John Henry Ramirez was convicted of capital murder in Texas and sentenced to death. After exhausting state-court appeals and being denied habeas corpus relief, the State set his execution date for September 8, 2021. Ramirez filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Texas's execution methods would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). His motion for a stay of execution was denied by the district court, which he has appealed.
The court denied the stay, with Chief Judge Priscilla R. Owen concurring. She agreed with the district court's finding that Ramirez did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on his First Amendment claims. However, she disagreed with Judge Dennis regarding the RLUIPA claims, emphasizing the complexity of administering execution drugs. The State contended that the Federal Bureau of Prisons restricts physical and verbal contact between spiritual advisors and condemned individuals in execution chambers. Although the court could not verify these claims due to time constraints, it noted that Ramirez had the opportunity to challenge them but did not.
Additionally, Ramirez's prior assertion that physical contact was unnecessary contrasted with his current request for such contact with his spiritual advisor during execution, raising concerns about the strategic nature of his litigation to delay the execution. The court concluded that the State's policy regarding spiritual advisors during executions was the least restrictive means to achieve its compelling government interest in maintaining order and safety. Thus, the district court's decision was upheld as a proper exercise of discretion.
John Henry Ramirez argues that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s (TDCJ) execution policy, which prohibits his spiritual advisor from physically touching him during lethal injection, violates his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the First Amendment. The policy allows spiritual advisors to be present in the execution chamber but restricts any physical contact. The court reviews such denials with strict scrutiny, requiring the state to show that its policy serves a compelling interest using the least restrictive means. The execution procedure in Texas permits spiritual advisors to be with the inmate prior to execution but limits their role during the actual process. Concerns about the complexities and risks of administering lethal injection without medical personnel involved were highlighted, supporting the state’s policy against non-medical contact. Circuit Judge James L. Dennis dissents, emphasizing that Ramirez's constitutional claims warrant a stay of execution for further consideration, arguing that the majority has not adequately addressed the potential merits of Ramirez's lawsuit challenging the execution policy.
In 2008, Ramirez was convicted of capital murder in Texas and sentenced to death, with an execution date set for September 8, 2021. On August 10, 2021, he filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging a policy adopted by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) on April 21, 2021. A § 1983 action does not automatically stay execution, and the burden is on the party requesting the stay to demonstrate justification for judicial discretion, as outlined in Nken v. Holder. The district court evaluates four factors when considering a stay: likelihood of success on the merits, potential for irreparable injury, impact on other parties, and public interest, with the first two factors being most critical.
The district court concluded that Ramirez was not entitled to a stay regarding his Free Exercise Clause claim. However, there is disagreement on his Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) claim, with the dissenting opinion suggesting that Ramirez has demonstrated entitlement to a stay based on RLUIPA's broader protections for religious liberty compared to First Amendment standards. Under RLUIPA, the government must not impose a substantial burden on religious exercise unless it meets a strict scrutiny standard. This involves an initial burden on the inmate to show a substantial burden, after which the burden shifts to the government to justify its policy.
'Religious exercise' is broadly defined under RLUIPA, and the sincerity of Ramirez's religious beliefs regarding audible prayer and physical contact with a pastor during execution is acknowledged. The critical issue is whether the TDCJ policy imposes a substantial burden on his religious practices. Recent Supreme Court cases, specifically Gutierrez v. Saenz and Dunn v. Smith, are cited as pertinent to the assessment of spiritual advisor claims under RLUIPA.
The Supreme Court addressed policies in Texas and Alabama that barred spiritual advisors from execution chambers. Following the Gutierrez case, Texas amended its policy to allow such presence, highlighting that Ramirez's challenge to the current Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) policy aligns with the issues raised in Gutierrez and Smith. In Gutierrez, the court vacated a stay of execution, asserting that while the absence of a spiritual advisor might limit spiritual comfort, it was not a substantial burden on religious exercise. However, the Supreme Court later granted a stay and directed further factual findings regarding security concerns related to allowing a spiritual advisor, suggesting that Gutierrez demonstrated a substantial burden on his religious exercise.
In Smith, the Court upheld an injunction against Alabama's policy prohibiting Willie Smith’s minister from being present during his execution, with Justice Kagan's concurrence emphasizing that such a prohibition imposed a substantial burden on Smith’s religious practice. Similarly, Ramirez contends that the presence of Pastor Moore is crucial to his faith, involving practices like laying on of hands and audible prayer, which are significant in his religious tradition. The district court acknowledged the sincerity of Ramirez’s beliefs but ruled otherwise regarding the burden imposed by the policy. The analysis indicates that, following the precedents set in Gutierrez and Smith, the current TDCJ policy substantially burdens Ramirez's religious exercise, and the district court's determination to the contrary constituted an abuse of discretion.
Gutierrez and Smith support Ramirez's argument for a stay, asserting he has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Once Ramirez shows a substantial burden on his religious exercise, the burden shifts to the State to prove that its policy meets RLUIPA's strict scrutiny standard. Ramirez has established this burden, while the State failed to demonstrate that its policy is the least restrictive means of achieving its compelling interest in execution security. The district court erroneously placed the burden on Ramirez to disprove the least restrictive means, which constitutes an abuse of discretion. The State must specifically justify why its prohibition of audible prayer and physical contact is necessary in this case, rather than relying on general security concerns. The opinions of Chief Judge Owen and Judge Higginbotham do not hold the State accountable to the rigorous standard required by RLUIPA. Ramirez has shown the importance of having his pastor present during execution, and the State has not adequately justified its policy as the least restrictive means. Therefore, Ramirez has made a compelling case for likely success on the merits of his RLUIPA claim.
A stay of execution is warranted in Ramirez's case, as other factors favor him and allow the district court to address significant issues. The role of a spiritual advisor, such as a pastor, is questioned, particularly their ability to provide spiritual support through prayer and physical presence during execution. Ramirez raises these concerns, which relate to recent Supreme Court decisions in Gutierrez and Smith, highlighting the need for judicial review. Although it is uncertain whether Ramirez will ultimately succeed in his RLUIPA claim or if the State can justify its policy under RLUIPA's standards, denying the stay risks inflicting irreparable harm on Ramirez by executing him in a manner that could infringe on his religious rights before his claims are fully adjudicated. Thus, the dissent emphasizes the need for a stay to allow for proper legal consideration of these rights.
