Rafath Quraishi, M.D. v. San Juanita Ochoa

Docket: 13-20-00405-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; August 31, 2021; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Rafath Quraishi, M.D. appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss a lawsuit filed by San Juanita Ochoa, claiming her allegations stem from a health care liability that requires an expert report under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 74. Ochoa, who worked at Quraishi's clinic for five years, alleges she was subjected to verbal and physical abuse during her employment, culminating in her termination on June 20, 2018, under aggressive circumstances. She claims Quraishi physically assaulted her while she attempted to collect her personal belongings, blocking her exit until her son intervened. Ochoa's lawsuit, filed on October 30, 2019, includes claims of false imprisonment and assault.

Quraishi argues that the nature of Ochoa's claims qualifies as health care liability because he is a health care provider and alleges that Ochoa had stolen patient records on the day of her termination. He asserts that when confronted, Ochoa threatened him with a hammer, leading him to instruct employees to detain her until police arrived. Although the police returned some files, this incident is not corroborated by the police report, and Ochoa denies any wrongdoing. In response to Quraishi's motion to dismiss filed on June 5, 2020, Ochoa contends that her lawsuit does not require an expert report and characterizes Quraishi's motions as attempts to delay the proceedings. The court ultimately affirms the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss.

On June 1, 2020, the trial court held a hearing regarding a motion to stay, followed by a hearing on July 16, 2020, concerning a motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied on August 25, 2020, leading Quraishi to appeal the dismissal decision. The appellate court reviews a trial court's dismissal under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 74.351 for abuse of discretion, which occurs if the court acts arbitrarily or fails to apply the law correctly. A trial court cannot misinterpret the law, and clear misapplication constitutes abuse of discretion. The classification of a claim as a health care liability claim is a legal question reviewed de novo, requiring courts to examine the entire court record and the nature of the plaintiff’s claim rather than its label. Under Chapter 74, if a claim qualifies as a health care liability claim, the plaintiff must serve an expert report within 120 days of the defendant's answer; failure to do so results in mandatory dismissal with prejudice. The Texas Medical Liability Act aims to balance the elimination of frivolous claims while protecting valid ones, requiring that health care liability claims meet specific criteria, including the involvement of a health care provider and the connection of the claims to medical treatment or standards of care. A rebuttable presumption arises that a claim is a health care liability claim if it involves the health care provider's conduct during patient care.

To rebut a health care liability claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) the allegation does not involve a complaint about medical or health care services beyond the alleged offensive contact; 2) the offensive contact was not consensual; and 3) the only link between the offensive contact and medical services is the context of the incident. In this case, the defendant physician, Quraishi, satisfies the first and third elements, as Ochoa alleges his actions caused her injury. The analysis primarily focuses on whether Ochoa’s claims pertain to medical treatment or deviations from accepted medical standards. Evidence shows that patient records were involved in the incident, with testimonies indicating Ochoa attempted to take patient files during her termination. This creates a presumption that the lawsuit may constitute a health care liability claim.

However, Ochoa successfully rebuts this presumption by alleging false imprisonment and assault, without any complaints about Quraishi's medical services apart from the offensive conduct. Additionally, Ochoa did not consent to the physical actions taken against her, such as being grabbed or locked in an office. Thus, the case does not qualify as a health care liability claim according to the Texas Supreme Court's standards.

The relationship between the alleged actions and the 'rendition of medical services or healthcare' is limited to their occurrence at Quraishi’s clinic, the Miramar Interventional Pain Center. Citing Drewery v. Adventist Health Sys./Tex. Inc., the court emphasizes that if the essence of the plaintiff's case is intentional assault, the court should prioritize the intentional conduct rather than secondary consequences related to medical procedures. In Brown v. Nocar, it was determined that claims of sexual assault occurring in a medical office do not constitute health care liability claims. Ochoa successfully rebuts the health care liability presumption, and the case is characterized as an employment dispute involving allegations of physical altercation and possible theft. Consequently, Ochoa was not obligated to file an expert report under Texas law. The trial court's denial of Quraishi’s motion to dismiss is upheld, and the judgment is affirmed.