Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; April 25, 2008; Alabama; State Appellate Court
M.H. was convicted of first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse against D.H., a minor under 10 years old, and sentenced to 30 years and 20 years of imprisonment, respectively, to run concurrently. The charges stemmed from D.H.'s testimony about multiple instances of abuse during the period when she lived with M.H. and her mother, T.F. M.H. did not testify but presented character evidence from his sister, who described his relationship with D.H. as akin to that of a father and daughter.
On appeal, M.H. argued that the State's evidence was insufficient, claiming that D.H.'s testimony was uncorroborated and lacked supporting physical or medical evidence. However, this challenge was not preserved for appellate review as M.H.'s legal counsel did not specify these grounds in the motions for judgment of acquittal made during the trial. The trial court had denied these motions, and M.H. failed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in his postjudgment motions. Legal precedents indicate that a defendant must provide specific grounds for objections made at trial to preserve issues for appeal, and general objections without specified grounds do not preserve issues for review. Thus, M.H.'s appeal on these grounds was unfounded due to procedural deficiencies in his trial objections.
M.H. failed to present specific grounds for his motion for a judgment of acquittal in the trial court, resulting in the issue not being preserved for appellate review. On appeal, M.H. claims the trial court improperly denied his motions for a mistrial and for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the court erred by issuing an Allen charge after the jury indicated it was deadlocked. The jury, after about two hours of deliberation, reported a split of 8 to 4. The trial court engaged in discussions with the jurors and attorneys, acknowledging the deadlock and the prosecution’s request to give the Allen charge to encourage further deliberation. M.H.'s counsel argued that further deliberations might be coercive. The court decided to give the Allen charge, urging the jurors to search their hearts and minds to reach a verdict based on reasonable doubt, emphasizing the importance of their decision and the unlikelihood of finding a better jury.
Jurors are encouraged to articulate their beliefs regarding the defendant's guilt or innocence, providing specific reasons for their views rather than holding stubbornly to one side. They are reminded of the importance of reaching a verdict to avoid the unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources on a retrial. Emphasis is placed on the impartial pursuit of justice, free from bias or sympathy, and jurors are urged to engage in thoughtful deliberation by considering different perspectives and questioning the presented evidence. The judge insists that their decision should be based on credible evidence, discarding anything unworthy of belief, and highlights the responsibility jurors have as representatives of the community. The judge expresses confidence in the jurors' ability to determine justice and instructs them to return the next morning after a night of rest to continue their deliberations. Following the charge, there is a discussion regarding the adequacy of the deliberation time, with the judge acknowledging the validity of the prosecutor's concerns about the brief deliberation period for a serious case. The judge remains open to reconsidering motions presented by counsel.
The speaker emphasizes the importance of striving for a fair verdict to avoid unnecessary retrials, indicating an awareness of the jury's near unanimity. Following an Allen charge, the jury resumed deliberations and returned guilty verdicts on both charges against M.H. In Alabama, it is permissible for trial courts to encourage jurors to reach a verdict, provided the judge does not indicate the desired outcome. An Allen charge, also known as a dynamite charge, is acceptable if it is not coercive or threatening, and its appropriateness must be assessed in the context of the case. The court finds that the Allen charge given was neither coercive nor inappropriate, dismissing M.H.’s claims regarding the jury's deadlocked status and the trial court's knowledge of the numerical division. Furthermore, it identifies M.H.'s 20-year sentence for first-degree sexual abuse as illegal, noting that the relevant statute under which he was convicted was amended prior to his sentencing, effectively removing the basis for his conviction. The court recognizes the jurisdictional nature of unauthorized sentences, allowing for the correction of such errors at any time.
Sexual abuse of a child under 12 in Alabama is classified as a Class B felony under Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-6-69.1(b). The law applicable at the time of an offense dictates the prosecution and sentencing. Prior cases affirm that unless a statute explicitly states otherwise, the law in effect at the time of the offense governs all related proceedings. Retrospective application of statutes is generally disfavored unless there is clear legislative intent. After reviewing Act No. 2006-575 and § 13A-6-69.1, it was determined that there is no indication that § 13A-6-69.1 was intended to apply retroactively, thereby applying only to offenses committed after its effective date of July 1, 2006. Consequently, the law applicable to M.H., whose offenses occurred between 2001 and 2005, is § 13A-6-66, categorizing his sexual abuse conviction as a Class C felony. Under Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-5-6(a)(3), the punishment for a Class C felony is a maximum of 10 years. M.H.’s 20-year sentence exceeded this limit, rendering it illegal. While affirming M.H.’s convictions for first-degree sodomy and sexual abuse, the court mandated a remand for a new sentencing hearing to align with the findings of this opinion. M.H. had also faced a separate indictment for first-degree rape but was acquitted in a prior mistrial. His appeal did not preserve an argument regarding the weight of the evidence, and there is no record indicating M.H. was sentenced under the Habitual Felony Offender Act. The court's decision includes directives for the trial court to file a return within 42 days, including a transcript of the remand hearing and amended sentencing order.
