Cochran v. Chapman

Citations: 81 So. 3d 344; 2011 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 252; 2011 WL 4133010Docket: 2100550

Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama; September 16, 2011; Alabama; State Appellate Court

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Linda Lee Cochran appeals a divorce judgment from the Mobile Circuit Court, which determined that she and Joseph P. Chapman had entered into a common-law marriage. This case marks the second appeal regarding their marital status, following Cochran v. Chapman, 21 So.3d 1244 (Ala.Civ.App.2008). Chapman initially filed for divorce on June 8, 2007, asserting they married on December 31, 1989, and separated on June 1, 2007. Cochran denied the existence of a marriage, leading to a trial on November 14, 2007, where the court ruled they had not established a common-law marriage. Following Chapman's motion to vacate this ruling, the trial court reversed its judgment on February 11, 2008, recognizing a common-law marriage. Cochran's subsequent appeal was dismissed as the order was not a final judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure.

On January 31, 2011, a second ore tenus proceeding was held, resulting in a divorce judgment and property division on February 3, 2011. Cochran contends the trial court erred by ruling they had a common-law marriage, warranting the vacation of the divorce judgment. The appellate court applies a stringent standard for common-law marriage claims, requiring clear and convincing evidence. Findings based on ore tenus evidence are given deference, affirming judgments supported by credible evidence under any logical interpretation. Clear and convincing evidence necessitates a high probability of correctness regarding each claim's essential elements.

Proof by clear and convincing evidence is required for establishing a common-law marriage in Alabama, necessitating a higher standard than merely a preponderance of evidence. The essential elements for recognition of such a marriage include: (1) the capacity to marry, (2) a mutual agreement to enter a marriage relationship exclusively, and (3) public acknowledgment of the relationship and fulfillment of marital responsibilities. Whether these elements are satisfied is a factual determination, as is the intent or mutual assent to marry.

At a hearing on November 14, 2007, the focus was on whether the parties had established a common-law marriage. Testimonies revealed that the couple began cohabitating in 1989, initially in a mobile home owned by Chapman. They later moved this mobile home to a property that Chapman claimed they purchased together, while Cochran asserted she had bought it herself, holding the title. Chapman testified about purchasing a double-wide mobile home in 1997 or 1998 with a cash advance from Cochran’s credit card, which was also titled in Cochran's name. They shared expenses for improvements, and Chapman made payments on Cochran’s credit card.

They opened a joint bank account, but Cochran claimed she had closed it shortly after making Chapman an authorized user due to his banking difficulties. Testimony indicated they had previously shared an automobile-insurance policy but maintained separate policies at the time of the hearing. Both parties filed their tax returns as 'single' and Chapman identified as single on a loan application in 2006. Cochran listed herself as 'single' on her health insurance application and identified Chapman as a 'friend' on her retirement plan, naming her mother as the primary beneficiary. Despite Chapman's belief that they were married, Cochran stated she never represented herself as married to him or introduced him as her husband.

Cochran did not use the title 'Mrs.' nor adopt Chapman’s surname. During a November 14, 2007, hearing, witnesses provided conflicting testimony regarding the couple's marital status. One friend believed they were married based on their cohabitation and property acquisition but admitted the topic had never been discussed. Another friend and Cochran's mother both testified that they had never seen the couple present themselves as married. Post-hearing, the trial court initially ruled that no common-law marriage existed. However, it later reversed this determination, referencing a 2005 divorce action filed by Chapman, which Cochran had dismissed while asserting they were not married. Cochran subsequently claimed Chapman had damaged her property and that authorities indicated they were common-law married, prompting her to seek a court ruling on property division. Chapman argued that Cochran's motion from the divorce case constituted an admission of their common-law marriage. Following the dismissal of an appeal, another hearing focused on asset division, where evidence included a receipt for a diamond ring and wedding band purchased by Chapman, which Cochran acknowledged receiving a diamond ring but denied receiving a wedding band. Additionally, Chapman submitted an application listing Cochran as his spouse, dated after the current action. Evidence also suggested they had a joint credit card, though Cochran claimed ownership with Chapman as an authorized user.

To establish a common-law marriage, clear and convincing evidence is required, demonstrating (1) capacity, (2) a mutual agreement to enter into a permanent marriage exclusive of other relationships, and (3) public recognition of the relationship as a marriage, along with public assumption of marital duties and cohabitation. Cochran contends that Chapman did not provide sufficient evidence of public recognition of their relationship as a marriage, and this view is supported by the court. Public knowledge is deemed essential to prevent casual relationships from being mischaracterized as marriage. Evidence of public recognition can include cohabitation, mutual referrals as spouses, joint documentation, sharing duties and expenses, and overall day-to-day life as married individuals. In this case, the court found no clear evidence that the parties publicly recognized their relationship as a marriage. They did not introduce themselves as married or refer to each other as such in public, and their documentation, such as loan applications and tax returns, consistently reflected their status as single. Although they lived together for years, mere cohabitation does not suffice to prove a common-law marriage. Evidence of a joint checking account, credit card, and insurance policy was insufficient to demonstrate public acknowledgment of marriage, and Cochran did not adopt Chapman’s surname. The evidence, largely contradicting the notion of public recognition, aligned with previous cases where similar claims were dismissed due to lack of sufficient public acknowledgment.

The trial court reversed its earlier decision and found that Cochran and Chapman were in a common-law marriage, based on statements in Cochran's motion to reinstate a 2005 divorce action, where she claimed she was told by authorities that they were married under common law. However, these statements do not provide sufficient evidence to support the finding of a common-law marriage. Initially, Cochran asserted they were not married but changed her stance due to concerns about property rights. The court concluded that the evidence did not demonstrate public recognition of their relationship as a marriage. Therefore, the trial court's finding was deemed erroneous, leading to the reversal of the judgment and remand for the dismissal of the action. The judgment was reversed and remanded with instructions, with Judges Pittman, Bryan, Thomas, and Moore concurring.