State v. Boyer

Citations: 56 So. 3d 1119; 2011 La. App. LEXIS 137; 2011 WL 312690Docket: No. 10-693

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; February 1, 2011; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Jonathan Edward Boyer appeals his convictions for second-degree murder and armed robbery with a firearm, alongside the sentences imposed. The events occurred on February 4, 2002, when Boyer and his brother were given a ride by Bradlee Marsh. Boyer demanded money and, upon refusal, shot Marsh three times in the head, killing him, and then stole money and a silver chain. Boyer was arrested in Florida on March 8, 2002.

Initially indicted for first-degree murder on June 6, 2002, the charge was later amended to second-degree murder on May 21, 2007. On the same date, Boyer faced armed robbery charges in a separate docket. A jury trial commenced on September 22, 2009, culminating in convictions for both charges on September 29, 2009. Following the denial of his motions for a new trial and for arrest of judgment on October 14, 2009, Boyer was sentenced to life imprisonment for second-degree murder and 99 years for armed robbery, with an additional five years for firearm use, all sentences to run concurrently with the life sentence. Boyer did not seek to reconsider his sentences but raised objections in court.

The appeals were consolidated, and a review for patent errors was conducted. A potential issue arose regarding actions taken after Boyer's mental incapacity was raised but before he was deemed competent to proceed. Louisiana law mandates that proceedings should halt until a defendant's mental capacity is established. A sanity commission was appointed on July 18, 2008, but various steps occurred after the incapacity issue was raised, including a denied request for defense counsel's presence during the evaluation.

On August 4, 2008, Judge Robert Wyatt appointed Drs. Ryder and Robertson to evaluate the Defendant’s sanity, scheduling a competency hearing for August 6, 2008, during which the court found the Defendant lacked mental capacity to proceed. Due to an extensive waiting list at the Eastern Louisiana Mental Health System, the court ordered the Defendant's name to be added to the list and remanded him for observation and treatment, with a six-month status conference to be scheduled. The State was tasked with coordinating the status hearing date. Following the hearing, the State submitted a supplemental response regarding outstanding forensic evidence, indicating pending reports on fingerprint analysis and DNA testing from the Southwest Louisiana Criminalistics Laboratory.

On September 8, 2008, the court issued a written Sanity Judgment confirming the Defendant's lack of capacity and committing him to the Feliciana Forensic Facility until further notice. After the six-month period expired, the State filed a Motion to Reappoint the Sanity Commission on March 6, 2009, requesting re-examination by Drs. Robertson and Ryder. The court approved this request. Subsequently, on March 16, 2009, the defense filed a Motion for Status Hearing and to Vacate the reappointment, arguing procedural non-compliance with La.Code Crim. P. art. 648(A)(2)(b). The State opposed this motion and sought to uphold the status conference order while denying the motion to vacate.

On April 15, 2009, the defense filed a motion for Judge Canaday's recusal, alleging he received improper ex parte communications from the State. The State opposed this motion, and during a hearing on the same day, the recusal was denied without referral to another division. The defense indicated plans to file a writ application, which was denied by the trial court. Ultimately, the court addressed the competency issue, with the defense willing to proceed based on the sanity reports without cross-examination of the physicians. The court then determined that the Defendant was competent to stand trial. The second circuit later noted that the procedural steps taken during the competency determination, particularly the State's discovery responses, were not prejudicial to the Defendant.

The stay of prosecution under Article 642 is designed to protect defendants from actions that could prejudice their rights until their capacity to understand the proceedings and assist in their defense is confirmed. In previous cases, such as State v. Perkins, it was established that proceedings should not advance until mental capacity is assessed. Despite a hearing occurring before the defendant was found competent, any errors were deemed harmless, as indicated in State v. Karam and State v. Young. The court emphasized that the stay ensures no prejudicial action occurs against the defendant until competence is established. 

