Albert Freedman, Administrator of the Estate of Jerry Freedman, Albert and Estelle Freedman v. City of Allentown, Pennsylvania, David M. Howells, Sr., Gerald Monahan, Jr., Carl Balliet, George Lafaver, Robert Hendricks, and Frank Kroboth
Docket: 87-1070
Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; August 10, 1988; Federal Appellate Court
In the case of Albert Freedman, Administrator of the Estate of Jerry Freedman, et al. v. City of Allentown, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is reviewing the dismissal of a complaint alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 related to a jailhouse suicide. The court must assess whether the plaintiffs, led by Albert Freedman, have sufficiently pleaded a viable claim, especially in light of a recent ruling in Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, which allowed for discovery in similar cases involving suicide.
The complaint outlines events from February 7, 1986, when Jerry Freedman was interrogated at the Allentown Police Station for alleged violations of state prescription laws. Freedman was arrested and placed in an isolated cell, away from constant observation. Shortly after his placement, he committed suicide by hanging. The plaintiffs allege that the police officers, including Detective Carl Balliet, were aware of Freedman's suicidal tendencies, as evidenced by visible scars on his wrists and neck, indicative of prior suicide attempts. The claim asserts that the officers failed to take necessary precautions regarding his custody, despite recognizing the risks associated with his mental state.
The complaint includes claims against multiple parties, including the City of Allentown and various police officials, as well as Pennsylvania state tort claims. Additionally, Freedman's parents are seeking damages under § 1983 for their suffering as his guardians. The court's analysis focuses on the allegations presented in the complaint and the necessary legal standards for establishing custodial negligence related to mental health risks.
The complaint alleges that during an interrogation, Balliet communicated with Frank Kroboth, Freedman's state probation officer, who allegedly failed to inform Balliet of Freedman's known suicidal tendencies and previous suicide attempts. It is asserted that there was at least one prior attempted suicide in the jail and one completed suicide by Freedman. The defendants are accused of willful misconduct, claiming their actions were intentional and recklessly disregarded Freedman's rights, rather than mere negligence. Specifically, Kroboth's failure to disclose Freedman's suicidal history is characterized as reckless disregard for Freedman's civil rights. Furthermore, the complaint alleges a city policy that neglected to implement monitoring procedures for detainees with suicidal tendencies and to provide adequate training for officers handling mentally disturbed individuals.
The district court granted a motion to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), determining that the complaint merely alleged negligence without sufficient facts to support claims of intentional or reckless misconduct. While the court acknowledged the presence of scars on Freedman's body as a potential indicator of his mental state, it concluded that these did not necessarily alert the officers to his suicidal tendencies. The court also found that the allegations against Kroboth were insufficient to substantiate claims of intentional misconduct, amounting only to a lack of due care, which is not actionable under Section 1983. Additionally, the court ruled that the allegations related to inadequate training did not provide a valid basis for claims against the City or supervisory personnel. The plaintiff has appealed the dismissal of the complaint. A claim under Section 1983 requires alleging conduct that deprives an individual of rights secured by the Constitution or U.S. laws, necessitating a certain level of factual specificity in the complaint.
The specificity rule in civil rights cases aims to balance the protection of local government officials from trials based on insufficient claims with the rights of plaintiffs injured by unlawful actions. Courts require specific factual allegations to determine if conduct falls under section 1983, allowing amendments when necessary to establish sufficient grounds. If defendants control relevant information, courts may allow reasonable discovery to aid plaintiffs in proving their cases. Each civil rights complaint must be assessed individually, considering whether the alleged conduct could reasonably be seen as a violation of rights. Conclusory allegations like "willful" or "intentional" actions are insufficient; the factual context must support claims. In cases of jail suicides, claims are not automatically dismissed due to the nature of the act, but prison officials are not deemed guarantors of inmate safety. The court must distinguish between constitutional claims and mere negligence, requiring a factual basis that could indicate a violation of rights rather than a state law issue.
A civil rights claim is valid when individual officers take direct actions leading to a prisoner’s suicide, as established in Madden v. City of Meriden. In that case, police forcibly removed a victim from a psychiatric hospital, physically assaulted him, and placed him in an unmonitored cell conducive to hanging. Section 1983 encompasses not only direct actions but also situations where prison officials are aware of a prisoner’s suicidal tendencies and neglect their duty to implement reasonable precautions. For example, in Matje v. Leis, prison employees failed to discover drugs on an inmate despite knowledge of her suicidal behavior. Similarly, in Colburn, a failure to recognize a prisoner’s risk of suicide warranted a claim, as the defendants should have known about the risk.
