Donald H. Wakefield and Barry J. Smith v. Harold E. Mathews
Docket: 87-2212
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; July 22, 1988; Federal Appellate Court
Employees of a school district, Donald H. Wakefield and Barry J. Smith, brought a discrimination suit against Harold E. Mathews and others, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on age and race. Following a settlement agreement, which included payments of $33,000 to Wakefield and $5,000 to Smith, the plaintiffs sought attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court denied their application, ruling that the plaintiffs had waived their right to fees in the settlement agreement, which contained a comprehensive release of claims against the defendants but did not explicitly mention attorneys' fees. The defendants argued that the waiver of fees was implied by discussions during settlement negotiations. The district judge, who had overseen the settlement, found that the breadth of the release indicated an intention to waive attorneys' fees and noted the absence of a referral to the trial court regarding any fee issues. The court highlighted that federal law generally entitles prevailing plaintiffs to attorneys' fees unless there is a waiver. The appeal addressed whether such a waiver existed in this case. Settlements of attorneys' fees in civil rights cases present complex issues. Before the Supreme Court's ruling in *Evans v. Jeff D.*, the Ninth Circuit disallowed negotiating attorneys' fees alongside civil rights claims due to potential conflicts of interest. The Third Circuit's decision in *Prandini v. National Tea Co.* supported this view, asserting that fee negotiations should occur only after court approval of the settlement for the underlying action. In contrast, the Supreme Court's ruling in *Evans v. Jeff D.* established that simultaneous settlements of merits and fees are permissible, allowing attorneys to waive fees even under protest when necessary for settlement acceptance. In the current case, the settlement was negotiated after the *Evans* decision, eliminating any legal barriers to waiving fees. Appellants argue that a settlement agreement must explicitly state a waiver of attorneys' fees to be valid, citing Third Circuit precedents where silence on fees indicated no waiver. However, the settlement in question included a broad release of all claims and "costs or expenses," distinguishing it from prior cases where such explicit language was absent or deleted following objections. The court found that the agreement's language was comprehensive and did not suggest any intent to reserve the right to seek attorneys' fees. It concluded that the waiver of attorneys' fees was valid under Section 1988, affirming the lower court's decision.