Ronald Lachman and Mary Ann Lachman, on Behalf of Benjamin Lachman, a Minor v. Illinois State Board of Education East Maine School District 63 and Maine Township Special Education Program
Docket: 87-2518
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; July 18, 1988; Federal Appellate Court
Benjamin Lachman, a profoundly deaf seven-year-old, resides in East Maine School District No. 63 and is eligible for the Regional Hearing Impaired Program (RHIP) through the Maine Township Special Education Program (MSTEP). His parents, Ronald and Mary Ann Lachman, disagree with the school district regarding his educational placement, leading them to file a lawsuit under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA). The Lachmans advocate for Benjamin to attend a neighborhood school with a full-time cued speech instructor, while the school district proposes that he spend part of his day in a self-contained classroom with other hearing-impaired children, promoting a total communication approach that primarily uses sign language.
As Benjamin approached kindergarten in Spring 1986, the conflict intensified, resulting in due process hearings at both local and state levels, which upheld the school district's placement recommendations. On November 15, 1986, the Lachmans filed a lawsuit against the school district, MSTEP, and the Illinois State Board of Education, claiming that the proposed Individualized Education Program (IEP) did not provide a free appropriate public education as mandated by the EAHCA. They seek an order for Benjamin to be educated in his local school with cued speech support and request an injunction against placing him in a self-contained classroom or requiring him to learn sign language as an educational goal.
The district court's analysis followed the Supreme Court's interpretation in Rowley regarding the procedural and substantive requirements of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA). The Act aims to provide handicapped children access to public education through specialized services, without mandating a specific level of education. A court must first verify compliance with statutory procedures and then assess if the individualized education program (IEP) is likely to provide educational benefits. If these criteria are satisfied, the obligations under the Act are fulfilled, and courts should not impose their educational preferences on responsible authorities.
In this case, the court found that the procedural requirements were met, as Benjamin's educational needs were thoroughly considered, and he was offered a free appropriate public education. The plaintiffs argued for cued speech as the preferred method of education, supported by their experts, while the defendants' experts advocated for total communication. The court determined that the defendants had met their obligation to provide a free appropriate public education for all handicapped children in the district and concluded that the plaintiffs could not demand a specific educational approach for Benjamin.
The district court dismissed the Lachmans' complaint, which they subsequently appealed. It is established that a district court, when reviewing administrative appeal outcomes under Secs. 1415(b) and (c), must independently assess whether the EAHCA requirements were met, based on a preponderance of evidence while considering state administrative proceedings. The district court's finding that the proposed IEP for Benjamin was compliant with the EAHCA is a mixed question of law and fact, reviewed de novo in appellate proceedings.
The district court identified Rowley as the key Supreme Court decision regarding the standards for school districts to fulfill their obligations under Sec. 1412(1) to provide handicapped students with a free appropriate public education (FAPE). Rowley established a two-part inquiry for evaluating such cases under Sec. 615(e)(2): first, whether the State followed the procedural requirements of the Act, and second, whether the individualized educational program (IEP) was reasonably designed to provide educational benefits to the child. The appellants did not dispute compliance with the procedural requirements, thus the analysis focused solely on the second inquiry regarding the adequacy of the proposed IEP for Benjamin.
The district court found the primary disagreement between the Lachmans and the school district to be whether to utilize the cued speech technique or total communication for Benjamin's education. The Lachmans contended that the critical issue was whether the IEP satisfied the mainstreaming requirement of Sec. 612(5), which mandates that handicapped children be educated with non-handicapped peers to the maximum extent appropriate. The court noted that Rowley did not directly address claims regarding the mainstreaming goal but acknowledged a preference for it.
While the district court's opinion thoroughly examined the Rowley test for ensuring FAPE, it considered the main contention to be about communication methods, leading to a limited discussion on mainstreaming. The court concluded that Benjamin would be fully mainstreamed shortly under the proposed IEP.
A court's determination that the requirements of the Act are met allows the State to resolve questions of methodology. The mainstreaming preference in Sec. 1412(5)(B) is integral to this determination. The disagreement between the parties regarding the extent of Benjamin's mainstreaming is closely linked to their differing views on choosing between cued speech and total communication methodologies. To understand the dispute, it is essential to clarify the mainstreaming obligation under Sec. 1412(5)(B) and its relationship to the broader requirement in Sec. 1412(1) for providing a free appropriate public education to handicapped children.
