Singh v. Singh

Citation: Not availableDocket: 28057

Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina; September 8, 2021; South Carolina; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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In the case Gunjit Rick Singh v. Simran P. Singh, the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed whether child custody and visitation issues could be submitted to binding arbitration without family court oversight or appellate review. The Court concluded that such a practice is not permitted under South Carolina law. 

The background of the case involves a separation after nearly seventeen years of marriage, during which Simran Singh (the Mother) and Gunjit Singh (the Father) reached a settlement agreement addressing custody and visitation of their two children. Under this agreement, the Mother was granted primary custody, and they agreed to submit future disputes regarding child support and visitation to an arbitrator, with the understanding that the arbitrator's decisions would be binding and non-appealable. The family court approved this agreement in February 2013.

Subsequently, the Father sought modifications to custody and visitation, arguing that the Mother violated the agreement by not returning to South Carolina with the children after a speaking tour. Throughout 2014, various family court judges dealt with this case, with some affirming the parties' choice to arbitrate disputes. The arbitration provisions in the agreements were progressively strengthened, although initial agreements did not explicitly include custody matters. 

Ultimately, an arbitrator issued a final award granting temporary custody to the Father, later confirmed by a family court judge. The outcome reinforced the Court's position on the limitations of arbitration concerning custody and visitation disputes, ensuring that such matters remain subject to judicial oversight.

Mother, represented by new counsel, filed a motion for emergency relief shortly after the arbitrator's final award and prior to the family court's approval, seeking to vacate arbitration awards and earlier court orders related to arbitration. The family court confirmed both the partial and final arbitration awards as final and denied Mother's motion as premature. Over time, four different family court judges approved the agreements to arbitrate, sometimes without a hearing. The family court indicated that changes in circumstances could allow either party to seek modifications to the agreement concerning their children.

In January 2014, following Father's request to modify custody, the family court approved an arbitration agreement that included custody issues, declaring the arbitrator's decision final and unappealable. In March, the parties amended the agreement to include a $10,000 penalty for challenging the arbitrator's decision, and in August, a supplemental amended agreement acknowledged the lack of express authorization for arbitrating children's issues, while releasing claims against the arbitrator and attorneys for exceeding their authority.

Mother filed five Rule 60(b)(4) motions to vacate all orders approving the arbitration agreements but requested consolidation for efficiency, which was denied. As a result, five separate hearings occurred, all denying her motions. Mother then appealed these denials, and the court of appeals consolidated the cases, ultimately ruling in December 2019 that the parties could not eliminate the family court's jurisdiction over custody, visitation, and child support issues. This ruling followed another decision asserting the family court lacked jurisdiction to approve binding arbitration for children's issues. The case was granted certiorari due to differing grounds in the court of appeals' decisions, with the key issue being whether the family court erred in concluding it could not delegate its exclusive jurisdiction regarding the child's best interest. Appellate review is typically de novo for family court decisions, except for evidentiary and procedural rulings, which are reviewed for abuse of discretion. The consolidated appeal revolves around the family court's authority to delegate jurisdiction to an arbitrator, a legal question for de novo review.

Family courts in South Carolina are established by the General Assembly under Article V, section 12 of the South Carolina Constitution, possessing limited jurisdiction defined by statute. Specifically, S.C. Code Ann. 63-3-530 grants the family court exclusive authority over forty-six designated matters. This jurisdiction extends only to matters expressly stated or implied by statute. Notably, subsection 63-3-530(39) allows the family court to mandate mediation and approve consensual arbitration, provided it complies with court rules and South Carolina law; however, parties must unanimously agree on any mediator.

While the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Rules allow for mediation and arbitration in family court, they restrict binding arbitration to property and alimony disputes. Specifically, Rule 3(a) requires mediation for all contested domestic relations issues unless the parties opt for arbitration, and Rule 4(d) allows early mediation for custody or visitation disputes but permits binding arbitration only for property and alimony issues. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius supports the interpretation that since arbitration for children's matters is not explicitly permitted in the rules, it is excluded by implication.

This interpretation aligns with prior case law, including Moseley v. Mosier, which asserts that family courts retain the jurisdiction to act in the best interests of children, regardless of separation agreements. The court also referenced Ex parte Messer, which involved a separation agreement with an arbitration clause, reaffirming the family court's authority over children's issues.

The court invalidated a provision for lacking conspicuousness, emphasizing that, except for child-related matters, parties in a separation agreement can contractually avoid ongoing court supervision. A year after the Messer case, the court of appeals distinguished between arbitrating child-related issues and matters of property and alimony in Swentor v. Swentor, where it upheld an arbitration award for property and alimony but specifically excluded child support and custody from arbitration. The court rejected Father's argument that the General Assembly approved arbitration for children's issues, interpreting statutes and court rules as intentionally excluding such matters. The court also clarified that the language from Messer and Swentor regarding the separation of children's issues from property and alimony was essential to those rulings, not merely dicta. The court highlighted the constitutional rights of children, asserting that the family court has a duty under the parens patriae doctrine to protect these rights, which cannot be waived through arbitration. It stated that parents cannot bypass state protection for children by agreeing to binding arbitration without judicial review. The court found that two family court judges had denied Mother's Rule 60(b) motions, with one judge indicating that she was estopped from disputing the validity of court orders and the arbitration award. Father argued that Mother did not appeal the estoppel ruling, making it the law of the case. However, the court determined that Mother adequately challenged the estoppel findings in both family court and on appeal, asserting that she raised sufficient objections regarding the focus on parental conduct instead of children's constitutional rights.

Mother asserted that constitutional rights cannot be waived by parents, highlighting the nuanced relationship between waiver and estoppel, which can be difficult to distinguish. Citing relevant case law, she argued that the lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and must be recognized by appellate courts, thereby challenging the procedural doctrines invoked by Father. The court affirmed the court of appeals' modified opinion, which vacated the arbitration award and the orders allowing arbitration of child-related issues, maintaining custody with Father until the Charleston County Family Court issues a new order. Despite Father’s claim that Mother did not appeal the estoppel finding, the court found that she adequately contested those findings, emphasizing that precise legal terminology is not necessary if the objections are clear. The court reiterated that preservation rules should not be a trap for attorneys and that it is prudent to address merits when preservation is ambiguous.