United States v. Pamela Gay Page
Docket: 87-5485
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; August 11, 1988; Federal Appellate Court
Pamela Gay Page, the defendant-appellant, was indicted on bank fraud charges and seeks to overturn her indictment and guilty plea, which was contingent on her argument that her rights under the Speedy Trial Act were violated. The relevant section of the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6), addresses the exclusion of certain delays in calculating the time for filing indictments and commencing trials. The District Court referenced the Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Feldman, which established that sua sponte dismissals by a trial court restart the speedy trial clock rather than merely tolling it. The court noted that the language of the Act implies that any dismissal not initiated by the government, including sua sponte dismissals, should be treated as if it were on the defendant's motion. This interpretation was further supported by the court's analysis that Page's withdrawal of her waiver of indictment functioned similarly to a motion to dismiss, thereby resetting the time limits under the Act. The District Court ultimately concluded that the time period for the prosecution to act began anew following the dismissal of the initial charges. Page's trial and guilty plea occurred within the time frame established by the Speedy Trial Act. The government argues against dismissing the case entirely for a defendant who pleads guilty under a lenient agreement rejected by the court. After the withdrawal of the indictment waiver and dismissal of the initial information, the government quickly recharged Page, presenting the case to a grand jury the following month. Although the Speedy Trial Act does not apply when no charges are pending, Page faces a potential five-year prison sentence and a fine of up to $250,000 under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 3623. After her plea agreement was dismissed, she was recharged and notified of a new trial date within the 70 days allowed by the Act, without objection from her despite prior notice. The District Court's decision, which aligns with federal case law regarding sua sponte dismissals, was upheld, with no compelling reason presented by the appellant to overturn the ruling. The decision was affirmed by Senior United States Circuit Judge George C. Edwards, Jr.