Williams v. Asbestos

Citations: 95 So. 3d 497; 2011 La.App. 4 Cir. 0716; 2012 La. App. LEXIS 677; 2012 WL 1847020Docket: No. 2011-CA-0716

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; May 16, 2012; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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The appeal involves a personal injury and wrongful death case brought by J.C. Williams and his wife against multiple defendants due to asbestos exposure leading to lung cancer and asbestosis. Following J.C. Williams' death, the trial court dismissed two defendants, ruled against punitive damages, and denied a motion for summary judgment on comparative fault. The court certified its judgments as final and appealable. The appellate court found that the trial court incorrectly ruled that comparative fault principles did not apply and erred in its handling of punitive damages, emphasizing the need for further fact evaluation. Additionally, the court determined that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding Union Carbide Corporation's and Dow's involvement in causation, warranting further proceedings. Initially, the Williams filed claims against several companies alleging asbestos exposure from 1980 to 1998, with subsequent amendments adding family members and claims for survival and wrongful death. Various defendants filed motions for summary judgment claiming comparative fault and insufficient evidence for product identification. The trial court granted summary judgment for UCC and Dow but denied it for other defendants concerning causation. After further motions from ELL and ENOI for joinder in the summary judgment, the trial court ultimately denied their claims regarding punitive damages and comparative fault.

The trial court issued a corrected judgment affirming that punitive damages were inapplicable to the case involving Defendants (UCC, Foster, Dow, Bucyrus, Riley, Shell, ELL, ENOI, and ANCO) while denying the applicability of comparative fault. The judgment was certified as final and appealable. Defendants filed for a devolutive appeal, arguing the trial court erred in ruling that comparative fault did not apply, as Mr. Williams' asbestos exposures occurred post-1980, when Louisiana’s Comparative Fault Act became effective. Plaintiffs also sought a devolutive appeal concerning the dismissal of Dow and UCC and the punitive damages ruling, contending the court erred in its dismissals and that punitive damages should apply.

For summary judgment motions, Louisiana law stipulates that a judgment should be rendered if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The burden of proof lies with the movant, who must demonstrate the absence of factual support for essential elements of the opposing party's claims. If the opposing party fails to provide sufficient factual support, there is no genuine issue of material fact. Summary judgment rulings are reviewed de novo, with courts not considering the merits or credibility of evidence. A genuine issue is one that is triable, while a material fact is essential to establishing a cause of action.

Defendants assert the trial court erred in denying their motion on comparative fault principles. The court notes that while Defendants seek appellate review of an interlocutory ruling, such judgments are appealable only when expressly permitted by law.

An appeal is not permitted from a court's refusal to issue a judgment on pleadings or summary judgment, as established by La. C.C.P. art. 968. Consequently, a denial of summary judgment is not a final, appealable decision. Despite discussions about potential delays between the trial court and attorneys, the judgment remains interlocutory. The court can convert the Defendants' appeal into an application for supervisory review if the motion was filed within thirty days of the judgment notice, which occurred in this case. Thus, the court exercises its discretion to convert the appeal for review.

On the merits, the Defendants argue that the trial court erred by not applying comparative fault principles in denying their summary judgment motion. All asbestos exposures alleged by Mr. Williams, who died in 2009, occurred after Louisiana's comparative fault law became effective. The trial court found that the damages caused by each Defendant could not be isolated, stating that the harm suffered by Mr. Williams was indivisible. This determination was framed as a factual finding rather than a legal question, which is improper in summary judgment contexts. While the comparative fault law is applicable, it is the jury's role to assess the evidence and determine how to apportion fault among the defendants based on the specifics of Mr. Williams' exposure to asbestos and related injuries. The jury will ultimately decide whether La. C.C. art. 2324(A) applies in this case.

