Oather Jefferson Samples and Barbara Jackson, on Behalf of Their Minor Child David Samples, Deceased, and on Their Own Behalf v. City of Atlanta and Officer J.M. Oglesby, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Police Officer for the City of Atlanta, Defendants

Citations: 846 F.2d 1328; 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 7986Docket: 87-8576

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; June 13, 1988; Federal Appellate Court

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Plaintiffs Oather Jefferson Samples and Barbara Jackson appeal the summary judgment granted by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia in favor of the City of Atlanta and Officer J.M. Oglesby after the shooting death of their son, David Samples. On August 1, 1984, Officer Oglesby shot David, striking him five times with fatal wounds to the chest. No witnesses were present, but Oglesby reported he was investigating a "demented person" before the shooting. An investigation by the Atlanta police and a Civilian Review Board later exonerated Oglesby, finding his actions reasonable.

The plaintiffs filed a suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleging excessive force and a violation of David's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, while also claiming the city had a practice of condoning police violence through inadequate investigations and lack of punishment. In response to the defendants' summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs submitted various evidence, including affidavits and newspaper articles, but the district court did not consider significant portions of this evidence, striking much of a key affidavit and failing to review most depositions. Ultimately, the court granted summary judgment favoring the defendants based on limited evidence. The appellate court found that genuine issues of material fact existed, indicating that summary judgment was inappropriate.

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows courts to grant summary judgment when there is no genuine issue of material fact. A plaintiff can defeat a summary judgment motion by presenting evidence that could enable a jury to find in their favor. Courts must view evidence favorably towards the non-movant, and if reasonable inferences can be drawn that create a genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment should not be granted. This standard applies similarly in appellate reviews of summary judgment rulings.

In evaluating a claim against Police Officer Oglesby, the court refers to Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, which permits claims under Sec. 1983 for unreasonable police violence. The assessment of excessive force involves analyzing the necessity of force used, the relationship between the need for force and the amount used, the officer's intent, and the extent of injury. 

The situation at hand involves Oglesby shooting Samples six times, resulting in Samples' death. The court must assess whether Oglesby's actions were reasonable, based on his account that Samples, who exhibited erratic behavior, threatened him with a knife after resisting commands to stop. Oglesby contended he shot Samples out of fear for his safety, with the situation escalating after the first shot failed to subdue Samples. No witnesses to the incident complicate the factual determination.

Evidence supports Oglesby’s account of the shooting, including that Samples was on the phone with his mother, emotionally distressed, and had nearly engaged in a fight earlier. Physical evidence at the scene included a broken Fanta bottle and an unopened pocket knife near Samples' body. While it’s possible Samples attempted to open the knife before being shot, it raises questions regarding excessive force since the knife was small and potentially non-threatening. The physical disparity between Oglesby, weighing 225 pounds and lifting weights, and Samples, who weighed only 128 pounds, suggests that Oglesby may have overreacted. Additionally, a bullet struck Samples in the back, introducing ambiguity regarding whether he was shot while fleeing or if the circumstances justified Oglesby's use of force. The evidence is not uncontroverted; both sides have supporting arguments, making summary judgment on liability inappropriate. 

Liability of the City of Atlanta is discussed within the framework of *Monell v. Department of Social Services*, emphasizing that municipalities can be liable under Section 1983 for policies or customs that lead to constitutional violations, but cannot be held liable under a respondeat superior theory unless the policy is the direct cause of the violation.

Plaintiffs claim that the Atlanta police force has an unwritten practice of ignoring police brutality, fostering a 'shoot to kill' mentality. Key supporting points include a low percentage of sustained claims against officers, incomplete investigations into police shootings, and statements from a precinct captain endorsing lethal force. J.T. Miller, a former police officer, provided an affidavit asserting that the department does not thoroughly investigate brutality and operates under a 'shoot first, ask questions later' philosophy, which, if credible, supports a cause of action against the city. The district court struck parts of Miller's affidavit, deeming them baseless, but the court's ruling is contested. It is argued that Miller's observations are relevant and admissible evidence regarding police practices that relate to the city's liability. Collectively, the evidence creates significant factual disputes that warrant a trial rather than summary judgment. Consequently, the decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the city is reversed, indicating that the case should proceed to trial to resolve outstanding issues.

A full trial is mandated to address the claims presented, recognizing the inherent dangers faced by police officers while underscoring the judiciary's duty to protect citizens' rights to public safety without undue interference. The court emphasizes the need for impartial fact finders to evaluate the merits of the claims after thorough fact development. The summary judgment against the city is reversed and remanded for trial. The plaintiffs, now divorced, are the natural parents of the deceased, David Samples, and assert that the police department's inadequate training has exacerbated the situation. Additionally, the court struck portions of an affidavit for being conclusory and containing inadmissible opinions. The standard of review for this case is notably less deferential than for verdicts post-trial, as the appellate court can only overturn clearly erroneous findings. The ruling outlines two frameworks for assessing police conduct: one based on substantive due process violations due to egregious police abuse, and the other concerning unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment. The plaintiffs claim that the police's conduct was sufficiently shocking to violate Samples' substantive due process rights, warranting analysis under this standard. Further, any Fourth Amendment claims require consideration of the governmental interests that justified the police actions.

Inconsistencies regarding when Samples allegedly threw a bottle at Oglesby do not impact the summary judgment analysis. Following Samples' death, an Atlanta newspaper highlighted his troubled life, detailing his experiences with family issues, including his parents' divorce and the criminal convictions of relatives. By age fourteen, he had started using drugs and had been arrested multiple times. In 1983, probation officials arranged for him to move in with a stepbrother to escape his problematic neighborhood, which yielded some improvement, though he continued to face challenges during visits to old friends. On August 1, 1984, Samples, distressed over his brother's imprisonment, expressed a desire to be arrested to be with him. Shortly after this call to his mother, he encountered Oglesby. The district court's summary judgment in favor of Oglesby was based on the conclusion that no Section 1983 violation occurred, which precluded city liability. However, upon reversing this judgment, further analysis is warranted. Captain L.F. New claimed misquotation in reporting. The plaintiffs contended that Miller, a former internal affairs investigator, was an expert witness who deemed Oglesby's use of excessive force. The admissibility of his affidavit is unnecessary for the reversal of summary judgment, given sufficient existing evidence. Additionally, the trial court's failure to unseal depositions submitted by plaintiffs is noted; however, this issue is moot due to the reversal on other grounds.