proposed instructions. The trial court was deemed to have acted within its discretion in these matters. The trial court's refusal to give Gillett's presumption-of-life jury instructions (DA-10, DA-11, DA-19, and DA-39) was deemed appropriate. Gillett contended that the court erred by denying instructions DA-66 and DA-67, which outlined the consequences of a jury's failure to reach a unanimous sentencing decision. DA-66 indicated that if the jury could not agree on punishment, the court would impose a life sentence without parole, while DA-67 stated that failing to reach a penalty verdict would not affect the guilt verdict. The court compared Gillett's situation to the precedent set in Edwards v. State, where similar instructions were also denied. The Edwards decision clarified that jury instructions should be interpreted holistically, and the jury had been adequately informed of their options, including the possibility of reporting an inability to agree on punishment. The trial court's denial of these instructions was justified, as cumulative instructions are not necessary, and even without them, no error occurred, as established in previous rulings like Stringer v. State. In the present case, the jury had been instructed on the potential outcomes: death, life imprisonment without parole, or inability to agree unanimously on punishment, fulfilling the legal requirements. Consequently, the trial court's decision to deny DA-66 and DA-67 was upheld. Additionally, Gillett's complaint regarding the denial of instructions DA-5 and DA-63 was also noted but not elaborated upon in this excerpt. The jury must deliberate on the appropriate punishment for Mr. Gillett, with specific emphasis on the unique nature of the death penalty, which is final and irrevocable. The court emphasizes the need for a decision based solely on evidence, devoid of any anger or prejudice. The State objected to the instruction highlighting the uniqueness of death as a punishment, claiming it was inappropriate. The court referenced Thorson v. State, which upheld a similar instruction and indicated that death is distinct from other sanctions. The court noted that the defendant did not cite relevant authority to support the necessity of such an instruction, thus procedurally barring the issue from consideration. Gillett cited the same cases as in Thorson but was informed that these did not require a specific instruction differentiating death penalty proceedings from ordinary criminal cases. Furthermore, the court ruled that the trial court adequately addressed concerns regarding impartiality in its instructions, and Gillett did not request the non-contested portions of the instruction after its denial. As a result, the trial court's decision to deny the instruction was found not to be in error. Gillett argues that the trial court wrongly denied DA-63, which clarifies the implications of a life sentence without parole, stating that if sentenced to death, he would face execution by the State of Mississippi. Citing *Flowers v. State*, the court concluded that providing the jury with only the options of death or life imprisonment without parole was sufficient, thus affirming the trial court's decision. Gillett also contends that his mercy instruction, DA-38, which suggests mercy may be a mitigating factor, was improperly denied. He references *Kansas v. Marsh* to support this claim, asserting a constitutional right to the instruction. However, the court, referencing *Chamberlin v. State*, determined that the denial of a mercy instruction was not an abuse of discretion. The *Marsh* decision does not mandate mercy instructions, and states have discretion in how juries consider mitigating evidence. The court has consistently held that capital defendants are not entitled to a mercy instruction, as it could lead to decisions based on emotion rather than evidence, aligning with the U.S. Supreme Court's stance on avoiding emotional decision-making in sentencing. Marsh, the only case cited by Gillett in support of DA-38, does not address the necessity of a mercy instruction, which this Court has consistently ruled is not required for capital defendants. Therefore, the trial court’s denial of DA-38 is upheld. Regarding allegations of prosecutorial misconduct during the trial, Gillett filed a notice of specific forensic misconduct prior to trial and later claimed that the State repeated seven violations listed in that notice, none of which he objected to during the trial. Gillett argues that failure to object should not preclude appellate review due to potential prejudice, citing United States v. Sawyer. However, the State contends that there was no prosecutorial misconduct and that Gillett is procedurally barred from raising these issues on appeal because he did not object at trial or include them in his motion for a new trial. The State argues that the Sawyer case ultimately supports their position, asserting that the defense counsel likely perceived no valid grounds for objection, which the Court agrees with. Consistent with prior rulings, the Court emphasizes that failing to object at trial waives any claim of error on appeal, a principle that applies even in capital cases. Consequently, the Court declines to consider claims of prosecutorial misconduct not raised during the trial. Contemporaneous objections are essential because the Supreme Court functions solely as an appellate court, lacking original jurisdiction, and can only review matters already addressed by the trial court. This requirement serves three main purposes: it prevents costly retrials, allows the offering party to address objections proactively, and ensures the trial court has the opportunity to rule on the matter before it can be contested on appeal. In capital cases, this rule applies strictly. Gillett's failure to object contemporaneously to seven alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct resulted in a waiver of his right to contest these issues on appeal. Gillett also assigned error to the trial court’s admission of autopsy photographs during both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. Citing precedent, the court emphasized that admission of such photographs is reviewed for abuse of discretion, with a high threshold for overturning the trial judge's decision. Photographs are admissible if they have some probative value and can serve a meaningful evidentiary purpose, regardless of their gruesomeness. The court outlined that a photograph must aid in describing the circumstances of the crime, the location of the body, or enhance witness testimony to possess sufficient probative value. Previous rulings have established that while gruesome images can be admitted, they must not be solely prejudicial without evidentiary purpose. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 401 favors the admission of evidence with any probative value. At trial, the State presented numerous autopsy photographs to assist pathologist Dr. Pojman in explaining the injuries sustained by victims Ms. Heintzelman and Mr. Hulett. Dr. Pojman testified that he took over one hundred photographs of Ms. Heintzelman and a lesser number of Mr. Hulett, with selected photos intended to represent the injuries for the jury. The thirteen photographs challenged by Gillett on appeal were chosen by Dr. Pojman to illustrate the injuries, with some showing the initial condition of the victims and others depicting specific injuries. Each photograph was distinct and fulfilled the requirements of having probative value and aiding in the description of the circumstances surrounding the killings, the victims' locations, and the causes of death. To exclude a photograph under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403, the trial court would need to determine that its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the autopsy photos during the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. Gillett's claims regarding the validity of his death sentence are also addressed. Gillett claims that his death sentence stems from an invalid penalty phase, arguing that it would constitute an "unreliable, arbitrary, and capricious killing," violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article Three, Section 28 of the Mississippi Constitution. He asserts that the State did not meet its burden of proving aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and points to numerous instructional errors during the penalty phase. The court has previously addressed similar cumulative-error arguments, notably in Thorson v. State, where it concluded that if no reversible errors occurred in any part of the proceedings, then no reversible error exists overall. The court found no reversible errors in Gillett's penalty phase, rendering his cumulative-error argument without merit. Gillett further contends that his death sentence is arbitrary, citing the totality of his claims. However, he fails to provide specific reasons for this assertion. He references past cases, such as Walker v. State and Taylor v. State, to illustrate his point. In Walker, the court found the admission of improper testimony as an arbitrary factor influencing the death penalty, leading to a remand for a new sentencing hearing. In Taylor, the court identified errors in jury instructions related to aggravating circumstances due to insufficient evidence. However, Gillett's cited cases do not substantiate his claim of arbitrariness in his own sentencing. Gillett’s sentence is determined to be lawful, as the cited cases are distinguishable and no impermissible factors influenced the death penalty. Gillett contends his death sentence is excessive and disproportionate under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-105(3)(c), arguing that insufficient aggravating factors and inadequate jury instructions regarding death eligibility led to this conclusion. The court notes it must evaluate the proportionality of the death sentence in relation to similar cases, referencing precedents where the death penalty was upheld in capital murders during robberies. The court concludes that Gillett’s sentence is neither excessive nor disproportionate, aligning with past rulings. Gillett also asserts that cumulative errors necessitate reversal of his conviction under federal constitutional law. However, the court finds that only one error was identified, which was deemed harmless. Therefore, based on the Fifth Circuit's standards, there was no violation of Gillett’s due-process rights due to cumulative error. Lastly, Gillett claims that Mississippi Code Section 99-19-101 is unconstitutional, alleging it violates his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by imposing cruel and unusual punishment. The court reaffirms its previous findings that the death penalty in Mississippi does not contravene the U.S. Constitution, rendering this claim meritless. The convictions and death sentences for Gillett, related to the capital murders of Vernon Hulett and Linda Heintzelman, were affirmed by the Circuit Court of Forrest County. The court's decision included the concurrence of Chief Justice Waller and Justices Carlson, Randolph, and Pierce, while Justice Chandler concurred in part with a separate opinion. Justice Kitchens dissented with a separate opinion, joined by Justice Dickinson, and Justice Lamar partly concurred and partly dissented, with Dickinson joining in part. Key evidence included testimony from Milam, who reported being threatened by Gillett with a gun to ensure her silence regarding his actions at the farm. A landfill employee confirmed Gillett's deliveries, during which he requested receipts to be issued under his aunt’s name. Additionally, testimony indicated Gillett