Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; April 11, 2012; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
Intervenors Pearl Hatter Biggs, Dock R. Hatter, Jr., Josezette Josephine White, and Bobbie Jean Hatter Smith sought supervisory writs following a trial court's denial of their motion for summary judgment against Isaac Curtis Hatter, Jr., Carolyn Hatter Curry, Steno Hatter Gillis, and Lewis Louisiana Properties, LLC. They contended that a judgment of possession favoring Isaac Jr. and Carolyn regarding a property in Claiborne Parish should be declared null due to fraud and ill practices, and they sought attorney fees and costs. Additionally, they claimed superior title to the property over Lewis Louisiana Properties, LLC. The court granted the writ application, ordered the record's lodging, and docketed the case for decision. Ultimately, the court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The background involves Isaac Hatter, Sr., who was divorced in California and died in 2003, leaving behind a will that appointed his brother and sister as personal representatives. The will stipulated the division of his estate among his children and siblings. After contesting the will's validity, Isaac Jr. was removed as the administrator, and Pearl became executrix. In 2005, Steno, Isaac Jr., and Carolyn filed for possession of Isaac Sr.’s immovable property in Claiborne Parish, claiming he died intestate, listing the property and mineral rights in question.
On January 31, 2006, the Claiborne Parish court issued a judgment of possession to Isaac Jr. and Carolyn for a property, which they sold to Lewis Louisiana Properties, LLC (LLP) on October 23, 2006, for about $90,000. LLP later pursued mineral royalty payments from Petro-Hunt LLC, claiming a 58 percent undivided interest in the property. On June 27, 2007, Petro-Hunt filed a concursus petition to deposit $200,503.75 into the court for defendants claiming royalty entitlements. In response, Pearl, Dock, Josezette Josephine White, and Bobbie Jean Hatter Smith sought an injunction to halt partition proceedings until their ownership rights were clarified.
On July 11, 2007, Pearl filed for ancillary probate of her brother Isaac Sr.'s estate and was confirmed as executrix. Shortly after, on July 30, 2007, she initiated a petitory action to annul the prior judgment of possession, alleging it was secured through fraud and ill practices. LLP, Isaac Jr., and Carolyn were named as defendants. An intervention petition was filed on October 24, 2007, by Pearl and others, seeking the same relief.
On April 14, 2008, plaintiffs amended their petition with additional fraud allegations. LLP responded on April 15, claiming it was an innocent third party relying on public records and filed a peremptory exception of prescription on September 5, 2008, arguing that Pearl's claims were barred as they were not recognized in the judgment of possession. The trial court granted this exception, but the succession and intervenors appealed. The court reversed the decision, ruling that Pearl’s petition interrupted the two-year prescriptive period and that the intervention was valid. The case was remanded for further proceedings. On September 24, 2008, a new judgment of possession was issued, recognizing the intervenors as Isaac Sr.'s sole heirs and owners of his interest in the property.
In April 2010, LLP filed a reconventional demand challenging a judgment of possession granted to intervenors on September 24, 2008, asserting that the disputed property is located in Colquitt, Louisiana, not Homer. LLP argued that Isaac Jr. and Carolyn had previously obtained a judgment of possession for the property in 2006 and sold it to LLP later that year. LLP claimed the intervenors' judgment clouds its title and sought to reform it to eliminate references to the disputed property.
LLP filed a motion for summary judgment on September 5, 2008, invoking the public record doctrine to protect its interests against unfiled documents, including a will purportedly probated in California. In a supplemental memorandum in April 2010, LLP contended that the will directed that property in Homer be given to the intervenors but did not address the 186-acre tract in Colquitt, which is central to the dispute. LLP argued that since the will lacked a residue clause directing the remaining estate to specific individuals, the estate would pass through intestacy laws to Isaac Sr.’s children, Isaac Jr. and Carolyn.
In response, the intervenors claimed that LLP's arguments regarding "good faith" and public records were irrelevant to succession proceedings. On June 4, 2010, the intervenors filed their own motion for summary judgment, asserting that their possession judgment was fraudulently obtained by Isaac Jr. and Carolyn, who claimed Isaac Sr. died without a will. They sought to have this judgment canceled and to recover attorney fees.
On December 3, 2010, the intervenors filed another motion for summary judgment against LLP, asserting superior title based on Isaac Sr.'s will, which they believed clearly intended to convey the disputed property to them. They emphasized the property's long-standing identity as the Wake Hatter Estate and referenced tax records supporting its location in Homer. The trial court denied all motions for summary judgment on July 8, 2011, leading to an application for supervisory review from the intervenors, who argued the trial court erred in its ruling. The court granted the writ application for further consideration. The intervenors maintained that the judgment favoring Isaac Jr. and Carolyn was obtained through fraudulent means, with Isaac Jr. having knowledge of his father's will, which bequeathed the Wake Hatter Estate to them.
Intervenors argue that Isaac Jr. and Carolyn's sale of property validates their mother’s fraudulent acquisition of a judgment of possession. They seek summary judgment against Isaac Jr. and Carolyn, requesting attorney fees and costs, as well as the annulment of the judgment of possession and the sale to LLP from public records. Legal principles indicate that appellate courts review summary judgments de novo. A motion for summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists, as stipulated under La. C.C.P. art. 966. If the motion is supported adequately, the opposing party must present specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue; failure to do so may result in summary judgment against them under La. C.C.P. art. 967(B). Fraud or ill practices can annul a final judgment under La. C.C.P. art. 2004, requiring action within one year of discovering the fraud. Historical criteria for nullity include the deprivation of legal rights and the unconscionability of enforcing the judgment, as recognized by the Louisiana Supreme Court. Ex parte judgments can be annulled if based on false affidavits. The intervenors supported their motion with various documents, including a sheriff's deed from 1979 and a judgment of possession from July 2003, which awarded interests in the disputed property.
