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Willie James Johnson Robert S. Gilder Etc., William Franklin v. Pullman, Inc. Pullman Standard, a Division of Pullman, Inc. Pullman Standard, Inc. Pullman Transportation Co.

Citation: 845 F.2d 911Docket: 86-7911

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; May 20, 1988; Federal Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

In this case, three former employees filed a lawsuit against Pullman Standard, Inc. and Trinity Industries, Inc., alleging fraud and breach of contract under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act after Pullman permanently closed its plant and sold the facility to Trinity, which did not rehire them. The district court dismissed Trinity, as it was not bound by any successorship obligations, and dismissed the fraud claim due to Alabama's one-year statute of limitations. Plaintiffs had failed to file their lawsuit within the appropriate timeframe, having known of Pullman's statements by early 1982 but waited until August 1984. The court further dismissed a request for an accounting due to lack of an independent cause of action. Procedurally, Pullman's summary judgment was granted despite a 10-day notice issue, as the court considered the motion submitted timely, and the plaintiffs, now pro se, did not oppose it. The court highlighted that specific notice requirements for filing affidavits apply only to pro se litigants who have never been represented. It was determined that the jurisdiction for claims regarding collective bargaining agreements expired along with the agreements themselves, rejecting the argument that seniority rights extended their duration. Ultimately, the court affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling in favor of Pullman.

Legal Issues Addressed

Fraud Claims and Statute of Limitations

Application: The court applied Alabama's one-year statute of limitations to dismiss the fraud claim, as the plaintiffs were aware of the alleged fraudulent statements in early 1982 but did not file suit until August 1984.

Reasoning: The court also dismissed the fraud claim as it was barred by Alabama's one-year statute of limitations, noting that plaintiffs were aware of Pullman's statements regarding lay-off rights in early 1982 but did not file suit until August 1984.

Jurisdiction and Duration of Collective Bargaining Agreements

Application: Jurisdiction over violations of collective bargaining agreements exists only while the agreement is active, and expired agreements are under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.

Reasoning: Jurisdiction over violations of collective bargaining agreements exists only while the agreement is active, and expired agreements result in claims that fall under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.

Pro Se Litigants and Notice Requirements

Application: The court found that specific notice requirements for filing affidavits do not apply to parties who were previously represented by counsel and are now proceeding pro se.

Reasoning: Plaintiffs, previously represented by counsel but now proceeding pro se, did not oppose Pullman's motion for summary judgment. The court noted that prior rulings require that pro se litigants receive specific notice of their rights to file affidavits and the consequences of inaction.

Successorship and Collective Bargaining Agreements

Application: Trinity Industries, Inc. was not bound by a successorship clause to adopt Pullman's collective bargaining agreement or hire former employees, leading to its dismissal from the case.

Reasoning: The district court dismissed Trinity from the case, ruling it was not bound by a successorship clause to adopt Pullman's collective bargaining agreement or hire former employees.

Summary Judgment and Procedural Requirements

Application: The court addressed a procedural issue regarding the 10-day advance notice requirement, determining that the motion was deemed submitted for decision on November 21, 1986, thus fulfilling the notice requirement.

Reasoning: A procedural issue arose regarding the lack of the required 10-day advance notice to the adverse party before granting summary judgment, but the court had deemed the motion submitted for decision on November 21, 1986.