Florida Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services v. Mendez
Docket: Nos. 4D11-4644, 4D12-196
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; July 25, 2012; Florida; State Appellate Court
This consolidated case involves parallel class actions from Palm Beach and Broward County regarding the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services' destruction of citrus trees, leading to inverse condemnation claims by two classes of affected landowners. The circuit courts found the Department liable, awarding $19,222,490.52 in Palm Beach and $8,043,541.50 in Broward. The appeals focus on post-judgment proceedings concerning the execution of these judgments against a state agency.
In the Palm Beach case, the final judgment stipulated that execution would not issue without further order. The Mendez class sought such an order, arguing that section 11.066, which prohibits execution against the state, should be interpreted to allow for exceptions in takings cases, citing section 74.091. They also contended that section 11.066 was unconstitutional in this context. The trial court ultimately ruled in favor of the Mendez class, allowing execution based on the exception in section 74.091 without requiring legislative appropriation, but did not address the constitutionality of section 11.066.
Conversely, in the Broward case, the trial court initially stated the award amount and allowed for execution. However, after the Department's motion to preclude execution, the court decided that sections 11.066(3) and (4) governed, concluding that they took precedence over section 74.091. It ruled that the class must pursue the appropriations process under section 11.066 before any execution could be permitted and upheld the constitutionality of section 11.066(3) as applied.
The Palm Beach order's core issue was the application of section 74.091 for issuing a writ of execution, which is not applicable to inverse condemnation proceedings. Statutory interpretation is conducted de novo, focusing on the statute's plain meaning to discern the drafters' intent. Courts do not look beyond clear and unambiguous statutes, adhering to the principle of harmonizing related provisions. Section 74.091 is part of chapter 74, applicable only to traditional, state-initiated eminent domain actions, as outlined in section 74.011, which specifies the entities eligible to exercise these provisions. Neither the Broward nor Palm Beach classes qualify as petitioners under this statute. The Palm Beach County circuit court referenced a case indicating chapter 73 applies to inverse condemnation but found it inapplicable to chapter 74 due to its specific limitations. Both classes claimed that subsections 11.066(3) and (4) are unconstitutional, arguing they restrict homeowners' rights to just compensation and interfere with judicial power. However, the court did not address these claims as they were not preserved in the Palm Beach case and were not ripe in the Broward case. The Palm Beach County circuit court specifically refrained from ruling on the constitutionality of the statute. As-applied challenges must be raised at the trial level, contrasting with facial challenges that can be introduced on appeal. The aggrieved party must secure a ruling for the preservation of error, which the Palm Beach County class failed to do.
As-applied constitutional challenges to section 11.066 concerning the Broward County class are not ripe. Article X, section 6(a) of the Florida Constitution mandates that private property can only be taken for public purposes with full compensation. The class contends that section 11.066 is unconstitutional as it restricts their ability to receive full payment. However, the legislature may yet allocate the full compensation through a statute. Consequently, challenges based on specific facts and claims of denied compensation are premature until the statute is applied and a constitutional violation occurs.
Case law supports this position: in State v. Newman, a challenge was ripe upon charging under the statute; in State v. Oakley, a challenge was deemed not ripe until the statute was applied at trial; in State v. Demarzo, the absence of a continuance request rendered the challenge premature; in Grady v. Dep’t of Prof'l Regulation, the absence of an actual controversy meant the challenge was not ripe. Similarly, in Shands v. City of Marathon, a takings claim was not ripe until a final decision on the ordinance's application was made.
Since the Broward County class has not utilized the appropriation process outlined in section 11.066, their as-applied constitutional challenge is not ready for review. The court reversed the portion of the Palm Beach County order authorizing execution against the Department and remanded for further proceedings. It also reversed the Broward County order that found section 11.066(3) constitutional as applied, as the issue was not ripe. Additionally, section 11.066 establishes that monetary judgments against the state or its agencies require legislative appropriation for enforcement and cannot be executed against state property without such appropriation.