Intervenors presented several key documents, including a 1950 divorce judgment, Isaac Sr.’s will, a contested probate from January 2004, and a November 2004 California judgment confirming the will and appointing Pearl as administrator. Additional documents included a February 2006 petition for possession filed by Steno for Isaac Jr. and Carolyn, a January 2006 judgment granting them possession of disputed property, an October 2006 cash sale deed transferring the property to LLP, and a September 2008 judgment favoring the intervenors in a possession dispute. Isaac Jr. provided an affidavit indicating he hired Daniel W. Newell for his father's succession and requested his mother sign an affidavit to avoid missing work to find a notary. Isaac Jr. acknowledged he was aware of the proceedings and requested his mother to sign on his behalf. No opposition was filed against the summary judgment motion, and their curator adopted LLP’s arguments.
The intervenors demonstrated that Isaac Jr. knew of the will’s existence, his unsuccessful challenge to it in California, and its probate status, which dictated the property’s disposition. Despite this, he, Carolyn, and Steno falsely claimed in a Claiborne Parish petition that Isaac Sr. died intestate, thus positioning themselves as heirs to the property. This led to a fraudulent judgment granting them possession, which they subsequently sold to LLP. The intervenors established that the possession judgment was obtained through fraud and ill practices. The court found no genuine issue of material fact and determined that the denial of the summary judgment motion was erroneous. Consequently, it reversed the trial court's decision, declaring the possession judgment null and ordering its cancellation from public records. The intervenors sought reasonable attorney fees and costs related to this judgment’s nullification, and the matter was remanded for evidence entry on those fees. Additionally, the intervenors argued that the trial court should have granted their motion for summary judgment against LLP, countering LLP’s claims of 'good faith' and public records doctrine as inapplicable to succession matters.
The public records doctrine in this state was revised by Acts 2005, No. 169, effective July 1, 2006, and governs the sale to LLP on October 23, 2006. Under La. C.C. art. 3338, certain instruments affecting immovable property, such as transfers, leases, options, and modifications, must be recorded to be effective against third parties. The recordation does not imply validity or authenticity of the instrument. A "third person" is defined as someone not bound by the instrument, and the doctrine aims to ensure land title stability, functioning as a negative doctrine that denies effectiveness of unrecorded rights.
There are exceptions to this doctrine, notably regarding inheritance rights, where the law of registry does not apply if property rights are acquired by inheritance. Jurisprudence affirms that property obtained through succession remains valid even if not documented in the public records. Recent revisions do not alter the rights created by operation of law. La. R.S. 9:5630 establishes a two-year prescription period for successors of deceased persons to assert their interests in immovables against third parties who acquired interests through recognized heirs or legatees.
The Section establishes a liberative prescription applicable both retroactively and prospectively, allowing individuals adversely affected by it one year from its effective date to assert claims as described in Subsection A; failure to do so results in the claim being permanently barred. A "third person" is defined as anyone not recognized as an heir or legatee in a judgment of possession. After thirty years from the recordation of such a judgment, there is a conclusive presumption of its validity. This provision permits successors of a deceased individual, not recognized in a judgment of possession, to assert interests in immovable property against third parties who have acquired interests from recognized heirs or legatees. The public records doctrine does not hinder these claims if filed within specified time limits.
In the case at hand, LLP argues that the intervenors did not file their California judgment in Claiborne Parish's public records before LLP's land purchase, thus claiming entitlement under the public records doctrine. However, inheritance rights established by law are exceptions to this doctrine. The intervenors acted promptly to protect their inheritance after discovering attempts by Isaac Jr. and Carolyn to claim title. They filed actions within two years of the judgment favoring Isaac Jr. and Carolyn, aligning with La. R.S. 9:5630. Consequently, the public records doctrine does not uphold LLP's claim to the property acquired through this allegedly fraudulent judgment.
LLP also contests the property description, asserting discrepancies between the will's conveyance of property in Homer, Louisiana, and the property it purchased near Colquitt, Louisiana. The intervenors countered by providing a map of the property known as the 'Wake Hatter Estate,' which matches the terminology in the decedent's will and indicates that the property conveyed to LLP does not include certain excluded acreage. They submitted deeds showing the property’s title history and deposition excerpts confirming that Isaac Sr. owned only the Wake Hatter Estate. Additionally, affidavits from Pearl Hatter Biggs and Dock Hatter were included to support their motion for summary judgment against LLP.
The trial court's failure to grant summary judgment in favor of the intervenors against LLP is deemed erroneous. The affidavits confirm that tax notices for the property originate from Homer, Louisiana, and clarify that Colquitt is not a town. Documentation shows that the property in question, the Wake Hatter Estate, was inherited by the intervenors through Isaac Sr.'s will and is the same property referenced in the judgment of possession obtained by Isaac Jr. and Carolyn. LLP's claims of a dispute regarding the property description lack supporting evidence, establishing no genuine issue of material fact exists. The judgment of possession held by Isaac Jr. and Carolyn is rendered null due to fraud and ill practices, and since the intervenors' title is vested by law, LLP's claim through their purchase is invalid. LLP's reconventional demand regarding the property’s description has been addressed, making it moot. Consequently, the court reverses the trial court’s judgment and grants the intervenors' motions for summary judgment, affirming their ownership of the property. The judgment of possession for Isaac Jr. and Carolyn, along with their sale to LLP, is ordered canceled. The case is remanded for consideration of attorney fees and costs for the intervenors, with court costs split equally between the intervenors and LLP.
