United States v. George Robert Gorski

Citations: 852 F.2d 692; 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 10058Docket: 1195

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; July 26, 1988; Federal Appellate Court

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Robert Gorski entered a conditional guilty plea on November 30, 1987, for conspiracy to distribute cocaine, following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence and statements made post-arrest by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The appeal concerns the legality of evidence obtained during his arrest and the admissibility of his statements. 

The case originated from an investigation initiated by FBI Special Agent Richard Foster, based on information received from Alfred Catucci, who reported contacts with Gorski, referred to as "Whitey." Gorski was under surveillance when he arrived at Bradley Airport on April 16, 1987. During a monitored meeting with Ron Catucci, Gorski discussed cocaine distribution, revealing his source, Ralph Yanes, and proposed arrangements for transporting cocaine from Florida to Connecticut. Subsequent recorded conversations between Ron Catucci and Yanes confirmed the price of cocaine and Gorski's involvement in the logistics. 

The Court of Appeals, comprising Circuit Judges and a District Judge, affirmed parts of the lower court's decision while reversing and remanding other aspects for further proceedings.

On April 26, 1987, Ron Catucci informed Foster that Gorski, who had contacted Catucci about cocaine delivery, was in the New Haven area. The next day, Gorski called Catucci, indicating he was near the Hartford train station and expected a cocaine delivery around 5:00 p.m., suggesting a meeting at a restaurant at 4:00 p.m. Foster equipped Catucci with a transmitter and sent him to meet Gorski. During their conversation, overheard by FBI agents, Gorski mentioned a courier arriving by bus at approximately 5:30 p.m. 

At about 6 p.m., surveillance agents reported that Gorski had met a person and was carrying a bag. Foster observed Gorski with a man matching the courier's description, and agents arrested them both along with Catucci. During the arrest, Foster seized a black vinyl bag from Gorski, which he identified as resembling packaging typically used for a kilogram of cocaine. 

Gorski and the other individual, Joseph Cabrera, were informed of their rights. Gorski declined to make a statement, and both men were taken to the FBI office for processing. Foster conducted a field test on a sample from the bag, which tested positive for cocaine, and subsequent lab tests confirmed its contents. 

On June 10, 1987, Gorski filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the bag and his statements to Foster. The district court ruled that the warrantless search of the bag was not justified by the arrest or exigent circumstances but ultimately found the discovery of the evidence was inevitable, referencing Nix v. Williams. The court also denied the motion to suppress Gorski's statements, determining they were made voluntarily without prompting. Foster argued the search was a lawful arrest incident and a security measure. The court acknowledged that prior events gave the agents probable cause to believe Gorski and Cabrera were involved in delivering cocaine, justifying the arrests and the seizure of the bag.

An immediate warrantless search of a bag is only permissible under exigent circumstances, which are narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement. Exigent circumstances arise when the societal costs of obtaining a warrant, such as potential danger to law enforcement or the risk of losing or destroying evidence, outweigh the need for a neutral magistrate's approval. In this case, the district court determined that exigent circumstances were absent since the bag, belonging to Cabrera, was secured by law enforcement and inaccessible to either defendant after their arrests. The court found no risk of harm to agents or loss of evidence, rejecting the government's claim that the search was lawful as incident to the arrests. The court also dismissed the government's argument that the search was valid under an established inventory procedure, citing a lack of support in the record. Consequently, the initial search was ruled unlawful. However, the court denied the motion to suppress the evidence based on the inevitable discovery doctrine, referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Nix v. Williams, which allows unlawfully obtained evidence to be admitted if it can be shown that it would have been discovered through lawful means anyway. This doctrine aims to balance societal interests in deterring police misconduct with the need for juries to have access to all relevant evidence.

The inventory search of Gorski's bag at the FBI office was deemed lawful following his arrest, in accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in *Illinois v. Lafayette*. In that case, the Supreme Court established that police may search containers in the possession of an arrested individual as part of routine booking procedures, even without probable cause or a search warrant. This practice aims to remove dangerous items, prevent theft or mismanagement of property, and mitigate false claims regarding police conduct.

Subsequently, in *United States v. Lartey*, the Second Circuit noted that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to determine whether a similar search was part of a standardized inventory procedure. The court indicated that if such a procedure was confirmed, the evidence would be admissible under the precedent set by *Illinois v. Lafayette*.

In Gorski's case, law enforcement had been monitoring him prior to the arrest and was aware of his involvement in a cocaine transaction. It was established that, regardless of the bag's search, Gorski would have been processed at the FBI office and subjected to an inventory search of his belongings. The district court concluded that the bag's contents would have been revealed through the inventory process, independent of any illegal search that may have occurred.

The court confirmed that Foster's search of the bag at the FBI office would have inevitably led to the discovery of cocaine; however, it found no evidence to support that an inventory search was a routine procedure at that specific FBI office. The only reference to such a search was Foster's brief testimony. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's denial of Gorski's motion to suppress the evidence from the bag and remanded for a hearing to determine if an inventory search was indeed standard procedure. If established, the cocaine would be deemed admissible under the Nix v. Williams precedent. 

Gorski's statements to Agent Foster were ruled admissible, with evidence showing he was informed of his Miranda rights twice and later agreed to speak voluntarily, without coercion. The court upheld the district court's denial of the motion to suppress these statements. Circuit Judge Lumbard concurred regarding the admissibility of Gorski's statements but dissented on remanding for further inquiry into the inventory search routine. Lumbard argued that agents had probable cause based on prior overheard conversations and that the bag was subject to immediate search upon Gorski's arrest without needing an inventory search. He emphasized that a search for weapons is permissible and any evidence found during such a search can be seized. Lumbard would affirm the judgment in all respects.