The court grants the Defendants' writ, reverses the trial court's ruling, and remands for further proceedings regarding punitive damages. The Plaintiffs contend that the trial court incorrectly granted the Defendants’ partial motion for summary judgment on punitive damages applicability. In accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(1), the Plaintiffs’ appeal is deemed procedurally appropriate. They argue that the previous version of La. C.C. art. 2315.3 applies to Mr. Williams’ asbestos exposures between September 1, 1984, and April 16, 1996, which stipulates that exemplary damages can be awarded if the Plaintiffs prove the Defendants' wanton and reckless behavior, endangerment to public safety, and that such conduct occurred in relation to hazardous substances, leading to the Plaintiffs' injuries. 

The court notes that the statute regarding exemplary damages must be strictly construed due to its penal nature. The definitions of wantonness and recklessness imply a disregard for safety that is akin to intending harm or being aware of a high probability of harm. The court cites a precedent ruling that punitive damages cannot be claimed in wrongful death actions and emphasizes the need to evaluate the trial court's denial of punitive damages in relation to the Plaintiffs’ survival action. The Plaintiffs seek to demonstrate that the Defendants were aware of asbestos dangers, referencing OSHA publications and the ban on asbestos-containing insulation. However, the trial court found insufficient evidence of the Defendants' wanton and reckless disregard for public safety in handling asbestos. The reviewing court concludes that the trial court erred in its decision.

The Court emphasized the importance of assessing the defendant’s state of mind to determine eligibility for punitive damages, referencing Griffin v. Tenneco Oil Co., which clarified that plaintiffs do not need to prove specific conduct constituting reckless disregard but must show conscious indifference to public safety. Whether defendants acted in such a manner involves subjective evaluations of intent, motive, and knowledge. The applicability of punitive damages in the plaintiffs' survival action relies on factual determinations about Mr. Williams' exposure to asbestos, which must be evaluated at trial. The trial court's grant of partial summary judgment on punitive damages was reversed due to the existence of genuine issues of material fact.

Foster's claim of exemption from La. C.C. art. 2315.3 was rejected. Although Foster contended that the statute does not regulate manufacturers' conduct, the plaintiffs argued that Foster was involved in the manufacturing or distribution of asbestos products. The Court referenced King v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours, which denied broad protections from La. C.C. art. 2315.3 for manufacturers. 

The plaintiffs also challenged the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of UCC regarding causation, asserting that Mr. Williams' work history at Taft, where he encountered asbestos insulation during shutdowns and turnarounds, established a basis for exposure. Dr. Judd Shellito affirmed that any asbestos exposure significantly contributed to Mr. Williams’ asbestosis and lung cancer. Mr. Williams testified he experienced consistent exposure while working alongside craftsmen during multiple operations at the facility, despite not directly handling asbestos-containing products.

Dr. Frank Parker, III, testified that Mr. Williams was exposed to asbestos during insulation removal at Taft. Thaddeus Porada, a UCC retiree, noted that the turnarounds at Taft lasted two to four weeks and stated that Mr. Williams, as an electrician, would not have been allowed in areas with asbestos abatement due to barricades. Glenn Miaño, also a UCC retiree, confirmed that no additional work occurred in areas undergoing asbestos abatement, which were isolated. Porada mentioned that electricians would not enter isolated areas if hazards were significant. However, Miaño could not confirm whether proper procedures were followed during asbestos removal. Dr. William Dyson asserted that UCC met or exceeded OSHA standards for asbestos abatement, indicating that signage should have warned workers against entering such areas. Porada suggested that any exposure Mr. Williams might have had would not be significant. 

The trial court found that plaintiffs failed to prove Mr. Williams was likely exposed to asbestos at Taft in 1992 and lacked sufficient evidence that Taft contributed to his injuries. The plaintiffs bear the burden of proving causation, as established in Vodanovich v. A.P. Green Indus. Inc. The record indicated conflicting evidence regarding Mr. Williams' exposure, and the trial court improperly weighed this evidence during a motion for summary judgment. Given Mr. Williams' testimony and expert opinions, there exists a genuine issue of material fact about whether UCC was responsible for his asbestos exposure and its contribution to his injuries and death. Consequently, the trial court's judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Additionally, the plaintiffs contested the trial court's granting of Dow’s motion for summary judgment on causation, while Dow contended that the plaintiffs' evidence was primarily hearsay. Hearsay, defined as an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, is generally inadmissible due to concerns over the credibility of the out-of-court speaker.