Regarding a motion to recuse, it was heard shortly before the court ruled on the defendant's capacity, and although not resolved in the defendant's favor, no prejudice was claimed, and both rulings occurred in the same hearing, reinforcing the harmless nature of any error. 

Additionally, the defendant contended that the trial court incorrectly barred him from questioning witness Anthony Boyer about a past domestic abuse allegation. The State objected, asserting that impeachment with a non-conviction was not allowed under La.Code Evid. art. 609.1. The defendant argued this prevented him from exercising his constitutional right to confront witnesses and present a defense, claiming Boyer was a key alternative suspect in the case. The State acknowledged that if charges against Boyer were pending, there could be grounds for the questioning, but maintained that without a conviction, the defense could not pursue that line of inquiry.

Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 609.1 establishes that, in criminal cases, witnesses may be examined regarding their criminal convictions to assess credibility, but inquiries into arrests, indictments, or acquittals are prohibited. The defendant argued that while general credibility cannot be impeached based on arrests, connections could be drawn between an arrest and the witness's testimony to allow for questioning. The trial court acknowledged an exception for establishing a witness's bias or interest arising from arrests or pending charges, referencing State v. Jefferson. In this case, the State denied awareness of a closed domestic violence charge against a witness and argued against its relevance. The trial court ruled the questioning irrelevant due to the absence of pending charges. The court noted that evidence admissibility under Articles 607(C) and (D) is subject to a balancing test outlined in Article 403, which may exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by potential prejudice or confusion. The trial court found that the relevance of the misdemeanor charge was significantly outweighed by potential jury confusion, adhering to Article 609.1, which restricts inquiry to actual convictions. The court concluded that the exception for bias did not apply in this instance, deeming the assignment of error unpersuasive.

Defendant contends that evidence of Anthony Boyer’s violent behavior is pertinent as it increases the likelihood that he was the individual who shot Mr. Marsh. Citing La.Code Evid. art. 401, the Defendant clarifies that relevant evidence is any evidence that makes a consequential fact more or less probable. Additionally, he notes that Louisiana appellate courts have ruled that La.C.E. art. 404(B)'s limitations do not apply to relevant evidence of wrongful acts by third parties. La.Code Evid. art. 404(B) restricts the admission of evidence regarding other crimes to prove character unless it shows motive, intent, or other specified purposes, with prior notice to the state.

The Defendant asserts that the trial court should have evaluated the probative versus prejudicial value of the evidence, which it failed to do, thereby infringing on his right to confront the witness due to the non-existence of pending charges at trial. Furthermore, La.Code Evid. art. 609.1 allows cross-examination to reveal bias or influence on a witness's testimony. In relevant case law, while a witness's pending charges were not disclosed in one instance, the Louisiana Supreme Court emphasized that revealing a witness's motivations is crucial for effective cross-examination, as it highlights potential bias influenced by leniency from the state.

In this case, the witness had previously accepted a plea agreement related to the victim's murder, which included a conviction for obstruction of justice. At the time of trial, he was on probation and acknowledged that his truthful testimony was part of the plea deal, aware that the District Attorney's Office could revoke his probation based on his cooperation.

At trial, there was no active charge against a witness that would allow for a bargaining of testimony in exchange for leniency. The trial court rightly denied the Defendant's request to question the witness about an uncharged incident, as per Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 608(B), which restricts the inquiry into a witness's character for truthfulness through extrinsic evidence, except for criminal convictions. The relevance of a domestic abuse complaint was deemed insufficient against potential prejudice and jury confusion.

Regarding expert testimony, the court maintained its pretrial decision not to allow an expert on confessions and interrogations to testify, with the ruling being based on the merits presented. The Louisiana Supreme Court's precedent emphasizes that while pretrial admissibility decisions are not final, they are given great deference unless proven patently erroneous in light of trial evidence. Consequently, the assignment of error concerning the expert testimony was dismissed.

