You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.

Harkins Amusement Enterprises, Inc. Daniel E. Harkins, Individually and Dba Tower Plaza Cinema I and II v. General Cinema Corporation, and the Harry Nace Company United Artists Theatres, Inc. American Multi-Cinema, Inc. Paramount Pictures Corporation Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation Universal Film Exchanges, Inc. Warner Bros. Distributing Corp. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. Avco Embassy Pictures Corp. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. United Artists Corporation Buena Vista Distributing Co., Inc., Harkins Amusement Enterprises, Inc. Daniel E. Harkins, Individually and Dba Tower Plaza Cinema I and II v. General Cinema Corporation, and the Harry Nace Company United Artists Theatres, Inc. American Multi-Cinema, Inc. United Artists Corporation, Harkins Amusement Enterprises, Inc. Daniel E. Harkins, Individually and Dba Tower Plaza Cinema I and II v. General Cinema Corporation, and the Harry Nace Company American Multi-Cinema, Inc. United Artists Corporation

Citation: 850 F.2d 477Docket: 87-1740

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; July 19, 1988; Federal Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

In this antitrust case, Harkins Amusement Enterprises, Inc. and Daniel E. Harkins appeal judgments from the District Court for the District of Arizona, which sided with several defendants, including major film distributors and exhibitors, on grounds of alleged anticompetitive practices in the Phoenix motion picture market. Harkins accused these parties of engaging in conspiracies, such as market splitting and bid rigging, under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which they claimed restricted fair competition and harmed their business. The district court granted partial summary judgment against Harkins on these claims, denying a continuance for further discovery. On appeal, the court affirmed some of these judgments while reversing others related to market splitting and bid rigging, remanding them for trial. The appellate court also upheld the district court's denial of a continuance, citing no abuse of discretion. Additionally, claims of shared monopoly under Section 2 were dismissed due to insufficient legal basis. The case has now been remanded for trial on specific claims, focusing on whether the distributors and exhibitors engaged in unlawful antitrust practices that damaged Harkins' competitive position in the market.

Legal Issues Addressed

Antitrust Violations under Sherman Act Section 1

Application: The case involves allegations of conspiracies in restraint of trade, including market splitting and bid rigging, among film distributors and exhibitors.

Reasoning: Harkins charges the distributors with seven types of conspiracies in restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act, asserting that preferential treatment from the distributors hindered their ability to compete fairly.

Denial of Continuance under Rule 56(f)

Application: The denial of a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and in this case, it was upheld due to the case's age and the opportunity for discovery.

Reasoning: A denial of a motion for continuance under Fed. R.Civ. P. 56(f) is reviewed for abuse of discretion, requiring a clear conviction that the lower court erred.

Market Splitting and Bid Rigging

Application: Claims of market splitting and bid rigging were reversed and remanded for trial, indicating potential antitrust violations needing jury evaluation.

Reasoning: Harkins has raised a triable issue of fact regarding the quality of its bids compared to those of licensed split members for top-grossing films.

Per Se Illegality and Rule of Reason in Antitrust

Application: While some split agreements might be per se illegal, this case requires a rule of reason analysis due to unclear economic impact.

Reasoning: The court concludes that if the alleged split agreement is proven, it would be illegal per se, and instructs the district court to guide the jury accordingly.

Shared Monopoly Claims under Sherman Act Section 2

Application: Shared monopoly claims were dismissed as they are not supported under Section 2, which concerns individual monopolization.

Reasoning: Section 2 applies to individual monopolization, and the concept of shared monopoly lacks direct legal support, as courts have determined that oligopoly alone does not violate this section.

Summary Judgment Standards

Application: The appellate court reviews summary judgment de novo, confirming that the analysis would be limited to issues presented to the district court.

Reasoning: The standard of review for summary judgment is de novo, allowing the appellate court to apply the same legal standards as the district court.