Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; February 12, 2009; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
Daniel Hinton, Jr. was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under La. R.S. 14:95.1. Hinton filed a motion to quash the charge, asserting that his prior felony conviction could not serve as a predicate offense. The trial court granted the motion, leading the State to appeal, claiming the court erred in its decision.
During a preliminary examination, Corporal James Dipuma observed Hinton walking and stopped him. Hinton admitted to possessing a handgun and later revealed a false identity due to an outstanding probation warrant. Upon verifying his identity, officers identified Hinton's prior felony conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery.
The State argued that conspiracy to commit armed robbery, while not explicitly listed as a crime of violence under La. R.S. 14:2(B), fits the broader definition of a crime of violence since it involves the threatened use of physical force and the possession of a dangerous weapon. The State contended that the facts surrounding Hinton's prior conviction supported this classification.
The trial court maintained that criminal statutes must be strictly construed and determined that conspiracy to commit armed robbery is not specifically enumerated under La. R.S. 14:2(B), thus it cannot serve as a predicate for the firearm possession charge. Hinton, in his response, argued that the legislature would have explicitly included conspiracy if it intended for it to be considered under La. R.S. 14:95.1.
The issue is viewed as a question of law, subject to de novo review, and emphasizes two principles of statutory construction: strict interpretation of criminal statutes and the necessity for statutory language to be understood in its ordinary sense. La. R.S. 14:95.1(A) prohibits individuals convicted of a crime of violence from possessing a firearm.
To establish that the defendant is a convicted felon in possession of a firearm under La. R.S. 14:95.1, the State must demonstrate four elements: 1) possession of a firearm by the defendant; 2) prior conviction of an enumerated felony; 3) absence of the 10-year limitation period; and 4) general intent to commit the offense. "Crime of violence," as defined by La. R.S. 14:2(B), includes offenses involving the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, and encompasses crimes like armed robbery, though the list of offenses is illustrative and not exhaustive. Notably, while attempts to commit these offenses are classified as crimes of violence, conspiracy to commit such offenses is not included. Criminal conspiracy, defined as an agreement among two or more persons to commit a crime, requires specific intent, which is the active desire for the criminal outcome. The existence of criminal intent must be shared by at least two individuals. The determination of whether conspiracy to commit armed robbery qualifies as a "crime of violence" hinges not on the nature of the predicate offense but rather on the definition of conspiracy itself, which focuses on the unlawful combination of minds rather than the violent execution of a crime. The overt act in furtherance of conspiracy need not constitute the completed crime, in contrast to attempts, where direct action toward the intended crime is necessary. The inclusion of attempts as crimes of violence does not imply that conspiracy to commit those offenses is similarly classified, as conspiracy is a distinct inchoate offense that does not inherently involve physical force.
Criminal conspiracy to commit armed robbery does not inherently involve a significant risk of physical force against persons or property, nor does it necessitate the possession or use of a dangerous weapon. Therefore, it does not qualify as a crime of violence under La. R.S. 14:2(B) and cannot serve as a proper predicate conviction for a felon in possession of a firearm charge. This contrasts with State v. Lewis, where conspiracy related to drug laws was deemed a valid predicate due to the broad language of La. R.S. 14:95.1 encompassing the entire Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substance Act. The trial court's decision to grant the defendant's motion to quash the bill of information was affirmed, with the sole assignment of error deemed meritless. The trial court found no probable cause to hold the defendant, admitting the bill of information and prior conviction details during the preliminary examination. For armed robbery, the necessary elements include taking something of value from a person or their immediate control through force or intimidation while armed with a dangerous weapon, as outlined in La. R.S. 14:64(A).
