Spann v. State

Citations: 91 So. 3d 812; 2012 WL 1868491Docket: No. SC09-2330

Court: Supreme Court of Florida; May 24, 2012; Florida; State Supreme Court

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Anthony Spann appeals the denial of his successive motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, challenging his first-degree murder conviction and death sentence based on newly discovered evidence: the recantation of his accomplice, Lenard Philmore. Spann's convictions arose from a November 1997 crime spree, which included robbery and murder, culminating in a jury trial in 2000 that resulted in multiple convictions and a death sentence for the murder of Kazue Perron. Following his conviction, Spann filed a federal habeas corpus petition, asserting claims including actual innocence based on Philmore's recantation, but the federal court deemed the claim unexhausted and suggested Spann pursue it in state court.

On May 4, 2009, Spann filed his successive rule 3.851 motion, asserting entitlement to a new trial due to Philmore’s recantation, which he claimed occurred after Philmore expressed a desire to tell the truth. An evidentiary hearing took place on September 1, 2009, where Philmore testified, denying Spann's involvement in the crimes. However, the trial court found Philmore's recantation to be not credible and unreliable, thereby denying Spann's motion. The appellate court, referencing established standards for newly discovered evidence, affirmed the trial court's decision, emphasizing that newly discovered evidence must be unknown at trial and likely to produce an acquittal upon retrial.

In evaluating a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the trial court must assess all admissible evidence and weigh it against the evidence presented during the original trial. Recantations by witnesses can qualify as newly discovered evidence, but they are generally deemed unreliable. A defendant is not automatically entitled to a new trial solely based on a witness's recantation; the trial judge must consider all case circumstances, including the witness's credibility and the potential impact of the recantation on the trial outcome. A new trial is warranted only if the court is convinced that the recantation is truthful and that it is likely to result in a different verdict. The trial court's findings regarding the credibility of a recantation are afforded significant deference on appeal, with affirmance given if supported by substantial evidence.

In this case, Philmore initially testified at trial that Spann was his accomplice in a series of crimes, but later recanted, claiming that another individual, Daryl Brooks, was involved instead. The trial court found Philmore's recantation untruthful. To assess whether this determination is supported by sufficient evidence, a comprehensive review of both Philmore's original and revised accounts, along with supporting evidence from the trial, is required.

Philmore testified that on November 13, 1997, he was staying at his acquaintance Sophia Hutchins' home when Spann awakened him with a plan to rob a pawn shop to secure money for their departure from Florida. Spann proposed using his blue Subaru as the getaway vehicle, but since Philmore could not drive a stick shift, it was arranged that he and Hutchins would execute the robbery while Spann drove. The robbery occurred as planned, resulting in the theft of jewelry and four guns, but very little cash, which disappointed Spann. Later, Philmore sold some of the stolen jewelry and one gun, while each of them kept one gun.

That evening, Spann and Philmore, along with their girlfriends, spent the night at a motel, where Spann suggested robbing a bank. They decided to steal another car to evade police detection and planned to escape to New York. The following day, after dropping off their girlfriends, they sought a vehicle to steal. They targeted Kazue Perron, asking to use her phone, and when she attempted to leave, Philmore brandished a gun and forced her into her car. 

After driving away, Spann directed Philmore to a secluded location, where Spann indicated Philmore should kill Perron. Philmore complied, shooting her in the forehead and disposing of her body in a canal. The two then concealed the stolen Lexus near the bank they intended to rob.

Philmore discarded his bloody shirt and donned Spann’s before they drove to the bank in a Subaru. Inside the bank, Philmore seized cash from a teller and returned to the Subaru, giving Spann $500, half of the stolen money. They then hid the Subaru and drove away in a Lexus, picking up Stevenson and Cooper afterward. Following a stop at a Burger King for Cooper’s paycheck, they approached Hutchins' home when they noticed police waiting, prompting Spann to flee in a high-speed chase that ended with a blown tire. Armed with guns, Spann and Philmore escaped into an orange grove, where they were apprehended hours later.

During his testimony, Philmore revealed he had not received any leniency from the prosecution and faced the death penalty. He stated that his decision to testify against Spann stemmed from remorse and a desire for justice regarding the death of Ms. Kazue Perron. Philmore admitted to initially lying to police about their involvement and revealed that Spann had instructed him to falsely claim that Spann had no role in the crimes. Spann had suggested Philmore fabricate details about the accomplice. Philmore’s resentment towards Spann influenced his choice to testify.

