United States v. Stuart Kenton Skarda

Citations: 845 F.2d 1508; 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 6063; 1988 WL 42913Docket: 87-5288

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; May 9, 1988; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Stuart Kenton Skarda was convicted of bank robbery, assault, hostage-taking, and possession of a firearm by a felon related to a robbery at the Drayton State Bank in North Dakota on February 19, 1987. Prior to the robbery, Skarda traveled with Cynthia Ehrlich and Thomas Harrelson, a fugitive and one of the FBI's ten most wanted criminals, seeking medical assistance for Harrelson's gunshot wound. After depleting their stolen funds from a previous robbery, they decided to rob the Drayton bank.

During the robbery, Ehrlich brandished a handgun and demanded money from the teller, obtaining $2,807. Following the heist, the bank president pursued the robbers. Their getaway vehicle eventually became stranded in a ditch, prompting Skarda to seek help from a local farmer and his family. However, when the Pokrzywinskis agreed to assist, Harrelson threatened them at gunpoint, forcing them to drive the robbers away while ignoring the family's pleas to be released.

The robbers evaded two roadblocks until police disabled their truck after a nine-mile chase. Upon stopping, the Pokrzywinskis escaped, while Skarda, Harrelson, and Ehrlich attempted to flee but were apprehended. Police recovered two handguns near where Skarda and Harrelson crouched and discovered Skarda attempting to conceal his identification. He was found with ammunition and cash, further implicating him in the robbery. The court ultimately affirmed Skarda's convictions.

Ehrlich pleaded guilty before Skarda's trial and agreed to testify for the government, providing evidence of Skarda's involvement in the Drayton bank robbery. Harrelson also pleaded guilty but testified for the defense, claiming Skarda had no knowledge of the robbery and was merely on vacation with them, asleep in the car during the incident. Skarda did not testify in his defense. The jury trial commenced on April 27, 1987, and concluded with the jury finding Skarda guilty of bank robbery, two counts of assault (against a teller and the bank president), hostage-taking, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was acquitted of one count of assault against a bystander.

Skarda raised several issues for appeal, including allegations of improper closing arguments by the prosecution, new issues raised during rebuttal, violation of local rules regarding closing arguments, and the trial court's additional jury instructions that favored the prosecution. He also contended that the evidence was insufficient to support the hostage-taking charge. After reviewing the record, only the first and fourth issues were deemed worthy of discussion. 

Specifically, Skarda argued he was denied a fair trial due to the prosecution's improper remarks during closing arguments that questioned the integrity of the defense rather than addressing the evidence. The assistant U.S. attorney suggested the defense was attacking the prosecution's motives, which was deemed an improper comment that undermined the objective nature of the trial and could have influenced the jury's perception of the prosecution's credibility.

The government contends that defense counsel's improper attacks during trial and closing arguments challenged the prosecutor's integrity and provoked a response from the prosecution. However, the court disagrees, asserting that the defense's comments primarily targeted the credibility of witness Cindy Ehrlich rather than the integrity of the government. Specific references from the defense's cross-examination and closing arguments indicated suggestions of perjury and accusations that the prosecutors manipulated evidence against Skarda. The court notes that similar harsh attacks in other cases did not justify improper prosecutorial responses. 

To establish a claim based on the prosecutor's remarks, the appellant must show both the impropriety of the comments and their prejudicial impact on substantive rights. As Skarda's attorney did not object to the remarks, the court applied the plain error rule to assess whether the comments undermined the trial's fairness and contributed to a miscarriage of justice. The court concluded that the improper remarks were isolated and did not detract from the overall fairness of the trial, which was largely supported by strong evidence against Skarda. Consequently, there was no indication of a miscarriage of justice resulting from the prosecutorial comments.

Skarda challenges the trial judge's responses to four jury questions during deliberations, arguing that the supplemental instructions favored the prosecution by not including favorable instructions for the defense, despite not claiming the instructions were legally incorrect. He cites Bollenbach v. United States, emphasizing that trial judges should address jury difficulties accurately and that responding to jury requests lies within the district court's discretion. Skarda insists that the judge must be impartial and ensure supplemental instructions are clear and non-prejudicial. While he references cases where improper supplemental instructions occurred, he does not argue that the specific instructions in his case were incorrect. Instead, he contends that the judge should have reiterated defense-favorable instructions, a claim previously rejected in similar cases. The court finds no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's actions, affirming Skarda's convictions and noting the judge should have reminded the jury to consider the supplemental instructions in the context of original instructions. The jury's questions included definitions of interstate commerce and possession of a handgun, as well as inquiries about the consideration of multiple assault charges and the completion of robbery.