47 Fair empl.prac.cas. 813, 47 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 38,166 Patricia Ann Stache v. International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, Afl-Cio Inland Empire Brickmason Joint Apprenticeship Committee, Patricia A. Stache v. Bricklayers and Tile Setters Union, Local 20 Inland Empire Brickmason Joint Apprenticeship Committee Masonry Builders, Inc., and International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, Afl-Cio

Citation: 852 F.2d 1231Docket: 86-6551

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; August 1, 1988; Federal Appellate Court

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The case involves Patricia Ann Stache's sex discrimination claims against the International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, AFL-CIO, and its local affiliate, Bricklayers and Tile Setters Local Union 20. Stache, the first woman to enroll in the apprenticeship program in 1980, faced intimidation, humiliation, and sexual harassment from local officials and peers. She alleged that Local 20 denied her job referrals, concealed employment information, and took no action against employers who discriminated based on her gender.

Stache filed multiple complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH), initially naming Local 20 in her charges, which included allegations of denied referrals, lack of a union card, and exclusion from orientation. The International Union was aware of the situation but did not engage in the EEOC or DFEH proceedings. The court assessed the procedural implications of Stache's failure to name the International in her administrative complaints, concluding this omission rendered her subsequent suit against the International procedurally defective, resulting in the reversal of the district court's decision regarding the International Union.

Stache filed a federal complaint against the International, Local 20, and the JAC, alleging violations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The International asserted an affirmative defense, claiming Stache's failure to name it in prior administrative complaints barred her from pursuing her claims. The district court instructed the jury that if Stache filed charges without naming a defendant, liability could be established only if a reasonable investigation would have included claims against that defendant. The jury found all defendants liable under FEHA, awarding damages to Stache. The court also found violations of Title VII and granted Stache an injunction against discrimination, lost pay, and attorney fees apportioned among the defendants, which Stache appeals, seeking full payment from the International. The International cross-appeals, questioning jurisdiction. Local 20 is in bankruptcy and did not appeal, while the JAC and AFL-CIO filed no appeals but supported the International. The discussion highlights that while filing an EEOC complaint is necessary before suing under Title VII, this requirement is not jurisdictional and can be waived. In contrast, California law mandates that state administrative remedies be exhausted before bringing a FEHA action, and judicial review is barred until such exhaustion occurs. The courts favor a liberal construction of filings to protect those with limited legal knowledge.

An employee can pursue Title VII claims in federal court for incidents not included in a prior EEOC charge if the new claims are “like or reasonably related” to the original allegations. However, if the claims are not closely related, a second EEOC investigation is necessary before a Title VII suit can proceed. In the case of Stache, her complaint alleged that the International failed to assist her regarding Local 20's discriminatory actions; however, her EEOC claims only specified Local 20's direct actions. The International's alleged inaction does not relate closely enough to Local 20's discrimination to avoid the need for a second EEOC investigation. Furthermore, the International lacked a direct contractual relationship with Stache’s employer for Title VII liability. Stache's EEOC claims did not sufficiently implicate the International, and there was no obligation for the International to act on her behalf. If a complainant does not name a defendant in their EEOC charges or provide facts indicating discrimination by that defendant, a Title VII action against them is considered premature. The International timely raised Stache's failure to comply with Title VII’s conditions precedent, which Stache did not meet. The court concluded that the International did not waive these conditions. While recognizing the policy favoring liberal construction of complaints, the court found that attributing Stache’s claims against Local 20 to the International would contradict the aims of Title VII. The failure to name the International in the DFEH complaint also barred that claim. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s judgment against the International and instructed to dismiss the complaint. Stache’s appeal regarding the allocation of attorney fees was also impacted by the ruling, leading to the vacating of the attorney fees awarded against the International, as she is no longer a prevailing party concerning that defendant. The matter of attorney fees against the other defendants may be reconsidered in light of this opinion.

The court reversed and remanded the case, with Judge Samuel P. King presiding. It declined to determine whether the conduct in question violated Title VII. Stache had sent a letter to the International, alleging misconduct by Local 20 and seeking assistance, but the International claimed it did not receive the letter. Under federal and California law, properly addressed and mailed letters create a presumption of receipt; however, Stache's letter lacked a street address, negating this presumption. Consequently, when a recipient denies receipt of an improperly addressed letter, the trier of fact must evaluate the denial against the proof of mailing. The district court's instruction to the jury that the International was presumed to be aware of the Local's actions based on Stache's letter was deemed legally incorrect.