Additional witnesses corroborated Philmore's testimony. Michael Buss, a pawn shop owner, described being robbed at gunpoint by Philmore and Hutchins and saw them flee towards a dark blue car. Keyontra Cooper and Latoya Stevenson testified about their presence with Spann and Philmore the night before the robbery, noting they saw guns that were later linked to the pawn shop theft. After the robbery, Cooper recalled a conversation with Philmore about needing money, to which Spann ominously responded, "You know what we have to do." Cooper and Stevenson were dropped off at home shortly thereafter.

Kazue Perron’s husband, Jean Claude Perron, last saw her at approximately 12:40 p.m. as she departed for a 1:00 p.m. appointment on Elizabeth Avenue in Lake Park. Martha Solis, a housekeeper, observed a blue Subaru parked nearby, which she later identified as belonging to Spann, with two black males—one matching Philmore’s description—nearby. A robbery occurred at the First Bank of Indiantown at 1:58 p.m., where bank teller Sandra Maguire witnessed Philmore stealing around $1,000. Catherine Donnelly saw Philmore leave the bank and enter the passenger side of a blue car with another black male driving. At about 2:00 p.m., Leo Gomez nearly collided with a car occupied by two black males. Police later discovered the Subaru at a pump station, registered to Folia Spann, Anthony Spann's wife, with a deposit ticket from the bank inside.

Cooper received a page from Philmore at 2:28 p.m. and learned that he and Spann were at Stevenson’s house. Spann picked up both women in a gold Lexus, which raised their suspicions. During the ride, they saw magazines addressed to Kazue Perron. After a stop at Burger King, Spann drove toward Sophia Hutchins’ house but turned around upon seeing police cars. The police chase began around 8:15 p.m., with the Lexus speeding through residential areas and onto Interstate 95 at speeds of 100 to 130 mph. During the chase, Stevenson observed two guns in the center console, and Spann admitted the Lexus was stolen. A tire eventually blew out, leading to Spann and Philmore fleeing the vehicle, armed, into an orange grove, where they encountered the grove’s owner, John Scarborough.

Spann and Philmore informed Scarborough that they were evading police due to a speeding incident, prompting Scarborough to guide them to a hiding spot in a grove. After police arrived, Scarborough aided in their search. Hours later, officers, including John Cummings of the Martin County Sheriff’s Office, arrested Spann and Philmore, who were found with $464.12 and $545, respectively. Scarborough later discovered two guns and a pager in the vicinity, one of which was identified as the murder weapon of Kazue Perron. During a police interview played at trial, Spann denied involvement in the robberies and murder, claiming he spent the day at his aunt's house until being picked up by Philmore in a Lexus, which he speculated was obtained through a drug trade. He stated that his Subaru was a "trash car" lent to Sophia Hutchins, despite claiming it was not his. Contrarily, Spann’s aunt testified he was not at her home that day, and his wife confirmed she owned the Subaru and that it was not shared.

At a postconviction evidentiary hearing, Philmore recanted his trial testimony implicating Spann, stating he fabricated it based on his attorney's advice to divert blame. He asserted that he began November 13 at Hutchins' home but could not recall if Spann was present. Philmore claimed he and Hutchins planned the pawn shop robbery and denied any knowledge about Spann needing to escape. He admitted to stealing items during the robbery but maintained that Spann was not the getaway driver, eventually identifying Daryl Brooks as the actual driver. Philmore described returning to Hutchins’ house in the Subaru post-robbery, while he and Hutchins sold the stolen jewelry at a pawn shop.

Philmore sold one gun and, along with Hutchins and Brooks, kept the remaining three guns. Later, Spann and Philmore picked up Latoya Stevenson and Kiki Cooper, bringing them to a hotel. When asked about Brooks, Philmore claimed he was at home and denied discussing the upcoming bank robbery with Spann. The following morning, after dropping off Stevenson and Cooper, Philmore picked up Brooks and suggested robbing a bank, stating he needed a getaway vehicle due to police interest in him. Philmore recounted the carjacking and murder of Perron, stating that he robbed the bank while Brooks waited in the Subaru. After the robbery, he returned to the vehicle and gave half the stolen money to Brooks, who drove them back to hide the Subaru and escape in a Lexus. The group was later apprehended following a police chase. 

Thomas Bakkedahl, the prosecutor in both Philmore's and Spann's cases, testified regarding Philmore's trial, which preceded Spann's, noting the jury's unanimous death penalty recommendation. Bakkedahl described how Philmore initially denied his involvement but later confessed during a polygraph test and again on November 26, aligning with his testimony at Spann’s trial. Initially reluctant to testify against Spann, Philmore changed his mind after being offended by Spann's comments in prison. Bakkedahl believed Philmore expressed genuine remorse for Perron's death but suggested that Philmore may have been manipulating the court. 

