United States v. Francisco Corral-Franco, Maria Guadalupe Corral-Franco, and Maria Aparis Franco
Docket: 87-1483
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; June 22, 1988; Federal Appellate Court
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed an appeal by the government challenging a district court's order that suppressed 191 pounds of marihuana discovered in the defendants' luggage at El Paso International Airport. The suppression was based on the court's finding that the marihuana was the result of an illegal arrest made by Border Patrol agents on February 25, 1987. The appellate court determined that the district court had incorrectly assessed whether an arrest occurred and, as a result, vacated the suppression order. The case was remanded for further consideration under the correct legal standard.
On the morning of the incident, Border Patrol agents observed defendants Francisco Corral-Franco, Maria Guadalupe Corral-Franco, and Maria Aparis Franco entering the airport with six suitcases. After checking in for a flight to Chicago, the agents approached the defendants to inquire about their citizenship, prompted by suspicions raised by one defendant's physical appearance. The agents identified themselves, and during questioning, the defendants displayed nervous behavior and inconsistencies regarding their luggage. Although the agents confirmed the defendants' citizenship and decided to release them, Agent Gomez monitored the suitcases throughout the encounter.
After the defendants departed, agents Castillo and Lopez noted their nervous behavior and inconsistent responses, reminiscent of drug smugglers Castillo had encountered during his eight and a half years with the Border Patrol. This prompted the agents to examine six suitcases, which they found solidly packed and equal in weight. The baggage claim tags were addressed to "Ramirez," a name not associated with any of the defendants, raising further suspicion as Castillo recognized this as a common trait of drug-related luggage. The agents decided to take the suitcases to the Border Patrol office for further investigation.
At approximately 7:20 a.m., agents approached the defendants at the boarding gate, asking if they would accompany them to the Border Patrol office, which was nearby. The agents provided oral Miranda warnings but did not arrest the defendants or imply they were required to go with them. There was no evidence of coercion, and the defendants did not inquire about their freedom to leave. Castillo indicated that had they asked to return to the gate, they would not have been allowed to do so, though there was no indication that the defendants were informed of this.
Upon arriving at the Border Patrol office around 7:25 a.m., the defendants were separated and given Miranda warnings again, acknowledging their rights. Each signed a Warning of Rights form. Francisco was found with $2,000, airline tickets, and keys to the suitcases, contradicting the defendants' earlier claims of round-trip tickets. During questioning, Francisco admitted ownership of the suitcases and acknowledged they contained marihuana, stating, "You know." Although Castillo testified to differing times of this admission, he confirmed that Francisco consented to a search of the luggage after being informed of his right to refuse. Francisco signed a Consent to Search form at 7:55 a.m., confirming his consent.
Maria Aparis initially denied ownership of luggage but later acknowledged owning two suitcases. Maria Guadalupe claimed one of those, with both women asserting the suitcases contained clothing, then refusing to answer additional questions. When they reunited with Francisco, who claimed ownership of all six suitcases, both women admitted he owned them. Francisco voluntarily agreed to open the suitcases, which were photographed before and during the opening. Approximately 191 pounds of marijuana were discovered inside, almost an hour after Francisco signed a Consent to Search form, and prior to any official arrest or charges against the defendants.
All three defendants were indicted for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute marijuana, as well as for using an interstate carrier for unlawful activity. They filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the suitcases, leading to a suppression hearing on May 22, 1987, where only Castillo testified. The district court granted the motion, determining that the agents had effectively made an informal arrest during their 7:20 a.m. encounter, which required probable cause that was not present. As a result, Francisco's consent to search the luggage was deemed invalid, leading to the suppression of the marijuana evidence.
In assessing whether an arrest occurred, the district court applied a four-factor test derived from case law, considering the focus of the investigation on the defendants, the agents' intent, the defendants' belief regarding their freedom, and the existence of probable cause. The court concluded that an arrest had taken place when the defendants were asked to accompany the agents, identifying a lack of probable cause at that moment, thereby legitimizing the suppression of the evidence.
In reviewing a district court's decision on a suppression hearing, factual findings are accepted unless clearly erroneous or affected by an incorrect legal view. If the latter occurs, remand is typically warranted. The district court incorrectly applied a "four factor" test in this case, which, while previously established in Fifth Amendment contexts, has since been rejected in favor of a "reasonable person" test for determining custody under Miranda. This new test assesses whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would perceive their situation as a significant restraint on freedom akin to formal arrest. This rationale from a Fifth Amendment case is also applicable to Fourth Amendment contexts, distinguishing between permissible investigative stops and formal arrests. The "four factor" test originated from Fifth Amendment-Miranda jurisprudence.
