St. Joseph Hospital v. The Celotex Corporation, as Successor to the Spraycraft Corporation (A Delaware Corporation), United States Gypsum Company (A Delaware Corporation)
Docket: 87-8140
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; September 6, 1988; Federal Appellate Court
The case involves St. Joseph Hospital as the plaintiff-appellee against Celotex Corporation and United States Gypsum Company as defendants-appellants, concerning the applicability of a newly enacted Georgia statute relevant to pending lawsuits. The Eleventh Circuit Court appeals from a decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, certifying a question to the Georgia Supreme Court due to the significance of Georgia law in resolving the matter.
St. Joseph Hospital filed a lawsuit on March 10, 1986, against four manufacturers of asbestos-containing fireproofing used in its building during renovations from 1969 to 1970. The asbestos was only discovered in March 1984 during subsequent renovations. The hospital sought to recover costs for asbestos removal. The defendants sought summary judgment, claiming the claims were barred by a four-year statute of limitations under Georgia law, but the district court ruled that Georgia's discovery rule delayed the commencement of the limitations period until the hospital was aware of the asbestos hazard.
After a five-day trial, the jury awarded $300,000 against Celotex and $200,000 against U.S. Gypsum. The defendants appealed, raising the application of Georgia's discovery rule, which stipulates that a tort claim accrues only when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the injury and its potential cause. The court highlighted the need for clarification on whether this rule applies to property damage claims as well as personal injury claims.
Ga. Code Ann. Sec. 9-3-30 establishes a four-year statute of limitations for actions arising from property damage. In Corporation of Mercer Univ. v. National Gypsum Co., the Georgia Supreme Court determined that the discovery rule does not apply to property damage cases, requiring such actions to be filed within four years of the substantial completion of the damaged property. Subsequently, the Georgia legislature enacted Ga. Code Ann. Sec. 9-3-30.1 on April 14, 1988, which revives or extends the statute of limitations for actions against asbestos manufacturers and suppliers related to property damage, allowing claims that would otherwise be barred by limitations to be filed by July 1, 1990. This statute does not affect personal injury claims or actions not specified within its provisions. The Georgia Supreme Court did not address how this new statute impacts Mercer's claim. Appellants argue that the new statute does not apply retroactively to cases filed before its effective date and assert that the four-year limitation under Sec. 9-3-30 applies to all such cases filed prior to April 14, 1988. They cite Hart v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., emphasizing that the new statute’s language suggests it applies only to future lawsuits.
The Georgia Supreme Court is asked to interpret Ga.Code Ann. Sec. 9-3-30.1 in relation to pending cases at the time of its enactment, specifically questioning whether it prevents claims from being barred by the statute of limitations. The matter has significant financial implications and necessitates precise application of Georgia law. The court is also asked to clarify the applicability of the discovery rule in property damage cases lacking a statute of repose but involving knowledge and concealment of hazardous defects.
Notably, the Georgia Supreme Court previously held that statutes should not be applied retroactively unless explicitly stated. In contrast, the current inquiry addresses whether a statute that revives time-barred actions can be applied favorably to plaintiffs. The appellants claim that the prior case, Mercer, has resolved this issue, but the court disagrees, emphasizing the need for clarification due to the importance of the legal questions involved. Although reluctant to certify a second question in ongoing asbestos-related cases, the court deems it necessary given the circumstances.