For Spann to succeed in his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, he must meet the criteria from Jones II, which require that the evidence was unknown to the trial court, the party, or counsel during the trial, and that it could not have been discovered with diligence. Philmore's recantation was not known to Spann until after his initial postconviction proceedings, making it officially recognized as newly discovered evidence by the trial court.

Spann must prove that the newly discovered evidence could likely lead to an acquittal on retrial, as per the second prong of Jones II. In cases where the new evidence is a witness's recantation, the defendant must first demonstrate the truthfulness of that recantation. The trial court deemed Philmore's recantation as "not credible, untruthful, and exceedingly unreliable," a finding supported by substantial evidence. The court noted inconsistencies in Philmore's recantation concerning the timeline of events surrounding the bank robbery. A 911 call indicated the robbery occurred at 1:58 p.m., while Philmore claimed he and Spann arrived at a residence in Riviera Beach at 2:28 p.m., which was inconsistent with the travel times and distances established through trial testimony and investigator findings. 

Philmore's original account aligned with the evidence that it took approximately 31 minutes to travel from Indiantown to Stevenson’s residence, while his recantation involved a convoluted route that could not feasibly be completed within the available time. Testimony from an investigator further supported the trial court's conclusion that it was implausible to complete the claimed journey in 30 minutes. Additionally, Philmore's recantation contradicted trial evidence regarding his ability to drive a stick-shift vehicle and his claim about the distribution of bank robbery proceeds, which did not align with the money found on Spann at the time of their arrest. Lastly, Philmore's recantation conflicted with Spann's initial alibi to law enforcement, and the trial court found no independent evidence to support Philmore's new claims.

Philmore was the sole witness identifying Spann as his co-perpetrator in the crimes, but significant circumstantial evidence supported Spann's involvement. Philmore later claimed that Daryl Brooks was his accomplice, yet no evidence confirmed Brooks' existence or connection to the crimes, as no trial witnesses linked him to the pawn shop robbery, Perron's murder, or the bank robbery. During a postconviction evidentiary hearing, Philmore was evasive about identifying his accomplice if Spann was excluded and only mentioned a "relationship" with Brooks. The trial court noted that Philmore identified Brooks only after being warned that his recantation could be disregarded. Spann presented no evidence beyond Philmore’s testimony to substantiate the identification of Brooks. The trial court found Philmore not credible, citing evidence of Spann's attempts to influence his testimony. Philmore testified that Spann had instructed him in a letter to falsify details and create a name if needed. Initially, Spann denied authorship of the letter but later admitted it after handwriting analysis was conducted. Philmore's recantation was further questioned due to his demeanor during cross-examination; he appeared amused and evasive when asked about Brooks, reinforcing the trial court's skepticism regarding his credibility.

Philmore's demeanor during his testimony raised concerns for the court, as he smiled inappropriately while recounting the events of shooting Perron, suggesting a lack of seriousness. When questioned about his behavior, he dismissed it as amusement over repetitive questioning by the State, which the court found unconvincing. The trial judge's observations of Philmore were given great deference, as appellate judges lack the same perspective on witness demeanor. In contrast to the case of Johnson v. Singletary, where the trial court denied a motion for new trial without an evidentiary hearing, the current case involved a hearing where the trial court assessed the credibility of newly discovered evidence. The trial court's conclusion that Philmore's recantation was untruthful was supported by competent and substantial evidence, leading to the affirmation of the denial of Spann’s postconviction relief motion. The court’s decision followed a procedural history where Spann had filed his initial motion for postconviction relief in 2004, which included hearings and amendments before the trial court denied all claims, a ruling that was subsequently affirmed by this Court.

Philmore was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, with his trial being separate from that of Spann. The Court upheld Philmore's convictions and death sentence on direct appeal in Philmore v. State, 820 So.2d 919 (Fla. 2002). During the appeal, a composite description of the offenses was provided based on trial evidence, without distinguishing which evidence pertained specifically to Philmore versus other witnesses. Philmore did not clarify at trial his and Spann's reasons for leaving Florida, although evidence indicated they faced serious criminal charges at that time. Ranew measured the distance to Hutchins’ house in response to a defense argument that a black male seen with Philmore was Hutchins, despite witnesses stating it was not. Spann noted in the margin of a letter that a specific point was significant. The admissibility of handwriting expert testimony was also contested during Spann’s direct appeal.