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United States v. Gonzolo Gonzales
Citations: 852 F.2d 1214; 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 10030; 1988 WL 77072Docket: 88-3149
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; July 28, 1988; Federal Appellate Court
Gonzolo Gonzales' emergency motion for bond pending trial was denied by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. A magistrate in the Central District of California initially ordered his detention on March 18, 1988, citing concerns of community danger and flight risk. After his transfer to the Western District of Washington, Gonzales was arraigned on April 19, 1988, where he was again ordered detained based on similar concerns. He appealed this detention order to the district court, which failed to hold a hearing within the required timeframe of 36 days, instead conducting it on June 24, 1988, where his motion was denied. Gonzales argued that the delay violated his right to a prompt hearing as mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b), which lacks a definition of "promptly" or specified remedies for delays. The court referenced its previous ruling in United States v. Fernandez-Alfonso, where a similar delay was deemed a violation of the promptness requirement. However, the court distinguished Gonzales' case due to findings of danger to the community, emphasizing that releasing a dangerous individual contradicts Congressional intent and societal safety. The court declined to extend Fernandez-Alfonso's conditional release remedy to cases involving identified dangers. Gonzales' requests for conditional release and a stay of the trial date were both denied. Judge Poole dissented, asserting that the Bail Act's promptness requirement must be strictly adhered to, aligning with the previous decision in Fernandez-Alfonso. The district court failed to promptly address Gonzales' motion for bail revocation, neglecting the requirement for expediency established in prior case law (Fernandez-Alfonso). Gonzales was arrested on March 11, 1988, and ordered detained without bail on March 18. After being transferred to the Western District of Washington, a motion for bail revocation was filed on May 17 but not addressed until June 24, resulting in a 38-day delay. During the hearing, the district judge, relying on the initial detention order and citing the complexity of the case due to co-defendants' motions, denied bail. The judge expressed concerns regarding community safety and flight risk, noting the severity of Gonzales' involvement with cocaine distribution and the unavailability of effective monitoring options. The court's order, issued on June 29, concluded that no conditions could assure Gonzales' appearance at trial or community safety, but failed to adequately consider the specific conditions outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3142, lacking substantive factual support for the decision. On July 5, 1988, Gonzales filed an appeal from a district court order, but the court did not respond until July 13, granting the government a week to respond to an emergency motion for bond pending trial. The trial was set to begin on July 18 without the court being informed of this timeline. As the trial commenced as scheduled, the suggestion arose that no relief could be granted since the trial was underway. The court rejected this notion, emphasizing the need for prompt action despite the trial's commencement, referencing precedent from Fernandez-Alfonso. The court expressed dissatisfaction with the neglect shown towards the urgency of Gonzales's motion and called for a stay of the trial. It instructed the district court to conduct a meaningful hearing under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142 to assess whether there are reasonable conditions that could ensure the defendant's appearance and public safety without detention. The court underscored the importance of upholding the defendant’s constitutional rights and the Bail Act, asserting that ignoring the statutory requirement for promptness and the right to bail undermines the administration of justice. Furthermore, the court indicated that while requiring the district court to act does not guarantee the defendant's release, it reinforces the significance of constitutional protections in legal proceedings. Lastly, it noted that the purpose of a pre-removal detention hearing is to determine if the arrestee should be released on bail or summons while awaiting return to the charge's originating district.