Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; July 25, 2012; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
The trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment against Dr. Charles Ugokwe in a medical malpractice case, determining he breached the standard of care by misdiagnosing Stacy Finley. However, the appellate court reversed this decision, citing that the summary judgment was based on a factual finding and was rendered too close to the scheduled trial date, violating La.Code Civ. P. art. 966, which requires judgment on such motions to be given at least ten days prior to trial. The court noted that the trial court has broad discretion regarding the consideration of untimely opposition memoranda and denied the plaintiffs’ motion to strike Dr. Ugokwe's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The procedural history revealed that Finley was misdiagnosed after presenting to the emergency room, and a prior medical review panel concluded Dr. Ugokwe did not deviate from the standard of care. The case raised two key issues: whether to grant the plaintiffs' motion to strike Dr. Ugokwe's opposition and the propriety of the summary judgment itself. Ultimately, the appellate court found the judgment granting summary judgment to be improper due to timing issues.
The defect identified is deemed a reversible error; however, it will not be addressed since it was not raised in brief, as per Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal, Rule 1-3. The plaintiffs claim that Dr. Ugokwe's opposition to their motion for summary judgment was not served timely. Mr. John Morton, representing the plaintiffs, filed the motion on August 24, 2011, with a hearing set for September 8, 2011, and included service instructions. It is alleged that Ms. Madeline Lee, counsel for Dr. Ugokwe, did not receive the motion until August 30, 2011. On August 31, 2011, she filed her opposition and attempted to deliver it to Mr. Morton, but it was deposited in a mail slot instead. Mr. Morton confirmed receipt via email on September 1, 2011, but subsequently filed a motion to strike the opposition, claiming improper service.
The trial court addressed the motion to strike on September 8, 2011, and the review will be based on that decision rather than revisiting the issue. Service of motions and oppositions is governed by La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(B) and District Court Rule 9.9, which outlines specific timing for service. Rule 9.9(a) requires that a memorandum in support be served at least fifteen days before the hearing, while Rule 9.9(b) mandates that oppositions be served at least eight days prior. Noncompliance may result in the loss of the right to oral argument.
La. Code Civ. P. Article 1313 permits service through various methods, including delivery to counsel of record. Although the plaintiffs reference the case Trusty v. Allstate Insurance Co. to argue insufficient service when documents are placed in a mail slot, that case is distinguishable because it involved pleadings requiring specific service methods due to court date implications. In contrast, the opposition to the motion for summary judgment does not set a hearing date and is, therefore, subject to the more flexible service requirements of Article 1313, which does not detail the exact method of delivery needed.
No interpretive jurisprudence exists regarding the sufficiency of a memorandum's service as 'delivery to counsel of record.' The trial court has discretion in determining whether to consider an opposition to summary judgment. Relevant case law indicates that courts may exclude late-filed oppositions, as seen in Guillory v. Chapman, Buggage v. Volks Constructors, and Phillips v. Lafayette Parish School Board, where the courts upheld discretion in excluding late submissions based on procedural requirements. In the present case, the trial court denied a motion to strike a late-filed opposition, finding no prejudice to either party since the opposing party was not properly served until shortly before the hearing.
The motion for summary judgment serves to eliminate unnecessary trials when no genuine issue of material fact exists, as outlined in La. Code Civ. P. art. 966. The burden of proof remains with the movant, who must show a lack of factual support for the opposition's claims. If the opposing party fails to demonstrate sufficient factual support, the court should grant summary judgment, as indicated by the relevant statutes. Summary judgment aims for a just, speedy, and cost-effective resolution of cases, with the procedural framework favoring such outcomes.
Appellate review of summary judgment is conducted de novo, utilizing the same standards as the trial court. On August 24, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for partial summary judgment against Dr. Ugokwe, despite previous denials of similar motions and an upcoming trial. This motion was based on a recent deposition of Dr. Robert Schwendimann, who aligned with the plaintiffs' experts, allegedly demonstrating Dr. Ugokwe's breach of care standards. However, determining whether conduct fell below the standard of care is a factual issue that cannot be resolved through summary judgment, as established by Louisiana law. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on a factual matter, reversed the decision, and remanded the case for a trial on its merits, with costs of the appeal assigned to the plaintiffs. The motion specifically addressed only Dr. Ugokwe's liability, not that of the other defendants.
