Crestview Memorial Funeral Home, Inc. v. Gilmer

Citations: 79 So. 3d 585; 2011 Ala. LEXIS 135; 2011 WL 3780099Docket: 1100235

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; August 26, 2011; Alabama; State Supreme Court

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Faye B. Gilmer initiated a lawsuit against Crestview Memorial Funeral Home, Inc. and several individuals, alleging issues related to the funeral services for her husband, Jack Gilmer. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on most claims, which Gilmer appealed. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment regarding claims against Garland Jones and negligent-supervision claims but reversed the decisions on tort-of-outrage, suppression, and breach-of-contract claims against Crestview, Barry Taul, and Mary Meg Caldwell, remanding the case for further proceedings.

At trial, Taul and Caldwell were dismissed, and the court granted Gilmer's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the breach-of-contract claim. The suppression and tort-of-outrage claims were presented to a jury, which ruled in favor of Gilmer on the suppression claim and against her on the tort-of-outrage claim, awarding her $350,000 in compensatory damages and $3 million in punitive damages for suppression. The trial court later reduced the punitive damages to $1,050,000 under Alabama law.

Crestview appealed the trial court’s rulings on the breach-of-contract and suppression claims as well as the damage awards. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial on these claims. Key facts include that Gilmer authorized the embalming by phone on the night of Jack's death, and during a subsequent meeting with Caldwell, she signed an authorization form without knowing that the only licensed embalmer was unavailable due to medical leave. Gilmer testified that she would have chosen another funeral home had she been aware of this situation.

Crestview occasionally contracted licensed embalmers when Groves was unavailable, but in this instance, Taul, who lacked a license and was not an apprentice, embalmed Jack’s body. Despite his extensive experience in the industry since 1987, Taul testified he was unlicensed at the time. Caldwell, an apprentice who had completed her licensing requirements but had not received her license, signed an embalming report for Jack’s body, indicating "embalmer" next to her signature, despite not having been present during the embalming process. After learning from a newspaper article that Crestview had no licensed embalmer during July 2003, Gilmer, Jack’s relative, became upset. Following her inquiries, she received documentation suggesting that Caldwell was licensed, but discrepancies were noted, including the alteration of her role on the report. The Alabama Board of Funeral Service confirmed Caldwell's license became effective two weeks after the embalming. Gilmer subsequently sued Crestview, Jones, Caldwell, and Taul for multiple claims, including negligent conduct and breach of contract. The defendants' motion for summary judgment was initially denied, but later, the trial court dismissed Gilmer’s claims, leading to an appeal. The appellate court affirmed summary judgment for Jones and Crestview regarding some claims but reversed it concerning the tort-of-outrage, suppression, and breach-of-contract claims against Crestview, Taul, and Caldwell, remanding for further proceedings.

A jury trial commenced in May 2010, during which Gilmer filed for a judgment as a matter of law (JML) on breach-of-contract and suppression claims. Taul and Caldwell also sought a JML on all claims against them, while Crestview requested a JML on the suppression and tort-of-outrage claims. The trial court granted Gilmer's JML on the breach-of-contract claim against Crestview but allowed the suppression and tort-of-outrage claims to proceed to the jury. Subsequently, Taul and Caldwell were dismissed without prejudice before jury deliberation. On May 14, 2010, the jury ruled in Crestview's favor on the tort-of-outrage claim but in favor of Gilmer on the suppression claim, awarding Gilmer $350,000 in compensatory damages and $3 million in punitive damages related to the suppression claim. The trial court entered judgment based on the jury's verdict. Crestview renewed its JML motion and alternatively sought a new trial or remittitur, but the trial court denied these motions, reducing punitive damages to $1,050,000 while keeping compensatory damages intact. Crestview appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying its JML on the suppression claim and granting JML in favor of Gilmer on the breach-of-contract claim. Crestview also contends that the damages awarded were excessive and challenges the trial court's dismissal of the small-business cap on punitive damages as outlined in Alabama Code § 6-11-21(b). The appellate review will apply the standard used by the trial court, favoring the nonmovant and presuming the jury verdict as correct, particularly in light of the trial court's denial of a new trial motion.

Crestview contends that the trial court incorrectly denied its motion for a judgment as a matter of law (JML) regarding the suppression claim. To succeed, Gilmer must prove four elements: Crestview had a duty to disclose a material fact, it concealed that fact, its suppression influenced Gilmer's actions, and Gilmer suffered damages as a result. Crestview argues that Gilmer failed to provide substantial evidence of a duty to disclose and reliance, asserting that mere silence does not constitute fraud without a duty to disclose, which can arise from either a confidential relationship or specific circumstances. Crestview claims no duty existed due to the absence of a confidential relationship, but it does not support this assertion with relevant authority or adequately address Gilmer's argument regarding the circumstances. The court emphasizes it will not perform legal research for parties lacking supportive arguments. Crestview failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that it had no duty to disclose that its only licensed embalmer was on medical leave and that no replacement would be hired. Additionally, while Crestview argues that the individuals involved did not know the facts that were allegedly suppressed, it acknowledges they were aware that Groves was unavailable to embalm Jack Gilmer's body. Consequently, Crestview has not shown entitlement to a JML on the suppression claim.

Caldwell acknowledged that she did not know who would embalm Jack's body when she authorized Gilmer but was aware that Taul, an unlicensed individual, had been performing embalming services at Crestview's funeral home, which was against the law. Caldwell also recognized that without contracting a licensed embalmer, it was likely that Taul would embalm Jack's body. There was no indication that either Caldwell or Taul sought to engage a licensed embalmer. Therefore, it cannot be legally concluded that Caldwell was unaware that the embalming would violate applicable law, which undermines Crestview's claim for a judgment as a matter of law (JML) on the suppression claim.

Crestview also contended that it was entitled to a new trial after the trial court granted JML to Gilmer on the breach-of-contract claim. To succeed in a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of an agreement, a breach by the defendant, and damages resulting from that breach. Crestview did not dispute the contract's existence or Gilmer’s claims of breach and resulting damages but argued that a factual question existed regarding the materiality of the alleged breach. A material breach is one that undermines the fundamental purpose of the contract.

The relevant portion of the authorization stipulated that embalming must be conducted by someone legally authorized to perform such work, aimed at ensuring proper preservation and disinfection of the body until burial. Gilmer did not argue that the embalming was poorly done, despite noting Jack's body appeared swollen during visitation. Both Caldwell and Taul provided explanations for the swelling, with Taul asserting that he embalmed the body correctly. Considering the evidence favorably for Crestview, it cannot be concluded that the failure to use a licensed embalmer constituted a material breach that defeated the contract’s essential purpose.

Crestview provided sufficient evidence to establish a factual dispute regarding the materiality of an alleged breach of contract, necessitating jury resolution. The trial court erred by granting a judgment as a matter of law (JML) in favor of Gilmer concerning this claim. Materiality is also relevant in claims of fraudulent suppression, which require proof that the defendant had a duty to disclose a material fact and that the defendant concealed that fact. The impact of the trial court’s JML on the jury's evaluation of the suppression claim is unclear, and the lump-sum award for compensatory damages does not specify how damages were allocated between the suppression and breach-of-contract claims. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's judgment on both claims and remanded for a new trial. The claims regarding the tort of outrage remain unaffected as Gilmer did not appeal that judgment. The decision to reverse makes it unnecessary to address Crestview's arguments concerning the damages awards.