Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; February 7, 2012; Florida; State Appellate Court
Denise and Phillip Sottilaro appeal a wrongful death judgment in favor of Maricela Figueroa, representing the Estate of Christopher Cepeda, who was killed after being struck by Ms. Sottilaro's vehicle. A jury found Denise Sottilaro seventy percent comparatively negligent and Christopher Cepeda thirty percent at fault, awarding the Estate $50,733.59 for past medical expenses and $1.325 million for pain and suffering. After adjusting for comparative negligence, the final judgment was $35,513.51 for medical bills and $927,500 for pain and suffering.
The Sottilaros contend that the trial court improperly interpreted the accident report privilege, which resulted in the exclusion of crucial impeachment evidence from key witnesses. The court's ruling that the privilege applied to statements from uninvolved witnesses was deemed incorrect, leading to a reversal and a remand for a new trial. Consequently, the award of costs to the Estate as the prevailing party was also reversed. Other issues raised in the appeal were rendered moot by the remand for a new trial.
Background: On September 21, 2008, Christopher Cepeda and his friends were walking home after playing basketball and were involved in a fatal accident while crossing U.S. 27. Ms. Sottilaro was driving at approximately sixty to sixty-five miles per hour when she struck Mr. Cepeda, who was allegedly texting while crossing. Testimonies from Cepeda's friends were included in the traffic investigation report, but the trial court ruled against the use of this report for impeachment purposes during the trial, leading to the appeal.
Following the trial, the Sottilaros requested a new trial, prompting a court hearing where the judge emphasized reliance on precedent from the Second District Court of Appeal, suggesting that he may have been inclined to allow witness statements as prior inconsistent statements had the case law not influenced his decision. Generally, a trial court's decision regarding evidence admissibility is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, but errors in interpreting relevant laws are reviewed de novo. The trial court's ruling concerning the accident report privilege was determined to be an incorrect interpretation of Florida law. According to Section 316.066(5) of the Florida Statutes, statements made during the completion of a crash report are generally inadmissible in trials, protecting individuals from self-incrimination when reporting accident details. However, law enforcement officers may testify about statements made by individuals involved in accidents, provided that the individual’s privilege against self-incrimination is not compromised. The statutory privilege applies only to drivers, owners, or occupants of a vehicle compelled to report under specific statutes; it does not extend to witnesses. The court firmly stated that the statute provides immunity solely for statements made by those required to report under section 316.066, affirming that non-defendant witnesses are not obligated to report and thus do not benefit from the privilege against self-incrimination.
The Fourth District's ruling in McTevia v. Schrag establishes that the accident report privilege is limited to individuals who are drivers, owners, or occupants of the vehicle involved in an accident. The court reaffirmed that this privilege does not extend to witnesses or others who voluntarily provide information to the investigating officer. In McTevia, a friend of the plaintiffs initially claimed he did not see the accident, but later admitted he did, leading to a motion to exclude his first statement. The trial court allowed the evidence, and the Fourth District upheld this decision, emphasizing that the privilege applies only to those legally required to report the accident. The privilege serves to protect individuals’ Fifth Amendment rights, as mandated by statute. Analogous to McTevia, the case at hand involves statements from witnesses who were not involved in the accident and were not required to report, thus making their testimony admissible. The principle "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" reinforces that the privilege explicitly applies only to reports from those directly involved in the accident, excluding others. The Estate's reference to the Williams case is deemed distinguishable, as it pertains to a statement from an accident victim rather than a witness.
The pedestrian provided a statement to an officer while hospitalized, and at trial, the officer recalled that the pedestrian seemed unaware of the traffic light's color. The court determined that the accident report privilege protected the pedestrian's statements, noting that while the relevant statutes (317.12-317.15 F.S.A.) do not mandate a pedestrian to report an accident, any statements made to an official investigator fall under the protection of 317.17 F.S.A., which grants immunity to individuals reporting accidents. The court emphasized that the rights and responsibilities of motorists and pedestrians are reciprocal, and admitting only the pedestrian's report while excluding the driver's would contravene this principle.
The case differs from Williams, which involved a pedestrian's statement; here, the focus is on witness statements. The court distinguished that witnesses lack the same rights and responsibilities as involved parties, rendering the Williams reasoning inapplicable. The trial's central issue was fault, particularly whether Mr. Cepeda was in the roadway or median at the time of the accident, with jury questions indicating concern over his location. The trial court's exclusion of key witness impeachment testimony was deemed a legal error, prompting a reversal and remand for a new trial. The court also reversed the trial court's award of costs to the Estate, as the statutory basis for such costs depended on the underlying judgment. The applicable statute for this case is the one in effect at the time of trial (2010), despite subsequent amendments in 2011.