In the present case, plaintiffs do not claim that the individual officers were aware of Freedman's suicidal tendencies. Instead, they assert that Kroboth, a probation officer, neglected to inform Balliet of Freedman's previous suicide attempt. This differs from Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers of Houston, where the officers were informed of the prisoner's mental state and prior attempts. The plaintiffs argue that Freedman’s visible scars should have indicated suicidal intent to the officers. However, simply failing to recognize these scars constitutes negligence, insufficient for a Section 1983 claim, as supported by Daniels v. Williams. Unlike Colburn, where there were specific allegations suggesting more than negligence, the current case lacks similar compelling evidence linking the officers’ actions to Freedman’s suicide.
Plaintiffs have not established a valid Section 1983 claim against the individual police officers due to a lack of allegations indicating more than negligence regarding their failure to recognize Freedman's suicidal tendencies. Consequently, there is no basis for claims related to the officers’ failure to place Freedman in a specially monitored cell. The district court correctly dismissed the complaint against these officers.
Plaintiffs also allege that the City and supervisory officials maintained a policy that prevented effective monitoring of prisoners with known suicidal tendencies, but this claim lacks factual support. The complaint acknowledges the existence of a booking cell designed for close observation of prisoners. The alleged failure to place Freedman in a monitored cell stemmed from the officers’ inability to identify him as a suicide risk, which the court deemed an instance of mere negligence.
Additionally, plaintiffs claim inadequate training of police officers in handling mentally disturbed individuals. While municipal liability under Section 1983 can arise from deficient training policies, the allegations presented lack factual support to demonstrate that the City intentionally chose not to provide necessary training. Prior case law requires evidence of prior knowledge of similar incidents and circumstances indicating the supervisor's approval of the subordinates' actions, which are not present in this case.
Regarding Kroboth, the state probation officer, allegations suggest he failed to inform Balliet of Freedman’s suicidal tendencies despite knowing about a previous suicide attempt. The court must determine whether this failure constitutes reckless indifference rather than mere negligence.
Kroboth's potential visit to Freedman during his detention does not alter the fact that the failure to inform other detaining officers about Freedman's prior suicide attempt is comparable to the negligent conduct in *Davidson v. Cannon*. In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that negligence does not constitute a valid claim under Section 1983, emphasizing that the Due Process Clause does not require the State to guarantee due care from its officials. The court found no factual basis to suggest Kroboth's actions amounted to more than negligence, leading to the affirmation of the district court's dismissal of the complaint against him. The majority recognized that while not every jail suicide leads to a viable claim against prison officials, there are circumstances under which a suicide may warrant such a claim. The dissenting opinion advocated for a broader application of liability for jail suicides, aligning with the principles established in *Colburn*, which asserts that custodial officials have a duty to avoid acting with reckless indifference to the suicidal tendencies of detainees. The court reiterated that detainees are entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause, regardless of the self-inflicted nature of their injuries, and that liability can arise when officials' actions exceed mere negligence.
Colburn involved an appeal concerning a 12(b)(6) dismissal of a plaintiff's complaint, highlighting the procedural context of the case at dismissal, where no evidence beyond the amended complaint had been presented. The court emphasized that the plaintiff should have a reasonable opportunity for discovery to substantiate claims, noting that merely alleging conduct violating the decedent's rights with minimal factual specificity suffices to meet pleading requirements. The court deemed the allegations against the searching officer and municipal defendants regarding inadequate supervision sufficient to overcome the threshold. However, the majority found the plaintiffs' allegations insufficient in the current case, leading to dissent. The dissenting opinion agreed with the dismissal of claims against Officers LaFaver and Hendricks, citing a lack of allegations indicating their involvement, and also concurred with the dismissal of claims against probation officer Kroboth due to his conduct being a minor breach of duty. Nonetheless, the dissent contested the dismissal of claims against Detective Balliet and municipal defendants, asserting it contradicted the Colburn precedent. The complaint claimed that Detective Balliet interrogated Freedman for over two hours, during which Freedman revealed scars indicative of prior suicide attempts. The plaintiffs argued these actions constituted willful misconduct rather than negligence, asserting a violation of the decedent's rights.