The Defendant also contested the admissibility of polygraph test results intended to impeach the lead detective, which was similarly affirmed as inadmissible based on the law of the case doctrine, with no evidence suggesting prior rulings were erroneous.

Additionally, the Defendant argued that the trial court improperly allowed the introduction of a suppression hearing transcript, claiming it contained prejudicial information detrimental to the defense. The Defendant had previously filed a notice demanding disclosure of any bad acts but was informed the State would only present evidence relevant to the charged offense. Furthermore, the Defendant filed a motion to suppress statements made during his apprehension in Florida, asserting that the detention was illegal and his confession was involuntary.

On April 26, 2008, a hearing addressed motions from the Defendant, including one to suppress his confession. Sergeant Weber testified about the apprehension of the Defendant, who was wanted for an execution-style murder and considered armed and dangerous. During the arrest in Jacksonville, Weber pursued the Defendant, who allegedly brandished a gun. Weber fired at the Defendant, who fell but was unharmed, and was subsequently arrested for assault on a police officer. Detective Jackson Short corroborated Weber’s account, noting he saw the Defendant struggle to retrieve something from his waistband, leading to the recovery of a gun nearby.

On September 17, 2009, the Defendant filed a motion to exclude the transcript of Sergeant Weber’s testimony, arguing that he had not been able to adequately cross-examine Weber regarding his credibility and the circumstances of the arrest, particularly since Weber was deployed to Iraq and unavailable for trial. A hearing on this motion was held on September 22, 2009, where the trial court denied the motion. The court referenced a 1974 Louisiana Supreme Court decision outlining five prerequisites for admitting prior testimony from an unavailable witness, which the Defendant later contested, asserting that the trial court relied on outdated standards. The prerequisites included the presence of legal counsel during the earlier hearing, that the witness testified under oath, that the witness was cross-examined or there was a valid waiver, the witness's unavailability at trial, and the State's good-faith efforts to secure the witness's presence.

Witness unavailability allows for the admission of prior testimony if it possesses sufficient 'indicia of reliability,' which is assessed based on whether there was an opportunity for cross-examination and whether the defense took advantage of that opportunity. This principle is supported by several cases, including State v. Robinson and Ohio v. Roberts, which highlight the need for a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of prior statements. Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 804(B)(1) specifies that former testimony is admissible if the party against whom it is offered had an opportunity and similar motive to develop that testimony through direct or cross-examination. The trial court found that these requirements were met in this case, although it did not explicitly address the 'similar motive' aspect. The court referenced State v. Ball, which reiterated the necessity of opportunity and motive in admitting prior testimony. The determination of a witness's unavailability is a preliminary question for the court, subject to a standard of manifest error review. Furthermore, the admission of prior testimony must not infringe upon the defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses, as protected by the Sixth Amendment and relevant state laws.

Certain conditions must be satisfied for the introduction of prior testimony to protect constitutional rights: 1) the defendant was represented by counsel during the earlier hearing; 2) the witness testified under oath; 3) the witness was cross-examined or there was a valid waiver of that right; 4) the witness is 'unavailable' at trial; and 5) the State made a good faith effort to locate the witness. These criteria align with La.Code Evid. art. 804(B)(1), allowing for the admission of prior recorded testimony as an exception to the hearsay rule. The trial court correctly applied this standard in ruling on the sergeant's prior testimony.

However, the court did not address the Defendant's claim regarding his ability to conduct a different and more effective cross-examination of the sergeant concerning allegations of gun possession and threats made during an escape attempt. The Defendant contends that this oversight violated his constitutional rights to due process and confrontation. He argues that Mr. Boyer, during the suppression hearing, lacked a similar motive for cross-examination as he was focused on the voluntariness of Boyer’s confessional statement and not on the accuracy of Det. Weber’s account. Defense counsel had no motivation to avoid harmful testimony in the absence of a jury, which contrasts with the different motivations present during trial.

