Melton v. Harbor Pointe, LLC

Citations: 57 So. 3d 695; 2010 Ala. LEXIS 25; 2010 WL 675605Docket: 1081096

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; February 25, 2010; Alabama; State Supreme Court

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Sharon Melton appeals a January 7, 2009, ruling by the Lee Circuit Court that denied her claims of trespass and established an easement over property owned by Harbor Pointe, LLC (HP). Melton initiated the lawsuit on April 15, 2008, claiming she had acquired an easement by prescription and implication due to her open and hostile use of the property for over ten years, as required by Alabama law. During a bench trial in July 2008, the court heard evidence, but did not call Maxine Jackson, a key figure whose property HP argued provided Melton with an alternative access route. On September 3, 2008, the court ordered Jackson to be joined as a necessary party, but she remained a witness only and was never formally added to the case.

The evidence revealed that Melton's great-great-grandfather owned farmland in the 1930s, which was subdivided among family members. By 1990, Melton's aunt owned lot 9B, which was landlocked, while her uncle owned adjacent lot 10. Melton purchased lot 9B and received a 30-foot-wide easement across lot 10, specifically platted along its southern part. However, Melton built her driveway on the northern part of lot 10 with her uncle's oral permission, using this access for 18 years. The record also suggests there might have been another easement for lot 9B across land owned by another family, but this was not clearly documented or explored during the trial.

Melton built a driveway on lot 10A, which was later subdivided by Tolbert into lots 10A and 10B. The driveway was entirely on lot 10A, while a platted easement was entirely on lot 10B. In 1994, a house was built over part of the easement on lot 10B, leaving only a 10-foot-wide strip of the original 30-foot easement accessible. After Tolbert's death, he left the lots to his daughter, Jackson. In 2007, Jackson negotiated the sale of lot 10A to HP, representing that Melton had no rights to the driveway. HP's representative confirmed there was an easement on lot 10B and concluded the purchase would be free from encumbrances. Jackson initially believed Melton had driveway rights but changed her view during the sale process. It was undisputed that Starr informed both parties of HP's intent to relocate Melton’s driveway to lot 10B if the purchase went through. HP completed the purchase in December 2007 and began removing the driveway in Spring 2008. Melton filed an action against HP on April 15, 2008, seeking a declaration of her easement rights and an injunction against the driveway's removal. By trial, HP had destroyed the original driveway but provided Melton with a gravel driveway on the reduced easement. Melton testified the gravel driveway was less convenient than the original. On January 7, 2009, the court ruled in favor of HP, stating Melton had not met the twenty-year requirement for an easement by prescription and had not demonstrated necessity for an implied easement. The court noted Melton had a recorded easement on lot 10B sufficient for her access needs. Melton filed a motion for reconsideration, which was effectively denied by operation of law after the court did not rule on it. She subsequently filed a timely appeal.

Melton presents six arguments on appeal: 1) Jackson and a member of the Bass family should have been joined as necessary parties under Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ. P.; 2) the trial court should have reformed the deed granting her an easement across lot 10; 3) she claims an easement over lot 10A through statutory adverse possession; 4) she asserts an easement by prescription over lot 10A; 5) she argues for an easement by necessity across lot 10A; and 6) she contends she has an easement by implication across lot 10A.

Regarding joinder, Melton argues the trial court erred by not joining Jackson and a member of the Bass family as indispensable parties. Although she did not raise this issue at trial, the appellate court can address the absence of an indispensable party for the first time on appeal. The court has discretion under Rule 19(b) to permit or deny joinder. Evidence presented at trial regarding the Bass family’s property was insufficient to establish the necessity of their joinder. 

The trial court had previously indicated that Jackson should be joined as a party, allowing Melton the option to either join her or submit testimony. Melton chose to submit her testimony. On appeal, Melton claims the trial court's decision on her easement over lot 10A impacted Jackson's interest in lot 10B. However, there was no court order requiring Jackson to remove a house obstructing part of the easement over lot 10B, and Melton possesses an uncontested right to a 10-foot-wide easement over that lot. There is no evidence that Jackson challenged this easement or objected to Melton's use of it. The appellate court found that the issue of whether the narrower easement on lot 10B conflicts with Melton's rights under a wider platted easement is not currently before them.