Plaintiffs' allegations that defendants acted recklessly align with the legal standard for imposing Section 1983 liability under Colburn. The critical legal question is whether the allegations support a claim of recklessness rather than mere negligence, particularly regarding a police officer's failure to recognize evident scars on a detainee associated with suicide risks. The majority concludes that such a failure constitutes only negligence, without providing substantial reasoning for this determination.
The dissent argues that the majority overlooks crucial factors, such as the officer's training in suicide risk detection and previous experiences with suicidal individuals, which could demonstrate recklessness. The dissent emphasizes that if the officer had significant experience and training, a reasonable jury could find that he acted with disregard for a known risk of harm. The dissent also critiques the majority’s distinction from Colburn, questioning why the specific facts in Colburn were deemed sufficient for a claim, while the failure to recognize scars was not. The majority's reasoning is perceived as vague, lacking a clear basis for differentiating between the two cases.
Plaintiffs' allegations against Officer Miller in the Colburn case suggest a stronger basis for Sec. 1983 liability compared to those against Detective Balliet in the current case. The focus here is on the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' Sec. 1983 complaint, rather than the strength of the evidence, which will be assessed at trial. The majority asserts that a police officer's failure to identify scars indicating suicidal risk constitutes mere negligence, a view with which the dissenting opinion disagrees, arguing that the complaint meets the necessary "modicum of factual specificity" as required by civil rights statutes, particularly in cases involving deceased complainants.
Regarding the municipal defendants, the majority affirms the dismissal of claims against the City of Allentown and its officials for (1) failing to implement monitoring systems for prisoners with known suicidal tendencies, and (2) inadequately training police officers in handling mentally disturbed individuals. The dissent criticizes this dismissal as inconsistent with the reasoning in Colburn, where similar claims were upheld based on accusations of a "custom of laxity" in supervision. The dissent points out that the majority provides no substantial analysis for its conclusion that there is insufficient factual support for these claims, especially given the precedent set in Colburn, which recognized that informal acts or omissions by officials could imply an official policy and therefore support municipal liability under Sec. 1983. The dissent emphasizes that the complaint's allegations, particularly regarding prior suicides in custody, provide a plausible basis for finding liability against the municipal defendants, indicating that proving a nexus between policy and constitutional infringement, though challenging, is not implausible at this stage.
Plaintiffs' allegations closely mirror those in the Colburn case, asserting that a suicide method used by the decedent had previously occurred with another detainee in the same jail, along with at least one prior suicide. Despite these similarities, the majority opinion dismisses the claims without sufficient justification. The reference to a special monitoring cell, termed the "pink room," is deemed insufficient to undermine the plaintiffs' claims regarding inadequate monitoring, as its effectiveness is unproven at this stage. Dismissing the claim solely based on the existence of this cell is likened to prematurely dismissing claims about inadequate medical facilities merely because an infirmary exists.
Regarding the plaintiffs' claims against municipal defendants for inadequate police training, there is a notable disagreement with the majority's stance. Citing Chinchello v. Fenton, it is emphasized that while this circuit has historically been hesitant to attribute unconstitutional conduct to supervisors through inaction, liability can arise if there is knowledge of prior incidents and a failure to act that may imply approval. The Colburn ruling supports the notion that deficient training policies can lead to Section 1983 liability, particularly when such inadequacy indicates a reckless disregard for individuals' rights.
The court applied the two-pronged Chinchello test in the case of Colburn, determining that the plaintiff's allegations of inadequate training were insufficient, relying primarily on a single incident involving Officer Miller's failure to detect a handgun. Despite this, the Colburn court allowed the plaintiff to amend her complaint, recognizing the challenges civil rights plaintiffs face in meeting factual specificity requirements. The current majority opinion, which finds the plaintiffs' complaint lacks sufficient support for claims against the City, diverges from the precedent set in Colburn. The court noted that civil rights plaintiffs are not required to provide complete evidence at the pleading stage, as much evidence is obtained through discovery. The dissenting opinion argues that the plaintiffs have made adequate allegations to proceed beyond the pleading stage and should be granted the same opportunity to develop their case as the Colburn plaintiff. The court also addressed other claims and procedural matters, including the voluntary dismissal of a claim against the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole and the dismissal of state claims without prejudice. The dissent emphasizes that the plaintiffs should not be denied their claims based solely on the volume of their factual allegations.