In State v. Jones, the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed the concept of 'similar motive' in relation to admitting prior testimony from an unavailable witness. The court highlighted that motivations can differ significantly between proceedings, impacting the admissibility of prior statements. The ruling emphasizes that 'similar motive' does not require identical motives but rather requires that the issues and context of the prior questioning be sufficiently aligned to ensure an adequate motive for testing the credibility of the testimony.

Defense counsel’s strategy at trial reflected concerns raised during the suppression hearing, particularly regarding the voluntariness of the Defendant's confession to the murder of Marsh. The Defendant claimed that his confession was not made freely or intelligently due to his psychological state and the traumatic experience of nearly being shot by police. At trial, he suggested that his brother might be the actual perpetrator, asserting that his confession resulted from the extreme trauma he experienced and his mental health issues.

During the suppression hearing, the Defendant rigorously cross-examined Florida officers about the incident of his capture, including questions about the officers' actions and the Defendant's behavior post-incident. In closing arguments, defense counsel emphasized a distinction between actually committing the act and merely claiming to have done so.

The trial court allowed the admission of a transcript from an unavailable officer's testimony, with the State agreeing to certain redactions as recommended by the court. The Defendant sought to exclude references to a gun, indications that he reached for a weapon, possession of ammunition, the officer's fear for his life, and prior charges against him, arguing that such evidence was inadmissible “other crimes” evidence that did not comply with Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 404(B)(1). The trial court granted some redactions but retained testimony about the Defendant’s possession of a gun unrelated to the murder, which the Defendant contested as improperly admitted evidence.

During the trial, the State contended that evidence regarding the Defendant's apprehension and his possession of a handgun was res gestae, integral to the robbery and murder under consideration. The Defendant argued that this evidence was highly prejudicial and should be excluded. The trial court determined the handgun evidence admissible, citing State v. Williams, which allowed a similar introduction of a firearm found during an arrest for drug possession. The Defendant distinguished his case from Williams, noting the gun was found immediately at the scene of the drug offense, whereas in his case, the handgun was linked to an arrest a month later in Florida and was unrelated to the current charges. The Defendant referenced State v. Taylor, where the Louisiana Supreme Court emphasized the necessity of close temporal and locational proximity between the charged offense and other crimes evidence to avoid portraying the defendant negatively and to provide context for the crime at trial. He argued that the trial court misapplied the 'integral part' exception by allowing evidence from a separate incident that did not meet these proximity requirements. The res gestae doctrine in Louisiana encompasses spontaneous statements and witness testimonies related to the crime, provided there is a clear continuous chain of events.

Integral act (res gestae) evidence in Louisiana is essential for maintaining the narrative momentum of a case, allowing jurors to draw necessary inferences for an honest verdict. In the current case, evidence of the Defendant's flight to Jacksonville, Florida shortly after a shooting is relevant to demonstrate consciousness of guilt. This includes any prior bad acts, supporting the jury's ability to reach a verdict. The trial court properly allowed the State to use a redacted transcript from a suppression hearing to present Sergeant Weber’s testimony, as the concerns in both hearings were substantially similar. The Defendant’s actions upon seeing officers—producing a weapon and attempting to flee—indicate a guilty mindset.

Regarding the Motion to Suppress, the Defendant contends that his confession to Detectives was not given freely or intelligently. The law requires that a confession must be shown to be free from coercion, and the State carries the burden of proving this at a suppression hearing. The State must also demonstrate that the Defendant was informed of his Miranda rights and that the confession was not coerced. Testimony from the interviewing officer may suffice to establish the confession's voluntariness. The admissibility of confessions must adhere to constitutional standards; any confession obtained through promises or improper influence is deemed involuntary and inadmissible. The trial court is responsible for evaluating the credibility and weight of evidence regarding the confession's admissibility.

