Dennis Goddard and Bonnie Goddard v. Pete Urrea, Gene Ford

Citations: 847 F.2d 765; 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 8600; 1988 WL 54683Docket: 87-8501

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; June 20, 1988; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The case involves Dennis and Bonnie Goddard as plaintiffs-appellees against Pete Urrea and Gene Ford, defendants-appellants, following an appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to existing genuine issues of material fact. 

On October 22, 1984, Urrea and Ford, agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, served a subpoena related to a grand jury investigation on the Goddards at their business, Guerin Enterprises. The agents explained the compliance options to Bonnie Goddard and gathered information about the business’s location, where they subsequently found additional records after Bonnie's consent. The agents sought to arrange a meeting with Dennis Goddard, who ultimately agreed to allow Urrea to take documents to California. The facts surrounding the agents' conduct after serving the subpoena remain disputed, particularly regarding the nature of the document served and the agents' actions during their visit.

The Goddards claim that Agent Urrea misrepresented a subpoena as a search warrant and failed to explain compliance options. Bonnie Goddard asserts that Urrea informed her the document was a search warrant, while Agent Ford later clarified it was not a search warrant but did not identify it as a subpoena. Bonnie escorted agents to Guerin Enterprises' basement to show them business records, and after unsuccessfully attempting to reach Dennis, she informed him of the agents' actions. Urrea discussed a federal grand jury investigation and a "gag order" with Dennis but did not clarify the nature of the document. Following this, the agents sought additional records without Bonnie's permission and seized two "display suppressors." Dennis contests that he authorized Urrea to take the business documents.

Procedurally, the Goddards filed a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action in Cobb County for emotional distress, trespass, and unlawful search and seizure on December 11, 1984. The case was removed to federal court, where Ford and Urrea sought dismissal or summary judgment, claiming immunity. The Goddards requested to amend their complaint to include a Bivens action. The district court later converted the motion to summary judgment, granting the Goddards a chance to respond. On August 16, 1985, the court granted immunity from state tort claims but denied it for the constitutional tort claim. After discovery, the agents filed separate summary judgment motions, which were denied on March 31, 1987, due to genuine issues regarding the agents' good faith. The court indicated that if the agents misrepresented the subpoena, the search and seizure could violate constitutional rights. The appeal focuses on whether the district court erred in denying the agents’ qualified immunity claim.

In reviewing summary judgment motions, all factual ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the opposing party. Qualified immunity allows government officials to avoid liability if a reasonable officer could believe their actions were constitutional, even if they were not. This doctrine applies to both Bivens actions and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. It protects officials except in cases of blatant incompetence or intentional law violations. When officials misuse their discretion, damages may be the only means to uphold constitutional rights.

In this case, the agents claim qualified immunity against allegations of unlawful search and seizure. However, the district court found that factual disputes exist regarding the agents' conduct, specifically whether the Goddards adequately alleged a violation of a clearly established right. The Goddards assert that the agents misrepresented a subpoena as a search warrant and inadequately explained compliance options, while the agents claim they clarified the document's nature.

Additionally, the agents conducted a search of business records and seized documents and materials, raising questions about the reasonableness of their actions. Given these factual disputes, a jury could determine if the agents' conduct violated established rights. The district court's denial of summary judgment on immunity grounds was deemed appropriate. The agents' argument regarding the unclear law on subpoenas with "gag orders" will be addressed later, once the facts are clarified.

Agent Ford's involvement in serving a subpoena is contested, particularly regarding his failure to inform Bonnie Goddard that the document was a subpoena, despite stating it was not a search warrant. This omission raises factual questions that are critical for assessing credibility and testimony weight, which are for a fact-finder to consider. The district court identified genuine factual issues that affect the determination of good faith or reasonableness, leading to the dismissal of the appeal. It is noted that a denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity is not a final appealable order if substantial factual development is needed, as established in Riley v. Wainwright. The dismissal is affirmed despite a previous denial of a motion to dismiss the appeal on jurisdictional grounds. 

In dissent, Judge Johnson argues that the majority erred in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. He references Mitchell v. Forsyth, which established that denial of qualified immunity claims can be appealable, particularly when it involves a legal issue rather than a factual one. Johnson emphasizes that the qualified immunity analysis does not require resolving factual disputes but rather assesses whether the alleged violations were clearly established at the time of the actions in question. Thus, according to Johnson, the appeal should not be dismissed based on the existence of factual disputes.

The majority's reliance on Riley v. Wainwright is misplaced. In that case, the Eleventh Circuit stated that a district court's denial of a qualified immunity claim, when based on an issue of law, qualifies as an appealable final decision under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, despite the absence of a final judgment. However, in the current case, the district court's denial of the defendants' summary judgment motion was based on the need for substantial factual development to determine if a constitutional deprivation occurred and whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Thus, the order is not an appealable final decision. 

Riley does not apply for two reasons: 

1. The district court's denial in this case was based on a legal issue regarding whether the defendants misrepresented the nature of the subpoena to Mrs. Goddard, which could lead a jury to find a violation of clearly established constitutional rights.
  
2. Discovery is complete, meaning no substantial factual development remains. While factual disputes exist, they do not affect the qualified immunity analysis, which assumes the plaintiffs' facts are valid.

Therefore, since the resolution of this appeal hinges on a legal issue without further factual development required, the Court has jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal. The qualified immunity defense allows defendants to avoid trial, and given that no additional steps can prevent the trial, the legal question of whether the plaintiffs' allegations support a claim of violation of established law should be addressed.