In United States v. Brunson, the court noted that the district court applied a "four prong" test for Miranda custody to assess whether a seizure occurred under the Fourth Amendment, with both parties treating these inquiries as equivalent. Although the court did not definitively state that every seizure equals Miranda custody, it acknowledged enough similarity in the inquiries to support the district court's approach. Subsequent cases, including United States v. Roberson and United States v. Johnson, also utilized this four factor test to evaluate arrests and the legality of searches incident to those arrests, primarily referencing prior Miranda cases.
The court has since transitioned to a "reasonable person" test for Miranda determinations, distinguishing between Terry stops and formal arrests. Consequently, it concluded that the district court erred by applying the outdated four factor test to determine whether the defendants were arrested during their encounter with law enforcement at the airport. The district court’s reliance on agents' subjective intent and the focus of the investigation—elements deemed irrelevant under the reasonable person standard—likely influenced its decision that an arrest occurred at 7:20 a.m. The court emphasized that a reasonable person’s perception of the situation, not the law enforcement officers' unrevealed intentions, should guide the assessment of whether an arrest took place. Thus, the district court's methodology may have improperly inflated the significance of the "focus" factor in its analysis.
The district court's determination that the defendants were arrested during the encounter at the airport was flawed, as it relied on a discredited four-factor test instead of the appropriate "reasonable person" standard. Consequently, the case is remanded for the district court to reassess whether a de facto arrest occurred before a significant statement regarding the luggage was made, allowing the court to reopen evidence if deemed necessary. The suppression order is vacated, and new findings on the suppression motion are mandated.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Hughes argues that the district court could have reached the same conclusion under the "reasonable person" standard, as the defendants' belief that they were under arrest was justified. He highlights that an experienced immigration officer testified the defendants were not free to leave, suggesting that the officer's subjective belief indicated an arrest was effectively communicated. Judge Hughes critiques the majority's push for a semantic shift to the "reasonable person" analysis, emphasizing that the evidence already supports that the defendants were not free to leave. He also expresses concern about the majority's comments regarding the trial court's disbelief of a witness, suggesting it undermines the credibility of that testimony.
The trial court in Bengivenga incorrectly applied the Morin four-part test, yet a remand for a "reasonable person" standard was unnecessary because the district judge's findings aligned with the new legal standards, resulting in a proper outcome. The case requires suppression of evidence under both the Morin and Bengivenga tests due to the specifics of the situation, which parallel the principles established in Florida v. Royer. An innocent traveler, subjected to a 25-minute stop before a flight and led into a law enforcement office under significant duress, would reasonably perceive being in police custody as defined by Miranda v. Arizona. Given the circumstances—confiscation of luggage, administration of Miranda warnings, and the inability to board the flight—there is a clear indication of custody. Judge Goldberg emphasized that the new standard must align with Miranda principles to avoid inconsistent judicial outcomes. Additionally, the government did not contest the defendants' standing to seek suppression of the marijuana, and the prior encounter was determined not to constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. The Bengivenga ruling clarified that not all police encounters equate to custody for Miranda purposes; actual arrest-like restraints are necessary for such a classification.
The focus on the defendants in this case is less pronounced than in precedent cases such as United States v. Hill, Morin, and United States v. Berry. In Hill, the court noted that an agent had requested to search the defendant for narcotics twice, both times refused. In Morin, the defendant was stopped twice, first refusing a search of his bag and then being informed of narcotics suspicion while in a restroom, leading to the retention of his identification and ticket. In Berry, agents confronted one defendant about false identification and questioned both defendants about drug possession. Comparatively, in Florida v. Royer, agents explicitly stated their suspicion of narcotics and retained the defendant’s identification before asking him to accompany them. The district court noted the lack of probable cause as indicative of arrest under the four-factor test; however, the presence of probable cause should indicate a de facto arrest. The "reasonable person" test considers the presence or absence of probable cause as potentially influencing perception, suggesting that here, the lack of probable cause is neutral or indicates no arrest.
The suppression hearing primarily relied on Agent Castillo's testimony, who was not present during the alleged arrest or the defendants' transport to the Border Patrol office. Despite the opportunity, the defendants did not testify, and their potential testimony could not be used against them at trial. The district court incorrectly concluded that the agents "instructed" the defendants to accompany them, as there was no evidence supporting this assertion. Instead, Castillo stated that the defendants voluntarily agreed to accompany the agents after being read their rights. The government bears the burden of proving that the defendants voluntarily accompanied the agents, but the district court's finding lacked evidentiary support. Additionally, the court's conclusion about an arrest at 7:20 a.m. was based on the scheduled departure of the defendants' flight at 7:45 a.m., with no evidence regarding the actual departure time. There is ambiguity regarding Francisco's statement about the luggage containing marijuana, which could have established probable cause while still allowing time to catch the flight. The district court is instructed to clarify its findings on remand.
