Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi; January 16, 2012; Mississippi; State Appellate Court
Zachary Clein, a student at Brandon Middle School, filed a lawsuit against the Rankin County School District (RCSD) following injuries sustained from a fall on school property during a physical-education class on November 20, 2008. The Rankin County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of RCSD, which Clein subsequently appealed.
On the day of the incident, Clein was instructed by Coach Marney Walker to "run the bleachers," which involved running up and down concrete stadium steps. Clein, dressed in jeans and flat-soled shoes, slipped while descending the steps, resulting in facial and knee injuries. He claimed the bleachers were slippery, although he admitted to walking down the steps at the time of the fall, contradicting the coach’s assertion that students were to run up and then walk down.
Clein's mother filed the complaint on November 12, 2009. RCSD moved for summary judgment on July 2, 2010, citing immunity under Mississippi law. A hearing on the motion led the circuit judge to determine RCSD was immune from liability under the discretionary-function exclusion of the Mississippi Torts Claim Act (MTCA) and found no premises liability. Clein's appeal includes claims of error regarding the grant of summary judgment and the judge’s findings of immunity.
The review standard for summary judgment involves examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, determining if there is a genuine issue of material fact, and assessing whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Clein's first two assignments of error are addressed together for clarity. The circuit judge granted RCSD's motion for summary judgment, determining that: 1) RCSD is a governmental entity under the MTCA; 2) its employees acted within their employment scope; 3) RCSD is immune from liability as its actions were discretionary functions per section 11-46-9(1)(d); and 4) RCSD is immune from premises-liability claims under section 11-46-9(1)(v). Clein contends that Coach Walker's actions do not qualify as discretionary functions, arguing that Coach Walker was aware of the 2006 Mississippi Physical Education Framework Overview (MPEF) requiring appropriate warm-up techniques during the time of Clein’s injury in November 2008. Clein claims that Coach Walker negligently failed to implement these techniques. However, Clein’s own deposition reveals he was walking down the bleachers when he fell, undermining his negligence claim against Coach Walker regarding warm-up instructions. The court notes that the determination of whether warm-up activities are discretionary or ministerial functions is guided by statute. The trial court confirmed RCSD as a governmental entity and a political subdivision. Section 11-46-9 states that governmental entities and employees are not liable for claims arising from discretionary functions, including those related to dangerous property conditions, provided the entity had no notice. The Mississippi Supreme Court's two-part test for discretionary functions involves determining if the act involves choice or judgment and if that choice relates to social, economic, or political policy.
The legal analysis involves determining whether government actions are discretionary or ministerial. An act is considered ministerial if legally mandated without reliance on the officer's discretion, as clarified in Stewart ex rel. Womack v. City of Jackson. Conversely, duties requiring personal judgment are deemed discretionary, as noted in Harris ex rel. Harris v. McCray. The RCSD references Mississippi Code Annotated section 37-7-301, which empowers school districts to manage athletic programs, and asserts that the 2006 MPEF Overview Guidelines for warmup activities leave implementation to instructors’ discretion. Clein argues that even if discretion exists, it does not invoke protections based on public policy. Citing precedent from Jones and Covington County School Dist. v. Magee, it is established that decisions rooted in policy are protected from liability. The court finds no error in equating Coach Walker’s role with that of a high school coach, asserting that school districts are well-positioned to make decisions affecting student welfare, which aligns with political policy. Consequently, Coach Walker’s actions are classified as discretionary, granting them immunity from liability under section 11-46-9(1)(d).
During his deposition, Clein provided inconsistent statements about his injury, claiming initially that he was running down the bleachers but later admitting he was walking at the time of his fall. Coach Walker and the RCSD argued that Walker had instructed the class to walk down the bleachers to prevent injuries, a claim Clein contested. Despite the conflicting accounts, the records indicate Clein fell while walking, leading to the conclusion that no material fact disputes exist regarding Coach Walker's duty of care.
Clein also contended that the circuit court incorrectly ruled that RCSD was immune from premises liability claims related to a dangerous condition on its property. Under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA), governmental entities are not liable for injuries caused by dangerous conditions unless there is evidence of negligent conduct or actual/constructive notice of the condition, which Clein failed to establish. Additionally, it is precedent that a property owner is not liable if no dangerous condition is present.
Clein argued that the steep, slippery nature of the bleachers constituted a dangerous condition that Coach Walker should have recognized. However, he did not provide sufficient evidence to support this claim or prove that RCSD had notice of the condition. As Clein acknowledged he was walking when he fell, the question of whether running on the bleachers created a dangerous condition was deemed irrelevant to the case.
Ultimately, the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of RCSD was upheld, affirming the decision with all costs of the appeal assigned to Clein. The record indicates that Clein's deposition was referenced, but a complete transcript was not included.
