David and Marla Parsons appeal a million-dollar jury verdict in favor of Patricia Culp, who was injured when their dog, Bogey, escaped and caused her to fall. Culp’s claim against the Parsons was based on Florida Statutes section 767.01, which holds dog owners liable for their dogs' actions. The Parsons argued that Culp was comparatively negligent, citing her decisions to approach the dumpster for a better view of Bogey and her failure to secure her dog during the incident. They also attempted to implicate the manufacturer of Bogey's collar, seeking to include it as a Fabre defendant, alleging the collar's defect caused its failure. However, the circuit court denied their motions related to both comparative negligence and the collar's liability before the trial began, ruling that comparative negligence could not apply in a strict liability case. The court referenced prior case law but ultimately concluded that it could not allow the Parsons to hold Culp’s negligence against her in this context.
The Jones court clarified that strict liability under Florida's dog bite statute (section 767.01) does not allow for liability avoidance based on contributory or comparative negligence by the plaintiff or third parties. The court ruled out comparative causation determinations, establishing that if the plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant's dog caused her injury, the defendant remains liable even if other contributing factors exist, as long as the dog's actions substantially contributed to the injury. While the court permitted an intervening cause instruction related to the plaintiff’s conduct, it limited its relevance strictly to causation and not to comparative negligence. The jury was asked if there was an affirmative or aggressive act by the dog that legally caused harm, to which they responded affirmatively. The circuit court upheld this verdict despite the defendants' motions for a new trial and remittitur. The appeal by the Parsons focuses on the circuit court's decision to bar a comparative negligence defense, which the court interpreted based on established case law regarding section 767.01. This statute establishes dog owners' liability for injuries caused by their dogs, effectively treating them as "insurers" for their pets' aggressive acts without needing to prove prior knowledge of the dog's vicious tendencies. This interpretation has evolved since the statute's enactment in 1881, moving away from the common law requirement of demonstrating the owner's knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensities.
Section 767.01 has been interpreted by various courts as establishing a form of strict liability for dog owners, effectively positioning them as insurers against damages caused by their dogs. The case Allstate Ins. Co. v. Greenstein illustrates this by affirming that comparative negligence is not a consideration under this statute, as dog owners are strictly liable for the actions of their pets. However, plaintiffs must still demonstrate causation, as shown in Bozarth v. Barreto, where the court ruled in favor of the defendants based on the lack of proximate cause linking the dog's actions to the plaintiff's injuries.
The Florida Supreme Court addressed the challenges of establishing causation in dog-related injuries in Jones v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co. The court criticized a district court's method of classifying canine behavior to determine liability, questioning how to assess whether a dog's actions are sufficiently active to impose owner responsibility. The court emphasized that a trial should not devolve into expert debates on animal behavior.
Reaffirming section 767.01 as a strict liability statute, the Jones court clarified that liability should not arise solely from a dog’s involvement in an incident unless there is an affirmative or aggressive act by the dog. This position safeguards against imposing liability when a dog is merely a passive participant in an injury. The court also asserted that liability is not contingent upon the dog physically touching the plaintiff and that the contributions of other parties to the injury do not negate the owner's liability. Overall, the court maintained that ordinary causation principles should guide the application of this strict liability statute, rejecting overly complex or metaphysical standards.
The Jones formulary for causation remains largely unchanged in Florida law, establishing that a dog owner is nearly an insurer for non-bite injuries caused by their dog, provided the dog exhibited an "aggressive or affirmative act" that legally caused the injury. Liability under section 767.01 does not require proof of physical contact by the dog but necessitates demonstrating an affirmative action by the dog that proximately caused the injury. Section 767.04, which addresses dog bites, stipulates that owners are liable for injuries from bites regardless of the dog's previous behavior or the owner's awareness of it, although any negligence by the bitten person that contributes to the incident will reduce the owner's liability proportionately. A person is considered lawfully on private property if fulfilling a legal duty or with the owner's expressed or implied invitation. However, owners are not liable if they have prominently displayed a "Bad Dog" sign, except for children under six or if the injury resulted from the owner's negligence. In the case discussed, since the injuries were caused by a fall and not a bite, section 767.04's bite-related defenses do not apply. The interpretation of the statutes follows the supremacy-of-text principle, indicating that section 767.01 was only superseded by section 767.04 concerning dog bites, not general injuries, and the legislature did not intend for "bite" to mean "injury." The intertwining of the two sections has influenced common law interpretations.