An easement narrower than that required by the plat does not necessitate the inclusion of Jackson in the case concerning lot 10A's easement by implication or necessity. The trial court determined that Jackson was not an indispensable party under Rule 19(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, and Melton has failed to demonstrate that this discretion was exceeded. Indispensable parties are defined as those whose interests are significantly affected by the judgment. The trial court's refusal to vacate the judgment against the defendant, who neglected to involve its mortgagee bank, was deemed equitable. 

Regarding the reformation of the deed, Melton's assertion that the deed from Tolbert should be reformed was not presented at trial but only in her post-judgment motion. The trial court has discretion in considering new arguments at this stage but is not obligated to do so. Melton did not provide justification for her delay in raising the reformation argument, which resulted in her motion being denied by default due to the court's inaction within 90 days, as per Rule 59.1. Consequently, there is no evidence that the trial court considered her reformation claim.

Lastly, Melton contends that the trial court erred by not granting her an easement over lot 10A through statutory adverse possession. HP argues that this claim was first introduced in her post-judgment motion. Melton references her complaint, stating she utilized the easement openly and hostilely for the required ten-year period under Alabama law, indicating her claim for prescriptive easement was established.

Ala.Code 1975 § 18-3-1 allows for a right-of-way for landlocked properties without requiring a 10-year use period, while establishing an easement by prescription necessitates 20 years of use. Melton claims she stated a case for statutory adverse possession under Ala.Code 1975 § 6-5-200, which requires either color of title or tax listing for 10 years. Although her complaint indicated a 10-year adverse possession claim, the trial court found insufficient evidence to support this under § 6-5-200. An easement by prescription requires adverse use for 20 years, which must be exclusive, continuous, and with the owner's knowledge. The court referenced previous cases to outline the requirements for establishing adverse possession and found that Melton failed to demonstrate her use of the driveway over lot 10A was adverse; evidence suggested it was permissive. Melton's argument that a deed for an easement over lot 10B met the color-of-title requirement for lot 10A was rejected, as the two easements are distinct. Consequently, she did not meet the criteria for adverse possession under § 6-5-200, nor did she fulfill the 20-year requirement for an easement by prescription, as her usage was only for 18 years. The trial court's conclusion that Melton had not satisfied the necessary requirements was affirmed.

Melton claims an easement by implication and necessity over lot 10A for her driveway. While she primarily argued for an easement by implication, the trial evidence included discussions on the necessity of a driveway across lot 10A. The trial court highlighted that the main issue was whether Melton's access was necessary or merely convenient. It ruled that Melton failed to demonstrate a legal necessity for the easement by implication. Under Alabama law, easements by necessity require genuine necessity, not convenience, which Melton did not prove. Original unity of title is necessary for both easements by necessity and implication. The court noted that easements by necessity typically involve access roads connecting to public roads and that Melton had an existing easement to lot 9B over lot 10B, which diminished her claim for necessity regarding lot 10A. Thus, the trial court correctly found that Melton did not meet the criteria for an easement by necessity.

Melton failed to demonstrate that the land forming her driveway on lot 10A was utilized as a roadway during the period when ownership unity ended. According to precedent established in Helms, the requisite use must be present at the time of property conveyance. The court did not need to evaluate the differing criteria for easements by implication versus necessity. Consequently, the trial court's judgment was affirmed. Melton raised an issue regarding HP's failure to prove its title to the land for the claimed easement but did not adequately support this argument in her principal appeal brief, leading the court to disregard it, as it only appeared in her reply. Testimony from Jackson indicated that children occasionally crossed lot 10 to reach lot 9B prior to Melton's house construction; however, no specific area was identified, and the driveway area was not used as a road until after the house was built. The trial court's written order did not address Melton's trespass claim, and she did not present any related arguments on appeal.