On August 26, 2021, the Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Appellees Brandon Scott Free, Ringo Drilling I, L.P., and Ringo Management Company, L.L.C. in a personal injury case stemming from a single-vehicle accident. Appellants Mark Wheeler, Jeremy Rich, and David Kiser, who were passengers in Free’s vehicle, alleged negligence against Free and sought to hold Ringo vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, as well as directly liable for negligent hiring, training, and retention of Free.
Ringo provided evidence that it subscribed to workers' compensation insurance and outlined its transportation policies, which allowed crew members to voluntarily carpool to drilling sites. On the date of the accident, Kiser’s vehicle was inoperable, prompting him to ask Free to drive; Kiser paid for the fuel, but Free did not receive drive pay for that trip. Ringo argued that Appellants' claims were barred by the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act's exclusive remedy provision and contended that Free was not acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
In their appeal, Appellants claimed Ringo's human resources manager admitted that they were not in the course and scope of employment during the incident. The trial court granted summary judgment without specifying the grounds, leading to review under the standard of de novo. The appellate court upheld the summary judgment, concluding that any of Ringo's theories for summary judgment were valid, thereby affirming the trial court's decision.
To qualify for traditional summary judgment, a defendant must definitively negate at least one essential element of the asserted cause of action or establish each element of an affirmative defense, with evidence being considered conclusive only if reasonable people could not differ in their conclusions (City of Keller v. Wilson). If the movant establishes a right to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present issues or evidence that would prevent summary judgment. Ringo claimed that Wheeler, Rich, and Kiser were acting within the course and scope of employment under the Act during the accident and that the Act’s exclusive remedy provision barred Appellants’ negligence claims. The Act stipulates that the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries is recovery of workers’ compensation benefits, and an injury must arise out of and be in the course and scope of employment to be compensable.
The definition of "course and scope of employment" requires that the activity must pertain to the employer’s business and be performed while furthering that business. Ringo also contended that Free was not acting within the course and scope of his employment, thus not imposing any duty towards Appellants regarding Free’s driving at the time of the accident. The determination of Free's employment status during the accident falls under the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior, which allows liability for one person's fault to be assigned to another due to their relationship. The Texas Supreme Court case Painter v. Amerimex Drilling I, Ltd. highlighted that a fact issue existed regarding whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of employment when an accident occurred. In this case, it was concluded that Free was not acting within his scope of employment at the time of the accident, and thus, Ringo's argument regarding the others' employment status under the Act was not addressed. The primary question is whether Free was performing his job duties at the time of the incident.
The determination of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of employment during a tortious act relies on an objective assessment of their job responsibilities at the time of the incident. In the Painter case, a driller was responsible for transporting crew members to lodging and was compensated with a bonus for this duty. The court recognized an exception to the “coming-and-going” rule in workers' compensation law, which typically exempts employers from liability for employees traveling to and from work, when an employee is performing a specific task directed by the employer.
In contrast, the current case involves a crew member, Free, who was not specifically assigned to transport the crew and did not receive drive pay for the accident day trip; he only received a travel allowance. The employer's drive pay policy required the driller to designate who would receive compensation for driving, and it was determined that Free’s role did not constitute a special mission for the employer’s benefit. The situation is similar to Pilgrim v. Fortune Drilling Co., where a travel allowance did not establish an employee’s course of employment, as merely providing reimbursement does not imply an employee is acting within the scope of employment. The court concluded that Free was not tasked with transporting the crew and that his travel did not serve a special benefit to the employer, thus falling under the coming-and-going rule.
Summary judgment evidence conclusively established that Free was not acting within the scope of his employment while transporting himself and fellow crew members to Ringo’s drill site. Appellants also claimed that Ringo was directly negligent in hiring, training, and retaining Free, asserting that Ringo should have known Free was a reckless driver. Such claims are based on the employer's direct negligence rather than vicarious liability, and do not require the employee to be acting in the course of employment at the time of the incident. However, there must be a job-related connection for the injury, as the employer cannot be seen as an insurer for any person interacting with the employee. This connection, which relates to foreseeability, is vital for establishing proximate cause and duty. Ringo argued it owed no duty to Appellants regarding an off-duty employee's actions, referencing Nabors Drilling, which held that employers typically do not have a duty for off-duty employees' actions. Exceptions exist only when the employer has control over the employee's conduct. The court emphasized that Ringo neither assigned Free to drive the crew nor was aware that he would do so at the time of the accident, indicating that Ringo had no control over Free’s actions. As a result, Ringo had no duty towards Appellants concerning the accident, leading to the overruling of Appellants’ appeal and affirming the trial court's judgment.
