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Haggard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Citations: 75 So. 3d 1120; 2011 Miss. App. LEXIS 733; 2011 WL 6211894Docket: No. 2010-CA-01499-COA
Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi; November 28, 2011; Mississippi; State Appellate Court
Dorothy Haggard appeals a ruling from the Circuit Court of Washington County, Mississippi, which upheld the County Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Haggard contends that there are genuine issues of material fact that warrant reconsideration of the summary judgment. However, the court determined that the summary judgment was appropriate, leading to the affirmation of the lower court's decision. The case arises from an incident on July 8, 2007, when Haggard slipped and fell on a clear substance while shopping at a Wal-Mart store in Greenville, Mississippi. She filed a negligence and premises liability complaint against Wal-Mart. In support of her case, Haggard provided three identical affidavits from acquaintances who claimed to have witnessed her fall and stated that Wal-Mart employees should have been aware of the hazardous condition. Fred Turner, the Wal-Mart manager on duty that night, submitted an affidavit stating he was called to the scene after Haggard fell and did not know the nature of the substance on the floor. Turner indicated he had walked past the area 20 minutes prior to the incident and did not observe any spills or hazards at that time. He confirmed he was unaware of any substance until after Haggard's fall and did not see any evidence that the substance had been on the floor for a significant period. Turner also noted that he did not witness the fall itself. Patricia Lewis, a Wal-Mart employee, testified that she knew Haggard personally and spoke with her before Haggard's fall. Lewis was unaware of any substance on the floor until after the incident, when she observed a clear substance with a shoe smear but could not identify it or its origin. She noted there were no spilled containers nearby and had no knowledge of any other employees being aware of the substance before the fall. Haggard, in her deposition, confirmed that no Wal-Mart employee informed her about the substance prior to her fall and had no information regarding how it got there or any prior knowledge of its presence. Following hearings on Wal-Mart's motion for summary judgment, the county court ruled in favor of Wal-Mart, a decision affirmed by the circuit court. Haggard filed a timely appeal, questioning whether there were any genuine issues of material fact that would justify overturning the summary judgment. The standards for summary judgment were cited, emphasizing that the moving party must prove no genuine issue of material fact exists, and that the non-moving party must present specific facts to demonstrate such issues for trial. Material facts are defined as those that could affect the outcome of the case, and summary judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party fails to establish an essential element of their claim. Mississippi employs a three-step framework for assessing premises liability: (1) identifying the status of the injured party as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser; (2) determining the duty owed to the injured party by the property owner/operator; and (3) establishing whether that duty was breached. In this case, it is established that Haggard was a business invitee at Wal-Mart. Business owners owe invitees a duty to maintain reasonably safe premises and to warn of hidden dangers that are not immediately apparent. However, owners are not liable as insurers against all injuries. In slip-and-fall claims, the plaintiff must demonstrate one of three scenarios to recover: (1) a negligent act by the defendant caused the injury; (2) the defendant had actual knowledge of a dangerous condition but failed to warn the plaintiff; or (3) the defendant should have known of the dangerous condition due to its duration. Haggard's deposition revealed no evidence of a negligent act or knowledge of the hazardous condition by Wal-Mart or its employees prior to her fall. Haggard and the employees deposed provided no information indicating that anyone was aware of the substance on the floor before the incident, leading to the conclusion that her claim does not succeed under any of the outlined theories. Turner stated in his affidavit and deposition that he did not see any substance on the floor approximately twenty minutes before Haggard's fall and had no prior knowledge of it. Lewis also confirmed her lack of knowledge regarding the substance until after the fall. The court found no genuine issue of material fact about Wal-Mart's actual knowledge, leading to the conclusion that Haggard's claim fails under this theory of liability. For premises liability based on constructive knowledge, a plaintiff must show that a dangerous condition existed long enough that the defendant should have known about it. Constructive knowledge requires evidence indicating the condition's duration, as the court will not make presumptions to cover deficiencies in the plaintiff's evidence. Haggard's argument for Wal-Mart's knowledge relies on affidavits from three customers, which assert that Wal-Mart employees should have known about the hazardous condition due to their proximity and failure to address it. However, these affidavits do not specify how long the substance was present on the floor, and Haggard herself could not provide any timeframe or evidence of the substance's duration. Haggard's deposition revealed her lack of knowledge about the substance's duration, and no physical evidence suggested that it had been there long enough to establish constructive knowledge. Additionally, she could not name any employees allegedly near the area during the incident, despite having completed discovery. The court emphasized that mere allegations are insufficient to create genuine issues of material fact, and unsupported claims cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment. Ultimately, Haggard did not provide the necessary specific evidence to show a genuine issue regarding Wal-Mart’s constructive knowledge. The court affirmed the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart, concluding that there were no material facts warranting jury consideration. The judgment of the Washington County Circuit Court is affirmed, with all appeal costs assessed to the appellant.