Clifford Craig v. James A. Lynaugh, Director, Texas Department of Corrections

Citations: 846 F.2d 11; 11 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 397; 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 7026; 1988 WL 44869Docket: 87-6266

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; May 26, 1988; Federal Appellate Court

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Clifford Craig, a pro se inmate, filed a lawsuit against James A. Lynaugh, the Director of the Texas Department of Corrections, and other officials, alleging excessive force and seeking damages and an injunction. The district court dismissed his complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) prior to service on the defendants, but failed to issue a separate judgment as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. Craig later filed a motion to vacate the dismissal and a notice of appeal, but did not serve the motion on the defendants. The appellate court ruled that the motion to vacate effectively nullified the notice of appeal, leading to the dismissal of the appeal due to lack of jurisdiction. The court also noted that additional claims raised in Craig's supplemental complaint were not addressed by the district court and remain unresolved.

Jurisdiction to consider Craig's earlier claims hinges on his Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the judgment, which was effectively a Rule 59(e) motion challenging the dismissal order. If served within 10 days of judgment, it would nullify his earlier notice of appeal, and since Craig did not file a new notice after the motion's disposition on November 17, jurisdiction would be lacking. Conversely, if the motion was untimely under Rule 59, it would not toll the appeal period, making the original notice valid upon the final judgment's entry.

Due to the district court's failure to comply with Rule 58, the judgment was not final when Craig filed his motion, but this does not affect its effectiveness. Rule 59(e) mandates that motions be served within 10 days post-judgment, but Craig did not serve his motion. The question arises whether an unserved Rule 59(e) motion is still effective. The Sixth Circuit has held that if a defendant is unserved, a timely Rule 59(e) motion is valid and suspends the appeal period. This approach promotes consistency across circuits.

Craig's unserved motion, while timely filed, nullified his initial notice of appeal. Consequently, without a new notice post-disposition, the court lacks jurisdiction to review the dismissal or the motion to vacate. Additionally, regarding his habeas corpus petition, he similarly failed to file a notice of appeal post-dismissal, precluding jurisdiction. Despite Craig's pro se status and the complexity of these rules, the court lacks the authority to overlook procedural noncompliance. The court advises district judges to inform pro se litigants about the necessity of timely filing a new notice of appeal following a Rule 59 motion's resolution.

The appeal is dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction. The relevant legal precedent includes various cases and rules that clarify the timing and effect of notices of appeal in relation to motions filed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Rule 4(a)(4) states that if a timely motion for a new trial or similar motion is filed, the appeal period begins from the order denying that motion. Any notice of appeal filed before such a motion is resolved is ineffective, requiring a new notice to be filed after the motion's disposition. Citations to relevant cases, such as Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co. and Harcon Barge Co. v. D.G. Boat Rentals, reinforce this procedural principle. Additional references to unpublished cases and decisions from the Fifth and Sixth Circuits provide further context on the application of these rules.