The trial court is responsible for determining the admissibility of evidence, specifically whether the Plaintiffs' evidence constitutes hearsay, as outlined in La. C.E. art. 104(A). This article states that preliminary questions regarding witness competency and evidence admissibility are decided by the court, which is not strictly bound by evidence rules except those concerning privileges. If the court finds statements to be hearsay, it must consider La. C.E. art. 801(D)(4) and the exceptions listed in La. C.E. art. 803, which includes present sense impressions, excited utterances, and statements of then-existing conditions.

The Plaintiffs presented more than just Mr. Williams' deposition against Dow's partial summary judgment motion. Mr. Williams described his role at Dow's Plaquemine facility and testified that various trades worked closely together, suggesting potential exposure to asbestos. He claimed he was exposed to asbestos indirectly while passing other craftsmen but did not assert direct handling of insulation products. His awareness of asbestos exposure was based on conversations with coworkers, and he expressed skepticism about safety procedures being consistently followed. 

Dr. Parker supported Mr. Williams' claims, stating that exposure was likely due to proximity to other workers. In contrast, Bradley Rabalais, a Dow employee, deemed it "unlikely" that insulation contained asbestos due to facility protocols and indicated that violations would occur if Mr. Williams worked closely with asbestos-removing workers. Roger Hudson, also from Dow, asserted that insulation was presumed to contain asbestos until proven otherwise and deemed it "extremely improbable" that Mr. Williams was exposed to asbestos in 1998, noting he had no direct knowledge of Mr. Williams' work.

Leroy Balzer, Dow's industrial hygienist, testified that materials were presumed to contain asbestos until proven otherwise, asserting that Mr. Williams' claims of asbestos exposure at Dow lacked scientific support. Dow argued that Plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence against its motion for summary judgment. However, Plaintiffs countered with Mr. Williams' testimony and Dr. Parker's expert opinion, which contradicted Dow's claims. Although the Plaintiffs may have demonstrated more evidence regarding asbestos exposure from other defendants, the trial judge serves as the gatekeeper for admissible evidence, and the factfinder must assess the credibility of this evidence to ascertain Mr. Williams' exposure to asbestos at Dow. Consequently, the trial court's granting of Dow's partial summary judgment was deemed erroneous, leading to a reversal for further proceedings. The decree also found that the trial court incorrectly ruled on comparative fault principles, punitive damages, and causation regarding UCC's motion for summary judgment, highlighting genuine issues of material fact concerning Mr. Williams' exposure to asbestos. Clauses from Louisiana civil code regarding partial judgments, divisible and indivisible obligations, and fault determination in damage actions were cited to support these findings. The court's actions were reversed and remanded for additional proceedings.

Claims for recovery of damages related to injury, death, or loss are governed by the provisions of Paragraph A, applicable to any legal doctrine or theory of liability. According to La. C.C. art. 2324, individuals who conspire to commit intentional acts are jointly liable for damages caused. In cases where liability is not solidary, multiple parties are jointly and severally liable, with each joint tortfeasor responsible only for their degree of fault and not for the fault of others, regardless of the other parties' insolvency or immunity. The plaintiffs argue that La. C.C. art. 2324(A) holds defendants liable for Mr. Williams’ death in a solidary manner. Additionally, La. C.E. art. 801(D) outlines that certain statements made under immediate pressure of an event are not considered hearsay, while La. C.E. art. 703 permits experts to base opinions on facts or data perceived or disclosed prior to the hearing, even if such information is not admissible as evidence, provided it is relied upon by experts in the field.