John Stubbs v. C.O. Robert Dudley, Individually and as an Employee of the New York Department of Corrections, and Robert E. McClay Individually and as Superintendent of the Arthur Kill Correctional Facility C.O. Clemmons (Phonic), Individually and as an Employee of the New York Department of Corrections C.O. Lewis, (Phonic), Individually and as an Employee of the New York Department of Corrections Robert A. Hoke, Individually and as Deputy Superintendent of Programs of the Arthur Kill Correctional Facility C.O. Domenico 'Rufino', Individually and as Employee of the New York Department of Corrections and C.O. 'John' Ranzer, Individually and as an Employee of the New York Department of Corrections

Citations: 849 F.2d 83; 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 8100Docket: 836

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; June 13, 1988; Federal Appellate Court

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John Stubbs, the plaintiff-appellant, filed an appeal against C.O. Robert Dudley and other defendants after a jury found Dudley liable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for violating Stubbs' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from an assault by fellow inmates. The jury awarded Stubbs $26,000 in compensatory damages for injuries incurred during a beating at the Arthur Kill Correctional Facility on February 4, 1977. However, Magistrate John L. Caden granted Dudley’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, ruling that the evidence did not demonstrate Dudley’s deliberate indifference to Stubbs' safety.

The evidence, viewed favorably for Stubbs, indicated that he was confronted by a group of 20 to 30 hostile inmates while attempting to make a phone call. Some inmates were armed, and Stubbs, unarmed, fled towards a locked door where Dudley and another officer were present. Although they opened the door, they quickly went through and locked it, leaving Stubbs vulnerable. As he sought help, Stubbs was cornered and subsequently beaten, sustaining serious injuries that required hospitalization. The court reversed the magistrate's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The section 1983 claim was tried before Magistrate Caden and a jury, with all state law claims and federal claims against defendants other than Dudley and Lewis dismissed prior to trial. Dudley’s defenses of statute of limitations and qualified immunity were rejected by Judge Henry Bramwell and Magistrate Caden. The jury ruled in favor of Lewis but against Dudley, awarding Stubbs $26,000 in compensatory damages without punitive damages. Subsequently, Magistrate Caden granted Dudley’s motion for judgment n.o.v. under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), rejecting the appellant's procedural challenges. Dudley's directed verdict motion, renewed at the end of the trial, adequately preserved the issue of evidence sufficiency regarding the deliberate indifference claim. The standard for granting judgment n.o.v. requires that only one conclusion could reasonably be reached by the jury, which was not met in this case. An inmate may maintain a damage action for deliberate indifference to safety under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, with the law clarifying that mere negligence does not constitute a constitutional violation. The jury instructions conveyed that a defendant must be found to have acted with intent to harm or with deliberate indifference, not merely in good faith, and that quick decision-making in crisis situations should be considered.

Detailed jury instructions were provided regarding the degrees of intent relevant to the plaintiff's claims. Magistrate Caden clearly defined "intent" and specified that mere negligence does not constitute a civil rights violation. After the jury ruled in favor of Stubbs, Caden granted judgment n.o.v. based on a misinterpretation of the Supreme Court's ruling in Whitley v. Albers, mistakenly believing it required a finding of malice alongside "deliberate indifference" to establish a constitutional violation. Whitley involved a prison riot, where the Court established a higher standard of "obduracy and wantonness" due to unique circumstances, but this does not apply to all cases of prison guards failing to protect inmates. 

In the current case, the incident itself created the disturbance, and the jury needed to determine whether the corrections officers acted unconstitutionally by allowing Stubbs to be harmed. The only concern for the officers was the potential risk to prison security or their own safety. The jury could reasonably conclude that Officer Dudley exhibited deliberate indifference by failing to protect Stubbs despite having the opportunity to do so without jeopardizing safety. The jury's verdict also indicated they understood that the officers were not obligated to risk their own safety for Stubbs, affirming that the Constitution mandates a standard of human decency rather than superhuman bravery.

Appellee's arguments for dismissal based on statute of limitations and qualified immunity have been found meritless, aligning with the views of Judge Bramwell and Magistrate Caden. The District Court's judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiff based on the jury's verdict. Additionally, the court is to consider the plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 (1982). During the trial, Magistrate Caden clarified to the jury that the case did not concern the reasonableness of the Correction Officers' actions, emphasizing that negligence was not applicable. The Magistrate had previously declined a proposed jury instruction from the defendants, which required a finding of "malicious and sadistic" intent. Evidence presented indicated that the prison's Muslim population was participating in a "sit-down strike" on the day of the incident, but this did not pose any significant threat to prison security.