Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
James B. Nutter & Co. v. John Doe 1
Citation: 2021 NY Slip Op 04910Docket: 2017-10547
Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York; September 1, 2021; New York; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
In *James B. Nutter Co. v. John Doe 1*, decided on September 1, 2021, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York affirmed a lower court's order that denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in a mortgage foreclosure action. The plaintiff, James B. Nutter Co., sought to foreclose on a reverse mortgage secured by a property formerly owned by Sarah Lymus, who transferred her interest to a trust prior to executing the reverse mortgage. After Lymus's death in 2011, the plaintiff initiated foreclosure proceedings in 2015 against the unknown trustees of the trust and Susan Patterson, Lymus's daughter. Patterson's defense claimed the plaintiff lacked standing because Lymus had already conveyed her property interest to the trust, thus lacking authority to secure the mortgage. The court found that the plaintiff had established prima facie entitlement to accelerate the debt under the reverse mortgage terms by submitting relevant documentation, including the note, mortgage, and evidence of Lymus's death. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court upheld the denial of the plaintiff's motion against Patterson and the trustees, maintaining the decision's integrity. To succeed in the motion for summary judgment against the trustees and Patterson, the plaintiff needed to demonstrate that its second-in-time mortgage interest had priority over the trust's first-in-time interest in the property. The plaintiff acknowledged that a deed is presumed to be delivered and accepted on its date but argued that it rebutted this presumption through evidence, including covenants in the reverse mortgage. The plaintiff claimed that the deed's recording date should be considered its delivery date, granting its mortgage interest priority. However, conflicting covenants did not conclusively counter the presumption of the deed's delivery date, instead creating a triable issue of fact. The plaintiff's evidence did not definitively resolve the priority issue, leading to the conclusion that it did not eliminate all triable issues of fact. Consequently, the Supreme Court correctly denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment against the trustees and Patterson, as well as other related requests, regardless of the opposition's sufficiency. The plaintiff's additional arguments were either rendered moot or improperly raised for the first time on appeal.