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State v. Brown

Citations: 77 So. 3d 693; 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 17772; 2011 WL 5375089Docket: No. 3D10-1633

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; November 8, 2011; Florida; State Appellate Court

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In the early hours of an October day, Michael Morris and his friend Nigel Whatley left a nightclub to show Morris's new car to the Victim in a nearby parking lot. They were confronted by the defendant, who demanded money. After a brief altercation, Morris threw his belongings on the ground, but the Victim challenged the defendant, who then brandished a gun. When a passing car momentarily distracted the defendant, Morris and the Victim attempted to subdue him, resulting in the Victim being shot and falling to the ground. Morris was also shot in the chest and witnessed the defendant shoot the Victim again while trying to escape. Despite his injuries, Morris reached a nearby restaurant where he was assisted by police and later provided a description of the shooter.

Police found a black skully cap near the Victim, which contained DNA matching the defendant. Nine months later, Morris identified the defendant in a photo array, initially stating he was "60 percent certain" of the identification, citing his background as a chemist for his cautious estimate. He expressed he would have been more confident if the photos included individuals wearing skully caps. The defendant initially denied being at the crime scene but later claimed he was at the club to retrieve a generator after a hurricane, failing to name the friend he was supposedly meeting.

During the trial, the defendant's girlfriend testified that she was with him at the club on the night of the murder. She recalled the defendant removing a black skully cap and a white do-rag before entering the club, leaving the skully cap in the car. She confirmed they left the club around the time of the shooting and received a call informing them of the incident shortly thereafter.

The girlfriend testified that she returned to the club with the defendant after fearing that a friend, nicknamed “Yellow,” had been shot. She claimed to have called 911 twice but hung up due to the operator's confusion, with no records of these calls. When asked about Yellow's identity, she could not provide a real name. She did not share her account with the police during the investigation, nor did she mention the generator the defendant claimed he was retrieving from the club. During closing arguments, the prosecutor pointed out the lack of recorded evidence regarding the defendant's claims. The defense moved for a mistrial, arguing the State improperly commented on the defendant's right to silence, a motion the court denied. Ultimately, the jury found the defendant guilty of second-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, armed robbery, and attempted armed robbery. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial, citing insufficient evidence and the denial of the mistrial. The trial court expressed a preliminary inclination to deny the motion but ordered polygraph tests for the defendant and the girlfriend, though the State objected, and neither took the test. During a later hearing, the court clarified that it would not consider the results of the polygraph tests in its ruling on the motion for a new trial.

The trial court granted a motion for a new trial, citing that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that the State improperly commented on the defendant's right to silence. However, upon review, it was determined that the trial court abused its discretion. The court's decision must be based solely on the record and evidence presented to the jury. Key evidence included a witness identifying the defendant from a photographic lineup and a skully cap found near the victim that contained the defendant's DNA. The defendant's inconsistent statements regarding his presence at the crime scene and the girlfriend's unverifiable testimony further complicated the case. The trial court's request for polygraph examinations was improper, as polygraph results are inadmissible in Florida without mutual stipulation between parties. The court's reliance on polygraph results, despite claiming not to consider them, indicated a significant influence on its decision-making process. Consequently, the trial court's ruling on the motion for a new trial was reversed, as it improperly relied on evidence not presented to the jury.

The trial court erred in granting a new trial based on the State's closing argument, which the court incorrectly deemed as improper comments on the defendant’s right to silence. The State highlighted the defendant's refusal to provide a recorded statement to the police, stating that the absence of a stenographic transcript or tape was due to the defendant saying, “no, I’m done.” Under Florida law, discussing a defendant's refusal to have statements recorded does not infringe on the right to silence, as established in San Martin v. State and McCoy v. State. The comment merely reiterated that the defendant had the opportunity to memorialize his oral statement but chose not to. This does not equate to an invocation of the right to silence, especially since the defendant had already waived his Miranda rights and provided a statement. The trial court initially denied a mistrial motion, indicating it did not view the comments as improper until later reconsiderations. Consequently, the order for a new trial was reversed and remanded. Additionally, Officer Nanni testified that Morris did not sign the photo array on July 21 because it was required during a sworn statement, which was arranged for July 23. The timing of the murder, the impact of Hurricane Katrina, and the defendant's DNA presence at the crime scene were noted, with the defense's explanation regarding the hurricane being insufficient. Although the court had not requested a polygraph examination, the defendant had previously undergone one related to pretrial release.