Previous case law, particularly Roncker v. Walter, emphasizes that mainstreaming is not mandated in all cases but indicates a strong congressional preference for it when appropriate. The inquiry should focus on whether a proposed placement is suitable under the Act, considering whether services that make a segregated placement superior could be provided in a non-segregated environment. If such services can be offered in a mainstream setting, the segregated placement may be deemed inappropriate. Additionally, the courts recognize that the mainstreaming preference should not be applied unqualifiedly; it is relevant only when a handicapped child can be satisfactorily educated in a mainstream environment, as articulated in cases like A.W. v. Northwest R-1 School District.
Appellants' framing of the central issue as whether the proposed Individualized Education Program (IEP) meets the mainstreaming preference under Section 1412(5)(B) is misguided. The case indeed raises a legitimate question regarding the IEP's ability to mainstream Benjamin “to the maximum extent appropriate,” but this evaluation depends fundamentally on the educational methodologies used. The effectiveness of the IEP cannot be assessed in isolation from the methods chosen for Benjamin's education. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) places the onus of selecting appropriate educational strategies on state and local agencies, in collaboration with the child's guardians.
The Lachmans argue for full mainstreaming based on their belief in the cued speech technique, asserting that Benjamin requires a full-time cued speech instructor to achieve this. However, they do not argue for greater mainstreaming than what the proposed IEP offers using a total communication approach, which the school district deems more suitable for Benjamin's education. The school district's reluctance to fully mainstream Benjamin stems from its skepticism about the effectiveness of cued speech for his needs.
Ultimately, the disagreement between the Lachmans and the school district centers on the appropriate educational methodology rather than on the mainstreaming issue itself. Hence, the district court's analysis, closely aligned with the Supreme Court's Rowley opinion, focused appropriately on the substantive disagreement about educational methods rather than on the mainstreaming preference. The court emphasized the importance of respecting the educational policy decisions made by local and state education officials, consistent with the deference highlighted by the Supreme Court under the IDEA.
Courts must refrain from imposing their preferred educational methods on states when determining compliance with the Act. The responsibility for developing educational plans for handicapped children lies with state and local educational agencies in collaboration with parents, not with the courts. Congressional intent suggests that courts should not overturn state decisions on educational methodologies. Judicial caution is warranted, as courts typically lack the specialized knowledge to address complex educational policy issues. Once compliance with the Act is established, states are tasked with resolving methodological questions. In this case, the district court confirmed that education officials complied with the Act, and it was concluded that parents cannot compel specific programs or methodologies under the Education of All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA). The proposed Individualized Education Program (IEP) for the child, Benjamin Lachman, is based on accepted methods for educating profoundly hearing-impaired children and meets the requirements of providing a free appropriate public education in a regular classroom setting. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellants’ claims regarding violations of the Illinois School Code and the Rehabilitation Act were not sufficiently argued, leading to their waiver. As no substantial arguments were presented regarding these claims, the court declined to analyze them further.
Cued speech is a method designed to assist hearing-impaired individuals in comprehending spoken language, utilizing hand shapes in proximity to the mouth to reduce phonetic confusion. The district court reviewed an updated Individualized Education Program (IEP) for Benjamin, proposing placement in a self-contained communication program at Forest View School, which would include an FM auditory training unit, mainstreaming with an interpreter for various subjects, and focus on reading and math at an early second-grade level. Cued speech would also aid in transitioning to signed English. The school has 317 students, with 35 being hearing-impaired.
Appellants noted the level of parental involvement permitted during the IEP formulation but did not claim a violation of the law based on this involvement. They referenced regulations under the Office of Special Education aimed at ensuring education in the least restrictive environment, aligning with the mainstreaming preference of the law. The cost of services for handicapped children in non-segregated environments was discussed in case law; however, the school district did not cite cost as a defense, making it unnecessary for consideration in this case.
Appellants argued that the proposed IEP reflects a disagreement with mainstreaming goals, but evidence showed that the IEP allows for significant mainstreaming, with nearly half the school day in a regular classroom. The law permits varying degrees of mainstreaming that fit a child’s educational needs. MSTEP, named in the appellants' complaint, sought dismissal on the grounds of lacking duty to the appellants but was denied by the district court. MSTEP appealed this denial, but further consideration of this appeal is rendered unnecessary by the court's decision.
