United States v. Aldo Gastelum

Citation: Not availableDocket: 20-3451

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; September 1, 2021; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Aldo Daniel Gastelum was stopped by Arkansas State Trooper Bernard Pettit for a traffic violation involving an unsafe lane change. During the stop, Trooper Pettit conducted a warrantless search of the car's trunk, discovering over 15 kilograms of cocaine. Gastelum sought to suppress this evidence, asserting that Trooper Pettit unlawfully extended the traffic stop and that he did not give voluntary consent for the search. The district court denied Gastelum's motion, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.

The incident occurred on April 7, 2018, where the interaction was recorded and characterized as friendly. After stopping Gastelum, Trooper Pettit engaged in conversation about his travel plans, learning that Gastelum had rented the vehicle in Houston and was headed to Chicago to visit Army Reserve facilities. The trooper found the details of Gastelum's trip, including the one-way, single-day rental agreement for $734.39, suspicious.

Approximately 15 minutes into the stop, after issuing a warning for the lane change, Trooper Pettit indicated the stop was concluding but then asked Gastelum about luggage in the trunk. When Gastelum confirmed there was luggage, Trooper Pettit requested to check the trunk, prompting Gastelum to search for the trunk release. During this time, Trooper Pettit casually asked for permission to look in the trunk, suggesting a lack of coercion.

Trooper Pettit testified that he relayed Gastelum's statements during a traffic stop, which ended with Gastelum exiting his vehicle and opening the trunk. Trooper Pettit discovered over 15 kilograms of cocaine in a duffle bag, leading to Gastelum's arrest and subsequent indictment for possession with intent to distribute. Gastelum moved to suppress the cocaine evidence, alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment related to the extension of the traffic stop and the trunk search. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the motion, and Gastelum entered a conditional guilty plea, receiving a 30-month prison sentence and 3 years of supervised release. He appealed the suppression denial.

In reviewing the appeal, the court affirmed that Trooper Pettit's initial traffic stop was lawful. Gastelum argued that the stop was unreasonably prolonged and the trunk search was unlawful due to lack of consent. The court referenced established legal standards for extending a traffic stop, noting that reasonable suspicion can develop during the stop as circumstances evolve. Trooper Pettit, with extensive experience and specialized training, had observed factors that raised reasonable suspicion, including the unusually short duration of the rental car in relation to Gastelum's stated purpose of job inquiries. The court concluded that Trooper Pettit had sufficient reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop based on the totality of circumstances.

A one-day rental car and a lengthy drive from Houston to Chicago raised doubts about Gastelum's claim of visiting military reserve units, as he was stopped approximately six hours after renting the vehicle. Trooper Pettit noted that the rental cost was higher than flying, aligning with patterns of drug smugglers who prefer rental vehicles. Previous cases have identified reasonable suspicion from inconsistencies between short rental periods and travel plans. Additionally, Gastelum's rationale for traveling from California to Houston and then Chicago seemed illogical, as a disabled college student would likely visit reserve units in California instead. Trooper Pettit, with military experience, recognized that individuals typically do not approach reserve units without prior arrangements. 

Gastelum's repeated emphasis on his military background during questioning, particularly when evading questions about his arrival in Houston, further heightened suspicion. The presence of military insignia in his car was perceived as an attempt to distract Trooper Pettit. While military insignia alone does not constitute reasonable suspicion, evasive responses do contribute to it. The court found no error in the district court's ruling on reasonable suspicion, noting that even seemingly innocent factors can collectively suggest criminal activity. Gastelum also contested the legality of the trunk search, arguing he did not voluntarily consent, but the court upheld the finding of voluntary consent based on the circumstances.

A warrantless search is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if conducted with the knowing and voluntary consent of the individual being searched. The government must prove that Gastelum consented voluntarily. The assessment of consent does not depend on the defendant's subjective mindset but rather on whether the officer reasonably believed consent was given. Factors influencing this assessment include the individual's age, mental capacity, intoxication level, awareness of Miranda rights, and previous legal experiences. Additionally, the context of consent is crucial, involving the length of detention, any intimidation or coercion by police, promises or misrepresentations made, the individual's custody status, and the setting of the consent.