In Rattet v. Dual Security Systems, Inc., 373 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), a car dealership employee was injured while attempting to escape from guard dogs. The plaintiff brought claims against the security company under sections 767.01 and 767.04 of the Florida Statutes. The Third District ruled that section 767.04 is a distinct statutory cause of action that replaces common law negligence claims in relevant cases, as supported by the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Donner, 358 So. 2d 24. The legislature intended to make dog owners strictly liable for their dogs' actions, unless the victim provoked the dog or received warnings through signs. The court dismissed the plaintiff's section 767.04 claim since he was not bitten but fell from a fence, and upheld the summary judgment against the section 767.01 claim due to the presence of "bad dog" signs, which constituted a valid defense. The court argued that denying such defenses under section 767.01 would lead to illogical outcomes, including allowing recovery despite provocation or proper signage. A decade later, in Kilpatrick v. Sklar, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed similar principles, ruling that common law defenses, such as the Fireman's Rule, do not apply to statutory claims under sections 767.01 and 767.04. The court endorsed the idea that only statutory defenses, including those added later like comparative negligence, are applicable, maintaining the consistency of the rulings from Rattet through Sklar. This sets the stage for analyzing the merits of the Parsons' argument regarding the application of defenses in strict liability cases.
The court ruled that the Parsons were improperly denied their comparative negligence defense under section 767.04. Although Sklar did not explicitly recede from Jones, it significantly altered the relationship between sections 767.01 and 767.04, marking an evolution in the common law regarding dog-related tort liability. The court emphasized that comparative negligence, added to section 767.04 in 1993, should be available to defendants facing claims under section 767.01, based on the assumption that the legislature was aware of existing common law when amending statutes. Despite Ms. Culp's argument that section 767.04's language regarding "persons bitten" and "dog bites" may not seem applicable, the court found that Sklar and related case law support the application of comparative negligence defenses to non-bite related dog damage claims. The dissent's reluctance to follow Sklar was criticized, as it risks undermining the authority of the Florida Supreme Court and creating legal instability. The court asserted that it must adhere to Sklar unless the Florida Supreme Court decides to modify or overturn it.
In Lewis v. State, the First District Court of Appeal interpreted a statement from the Florida Supreme Court in Brooks v. State regarding aggravated child abuse and felony murder as "dicta," concluding it was not essential to the case's outcome. This interpretation was later challenged in State v. Sturdivant, where the Florida Supreme Court clarified that the Lewis court had mischaracterized the Brooks statement, deeming it a wrongly decided holding rather than dicta. The Supreme Court aligned with Justice Lewis's dissent, emphasizing that the ruling contradicted the felony-murder statute's language and legislative intent.
The document also addresses the applicability of sections 767.01 and 767.04 of the Florida Statutes, which govern dog bite liability. It affirms that these statutes supersede common law negligence claims, establishing strict liability for dog owners while allowing limited exceptions, notably the plaintiff's comparative negligence. The text emphasizes that the Fabre defense, which involves allocating fault to nonparties, is not applicable under the dog bite statutes since they do not encompass such defenses nor are they considered negligence actions. The circuit court's exclusion of the Parsons' proposed Fabre defense is therefore supported by this legal framework.
A third party's comparative fault is not a valid defense against a claim under section 767.01 regarding dog-related injuries, as the court cannot modify the statute's explicit language without legislative action. The circuit court properly excluded evidence related to this defense from the jury. Additionally, the Parsons argue that the circuit court improperly allowed the introduction of invoices showing the total billed amount for Ms. Culp's medical expenses, rather than the reduced amount accepted by providers. This discrepancy amounted to $103,117.69, but the jury was not responsible for determining the amount of Ms. Culp's past medical expenses, as the parties had stipulated to this amount. The Parsons claim that the admission of these bills may have affected the jury's award of noneconomic damages, warranting a new trial, which is evaluated under an abuse of discretion standard. They reference a previous case, Cooperative Leasing, Inc. v. Johnson, which established that the full amount of medical bills should not be included in damages when a plaintiff has received Medicare benefits. Ms. Culp counters that a Florida Supreme Court ruling in Joerg v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. renders the Johnson decision inapplicable regarding Medicare recipients or that the admission of the bills was harmless. This issue was further examined in a subsequent case, Dial v. Calusa Palms Master Ass'n.
