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Smith v. St. Landry Parish Solid Waste Disposal District

Citations: 81 So. 3d 50; 2011 La.App. 3 Cir. 946; 2011 La. App. LEXIS 1466Docket: No. 11-946

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; December 6, 2011; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Michael and Ernesta Smith sued the St. Landry Parish Solid Waste Disposal District and supervisor Katry Martin after their son, Martel Smith, died while working at the St. Landry Sanitary Landfill. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, determining that the Smiths failed to prove the intentional act exception to workers’ compensation immunity. Martel was found crushed between the hoist and truck frame while working alone, and resuscitation efforts were unsuccessful. Co-workers were unsure how the accident occurred, with some speculating that Martel might have inadvertently engaged the controls while investigating the truck. The plaintiffs’ expert suggested a third party must have been involved, as Martel could not have operated the controls alone. However, all co-employees testified they were not present during the incident and could not identify anyone else who witnessed it. The truck had no recorded malfunctions and was returned to service post-accident. The Smiths argued that Martel was murdered by an unnamed co-employee, asserting that this constituted an intentional act and an exception to workers' compensation protections. The trial court found the Smiths did not provide specific facts to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, deeming their theory speculative. The court stated that to invoke the intentional act exception, a plaintiff must show the employer either desired the result or knew it was substantially certain to occur. The defendants’ evidence, showing no co-employees were near Martel at the time of death, indicated that the employer could not have intentionally caused the incident. The burden then shifted to the plaintiffs, who failed to present specific facts to support their claims.

Martel's death was attributed to various potential causes, including a practical joke gone wrong, murder, suicide, mechanical failure, or accidental engagement of vehicle controls. The Smiths failed to provide specific evidence to support any particular theory, leading to the conclusion that summary judgment was appropriate. The plaintiffs could not meet their burden of proof based solely on speculation. Even expert testimony suggesting that Martel likely did not cause his own death did not create a genuine issue regarding the employer's alleged intent to cause harm. Previous rulings indicated that mere presence of hazards, such as asbestos, does not imply intent or knowledge of inevitable exposure by the employer. Cleco's affidavits supported their lack of intent to expose plaintiffs to asbestos, which the plaintiffs did not contest. The court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Constructors and Cleco. Additionally, the court rejected the application of res ipsa loquitur to the plaintiffs' claims, clarifying that the doctrine concerns negligence, not intentional acts, and that the evidence did not sufficiently rule out other causes of Martel's death. Costs of the appeal were assessed to the plaintiffs.