In this case, although Trooper Pettit initially issued a command regarding the trunk, he quickly retracted it and sought explicit permission from Gastelum to search the trunk. The atmosphere during the encounter was friendly and relaxed, devoid of threats or intimidation. The officer's demeanor was polite, and he sought consent three times, to which Gastelum responded affirmatively. Gastelum's background as an educated adult with military experience suggests he was informed and capable of exercising his rights. He was not under arrest when he consented, further supporting the voluntariness of his consent. The court found no clear error in the district court's assessment of these factors.

Trooper Pettit conducted a brief 15-minute stop of Gastelum on a busy interstate, during which he inquired about luggage. Initially, Gastelum remained in the vehicle and did not object to a search, later opening the trunk voluntarily. Trooper Pettit did not handcuff Gastelum until after drugs were discovered, and the overall interaction was characterized by a friendly atmosphere and rapport. The district court found that Gastelum's consent to the search was voluntary, supported by the video evidence of the encounter and Gastelum's demeanor. The court rejected the notion that Gastelum's will was overborne, referencing precedent that emphasizes evaluating the totality of circumstances rather than establishing strict rules regarding consent and the officer's obligation to inform suspects of their right to refuse. Consequently, the denial of Gastelum's motion to suppress was affirmed. However, Circuit Judge Kelly dissented, arguing that the search was unlawful as he believed Gastelum did not provide voluntary consent. He highlighted that warrantless searches are generally unreasonable unless conducted with knowing and voluntary consent, which the government must demonstrate. He maintained that consent must be both express or implied and freely given, emphasizing that it is the government's burden to prove the voluntariness of such consent.

Mere acquiescence to police authority does not equate to consent for a search. Consent must be established through clear evidence of a subject's willingness, which cannot be inferred solely from a lack of resistance or passive compliance. The key issue is whether a reasonable officer would interpret a subject's actions as consent. In this case, the focus is on whether Trooper Pettit reasonably believed that Gastelum consented to a search of his rental car's trunk. The analysis suggests that a reasonable officer would not have concluded that Gastelum consented; rather, he appeared to submit to commands. 

During the traffic stop, Trooper Pettit engaged Gastelum briefly before instructing him to exit the vehicle and open the trunk. This initial instruction was framed as a command, indicating to Gastelum that he had no option to refuse. The narrative indicates that Gastelum's search for the trunk release reflected his understanding of the command's authoritative nature. Although the district court found that subsequent statements might have clarified Gastelum's ability to refuse, the author of this analysis remains unconvinced that the coercive nature of the initial command was adequately mitigated.

There is no requirement for an officer to inform a citizen of their right to refuse consent. However, if an officer issues a command, it is unreasonable to expect that a citizen can voluntarily consent to a follow-up request without clear communication that the command is no longer in effect. In this case, Trooper Pettit’s leading questions, issued immediately after his command, did not indicate to Gastelum that he could refuse the search. Gastelum was still complying with the command to open the trunk when asked if he minded a search, which created a misunderstanding of his ability to consent. 

The analysis hinges on whether a reasonable officer would believe that Gastelum made a free and unconstrained choice to consent. Factors such as the nature of the interaction, Gastelum's personal characteristics, and the environment at the time of consent inform the voluntariness of consent, but do not negate the fact that Trooper Pettit gained access through a command. Despite Gastelum’s age, intelligence, and military background suggesting he recognized authority, the follow-up questions did not clarify that he had the option to refuse consent. 

The court's emphasis on the cordiality of the encounter does not alter the requirement that consent must not be coerced, either explicitly or implicitly. The expectation that Gastelum should have felt comfortable refusing the follow-up questions is misplaced, given the recent command. Considering the totality of circumstances, it is concluded that the government did not demonstrate that Gastelum voluntarily consented to the search; instead, he complied with the command. The dissent asserts that consent was not given freely but rather was a response to coercion.