Joerg's holding regarding the admissibility of evidence for future medical expenses covered by Medicare was found to be limited, particularly in light of concerns established in Johnson about plaintiffs recovering unpaid past medical expenses. The circuit court erred by allowing past medical bills, paid at a reduced Medicare rate, to be considered by the jury; however, the impact of this error on the jury's overall verdict was deemed minimal, leading to the conclusion that a new trial was not warranted on this basis. The Parsons' request for a new trial was denied, as the jury did not assess past medical expenses nor were economic and noneconomic damages conflated during the trial. The court found no miscarriage of justice regarding the jury's verdict. Conversely, the circuit court's exclusion of evidence related to the alleged manufacturing defect in Bogey's collar warranted a new trial solely on the issue of comparative fault, as this exclusion affected the Parsons' comparative negligence defense. The ruling mandates a remand limited to the comparative fault issue, affirming the rest of the judgment.
The statutory defenses in Florida's dog-bite statute (section 767.04) do not apply to causes of action under the dog-damage statute (section 767.01). While the Florida Supreme Court's ruling in *Kilpatrick v. Sklar* indicates that defenses in section 767.04 are relevant to section 767.01 claims, such pronouncements are considered dicta and not binding precedent. The only issue in *Sklar* was regarding a common law defense (the Fireman's Rule), and the court established that common law defenses do not apply to statutory causes of action under sections 767.01 and 767.04. Therefore, the court's agreement with the Third District's view that defenses from section 767.04 also apply to section 767.01 was nonessential and not controlling. Dicta, which refers to statements in judicial opinions that are unnecessary for the case's resolution, lacks the binding nature of legal precedent. Although lower courts should respect the Supreme Court's opinions, they are not obligated to follow dicta, which may offer guidance but does not carry the force of law.
Supreme Court dicta holds persuasive weight but is subordinate to binding Supreme Court decisions. In the absence of a conflicting ruling, such dicta can influence lower courts, as noted in O'Sullivan v. City of Deerfield Beach. The majority recognizes that the statement in Sklar regarding section 767.04 defenses applying to section 767.01 claims contradicts the earlier ruling in Jones, where the Florida Supreme Court asserted that section 767.01 does not allow for liability avoidance based on comparative negligence. The Court has consistently advised against lower courts interpreting subsequent dicta as overruling prior express holdings without explicit direction. Moreover, the principle established in Puryear mandates that when faced with a specific issue, lower courts should adhere to the earlier decision until the Supreme Court formally revises it. The Jones decision addressed common law defenses, as statutory comparative negligence had not been adopted at that time, and the subsequent addition of such defenses to section 767.04 creates a conflict with the prior ruling regarding section 767.01. The Sklar case did not pertain to statutory defenses but to the applicability of common law defenses in claims under section 767.01. Therefore, the reference in Sklar to the applicability of section 767.04 defenses should not outweigh the explicit legislative action regarding comparative negligence limited to section 767.04.
The majority opinion emphasizes adherence to the text of legislative pronouncements, invoking the 'supremacy-of-text principle'—that the context and meaning of a governing text take precedence. While district courts must follow Florida Supreme Court holdings, they are not required to adhere to dicta that conflict with statutory language. Clear statutory language must prevail over conflicting judicial interpretations, particularly when the legislature's intent is explicitly stated. The dissenting opinion argues against the majority's reversal and remand for a new trial regarding the comparative negligence defense, asserting that the trial court correctly excluded this defense in cases under section 767.01. The dissent agrees with the majority's conclusions regarding the exclusion of comparative fault defenses related to third-party products liability and the denial of a new trial based on erroneous evidence of past medical expenses.