mentioned needing assistance to dispose of a pickup truck containing two dead bodies. The jury identified four aggravating circumstances for the capital offense: engagement in robbery, heinous nature of the crime, intent to evade arrest, and prior felony convictions involving violence. Gillett's appeal raised a choice-of-law issue regarding the applicability of Mississippi or Kansas law, noting the State did not address this in their responses, nor did the trial court provide findings regarding Gillett's suppression motions. Testimony during the trial involved officers conducting searches and securing warrants, and there was ambiguity regarding Gillett's statements during police interrogation. It was clarified that Kansas authorities had not surveilled the Gillett farm, as Lyon sought to protect Milam's identity as an informant. Lyon indicated he had not prepared an affidavit for an arrest warrant, which is pertinent to the ongoing legal argument about Gillett's standing to challenge the search of a property owned by his aunt at 606 North Ash Street. The State contends that Gillett lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy at this residence, rendering the argument moot in light of the search warrant's validity. Gillett's reliance on Thomas v. State, which establishes that specific intent to steal is crucial for robbery, does not substantiate his claim that Count II should not have been presented to the jury. Gillett asserts multiple claims regarding Count II: - Claim 5(A) argues that it was a reversible error to deny his motion for a directed verdict and to reject jury instruction D-72. - Claim 5(B) contends that the guilty verdict on Count Two is legally insufficient. - Claim 5(C) states that due to the insufficiency of Count Two, the death sentence associated with this conviction should be vacated. Claim 6 posits that the death sentence for Count One must also be vacated since it relies on inadmissible evidence tied to Count Two's insufficiency. Additionally, the excerpt references a discussion from Pickle regarding the felony-murder doctrine, noting that it does not apply if the intent to steal arises after a homicide occurs. Regarding evidence, Jones had requested purple-top tubes for testing but later clarified they were needed only if available, given the deaths of the individuals involved. Dr. Pojman explained that after death, blood samples can be collected in red-top tubes, as the preservation requirements differ post-mortem. Lastly, it notes that although Kansas Statutes Section 21-3810 was repealed and replaced, the relevant language remains consistent in the new legislation. The court has also ruled on how convictions under sister state statutes are evaluated concerning violent felonies under Mississippi law. Determination is needed on whether a prior conviction from a sister state qualifies as a crime of violence under Mississippi law. The analysis must focus on Mississippi statutes rather than the sister state's classification. The court finds that it does not need to evaluate whether Gillett's attempted escape constitutes a crime of violence under Mississippi law due to insufficient information. Gillett's references to Jordan v. State and King v. State do not support his claim for specific jury instructions. The jury is instructed on mitigating circumstances, emphasizing that jurors are not required to reach a unanimous decision regarding mitigating factors and can consider any evidence that suggests mitigation, regardless of its strength. Each juror must independently assess mitigating factors without an exhaustive list provided. The court clarifies that while aggravating circumstances are presented, this does not imply a diminished consideration for mitigating circumstances. Jurors are reminded they can individually decide on the appropriate punishment, including the option for life imprisonment. The State argues against Gillett's presumption-of-life instructions on the grounds that they improperly shifted the burden of proof and were flawed mercy instructions. The court notes that these arguments are unnecessary to address, as they relate to instructions not challenged by Gillett himself. Seven alleged violations cited by Gillett are also mentioned but not detailed in this summary. During the second-phase summation, the State presented several arguments deemed improper. Firstly, the State expressed a personal opinion advocating for the death penalty, asserting that the case involved a "special person" and "special circumstances," which contradicts established legal standards regarding prosecutorial conduct. Additionally, the State claimed it was unimaginable to have a worse case and had never encountered one as severe, which conflicts with prior case authority. The State also employed a "Golden Rule" argument, urging jurors to consider the victims' suffering in relation to mitigating evidence. In the first phase, the State improperly urged the jury to consider the victims' families while deliberating, seeking justice on their behalf, which again opposed established legal guidelines. In the second phase, the State stated that a death sentence would fulfill the jury's duty under Mississippi law, which was also challenged by previous case law. Furthermore, the State made extraneous statements about Vernon Hulett, depicting him as a virtuous and hardworking individual, which lacked evidentiary support and contradicted legal precedents. Gillett noted that while he offered to stipulate to the victims' identities and the circumstances of their deaths, this did not preclude the admissibility of evidence as ruled in prior cases. The document concludes by addressing the inadequacy of the State's evidence regarding the alleged kidnapping and the characterization of the murder as particularly heinous, indicating reliance on conjecture rather than substantive proof.