Genene Jones v. the State of Texas

Citation: Not availableDocket: 04-20-00108-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; August 25, 2021; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Genene Jones appeals the denial of her 'Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Speedy Trial and Denial of Due Process' after pleading guilty to murder. The Fourth Court of Appeals reviewed her case, affirming the trial court's decision. Jones, previously convicted of murder and child injury in 1984, had been imprisoned for those offenses. In 2017, following indications of her potential parole eligibility, she was indicted for the murder of another child from 1981. Jones claimed the 36-year delay from the crime to indictment violated her right to a speedy trial, arguing that the State acted in "Bad Faith" to prolong her incarceration.

The court clarified that her claim is more aligned with the Fifth Amendment's due process protections rather than the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial guarantee. The court noted that the right to a speedy trial attaches once a person is charged, and delays are evaluated under a balancing test to determine if they are unreasonable and presumptively prejudicial. Ultimately, the court overruled her Sixth Amendment complaint and upheld the trial court's denial of her motion.

Jones's complaint focuses on the delay in bringing an indictment in 2017 for a death that occurred in 1981, rather than the delay to trial itself, which does not raise speedy trial issues under the Sixth Amendment or Texas Constitution. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause is implicated, as statutes of limitation protect against stale charges. However, the Due Process Clause's role regarding pre-indictment delays is limited, and the Supreme Court has not clearly defined the circumstances that would constitute a violation. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals requires a defendant to show that the delay caused substantial prejudice to a fair trial and was an intentional tactic to gain an advantage. While Texas law does not specify additional bad faith reasons for delay, purposes such as harassment are included. The trial court's decision to deny Jones's motion to dismiss is reviewed with deference to its factual findings, as the Texas due process clause aligns closely with the federal standard. Notably, there is no statute of limitations for murder in Texas. Despite Jones's claim that the State's delay was intended to deny her a fair trial, mere proof of delay and prejudice does not establish bad faith.

A 23-year delay in prosecuting Jones did not violate due process as there was no evidence of improper intent by the State, despite Jones demonstrating 'significant prejudice.' The State's decision to delay was justified by favorable legal changes, the gathering of additional evidence, and differing opinions among prosecutors regarding the case's viability. The original prosecutor chose not to pursue the case in the 1980s due to insufficient evidence, which was compounded by outdated legal standards at the time. Subsequent prosecutors collected new evidence, including eyewitness accounts and statements about additional murders, leading them to believe there was enough evidence to indict Jones in 2017. Testimonies indicated that disagreements among prosecutors about the case's strength were not grounds for a due process violation. Consequently, without proof of malicious intent, Jones could not establish a due process infringement. The trial court's judgment was affirmed.