The voluntary nature of a confession can only be challenged on appeal if unsupported by evidence. The trial court's determinations are given significant weight due to its ability to observe witness credibility. During the suppression hearing, detectives confirmed that the Defendant was read his Miranda rights and signed a waiver form before a two-hour interrogation, which was audiotaped. The Defendant affirmed that his statements were made voluntarily and without coercion. The trial court ruled on May 1, 2008, that the State proved the statements were given voluntarily, intelligently, and freely, while the Defendant bore the burden of proving his motion's grounds. The Defendant argued that his traumatic experience with police and mental health issues undermined the voluntariness of his statement; however, the court found that the State met its burden of proof. Previous rulings indicated that a confession could be deemed inadmissible only if chemical impairment significantly hindered comprehension during interrogation. The trial judge's findings on such impairments are upheld unless lacking evidentiary support. During questioning, the detectives acknowledged knowledge of shots fired but were unaware of the Defendant's suicidal status.

Defendant's interrogation audiotape revealed he answered questions calmly and clearly without mentioning being shot by police. No evidence supported his claim of becoming suicidal post-questioning, nor was there any indication he lacked understanding of his statements or their consequences. His confession regarding shooting Bradlee Marsh was deemed freely and voluntarily given. Concerns about the absence of fourteen minutes from the tape were addressed; the detectives explained that the voice-activated recording device paused during silence, and the coherent nature of the discussion was confirmed.

Regarding the speedy trial argument, Defendant contended his trial violated statutory and constitutional rights. The court affirmed the trial court's ruling that no error occurred in denying the motion to quash, with the supreme court upholding this decision. The applicable statutory time limits were identified as either three years (until November 16, 2010) or two years (until November 16, 2009). Since Defendant was convicted on September 29, 2009, there was no violation under either timeframe for his second-degree murder or armed robbery convictions. The court emphasized that the constitutional right to a speedy trial exists independently of motion filing, and despite the absence of statutory violations, the analysis of delays must consider the fundamental nature of the right to a speedy trial. The trial court had not found any state or federal constitutional speedy trial violations.

In State v. Van Dyke, the court analyzed constitutional speedy trial violations using the four factors established in Barker v. Wingo: length of delay, reason for the delay, defendant’s assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant. 

1. **Length of Delay**: A delay must be presumptively prejudicial to trigger further inquiry into the other factors. The Supreme Court indicated that the tolerable length of delay varies by case type, with a five-year delay considered “extraordinary” and a three-year delay deemed presumptively prejudicial.

2. **Reason for Delay**: The government’s justification for the delay carries significant weight. Deliberate attempts to delay trials are heavily criticized, while neutral reasons like negligence are considered less culpable, although responsibility ultimately rests with the government.

3. **Defendant’s Assertion of Right**: The degree to which a defendant asserts their right to a speedy trial is crucial and intertwined with the other factors. Stronger assertions are likely when a defendant experiences significant prejudice, and a failure to assert this right complicates claims of deprivation.

4. **Prejudice**: The final factor examines whether the defendant has suffered prejudice due to the delay. 

These factors collectively guide courts in evaluating claims of speedy trial violations under constitutional standards.

Prejudice in the context of the right to a speedy trial is evaluated based on interests designed to protect defendants, namely: (i) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, (ii) minimizing anxiety and concern for the accused, and (iii) limiting the possibility of impaired defense. The most critical interest is the potential impairment of the defense, as inadequate preparation can undermine fairness in the judicial process. Delays can lead to loss of witnesses or diminished memory, though lost memory is often unrecorded. The detrimental effects of pretrial incarceration include job loss, disrupted family life, idleness, and impaired ability to prepare a defense. Even when not incarcerated, defendants face restrictions on liberty and heightened anxiety. 

In the case of Van Dyke, the court found no violation of the right to a speedy trial despite his six years and five months of incarceration from indictment to trial. His original indictment in 1996 was quashed in 2002 due to an unqualified grand juror, and after reindictment, he moved to quash based on speedy trial rights, which the trial court granted. However, the court highlighted that most delays were attributed to the defense, including numerous motions and continuances requested by defense counsel. Ultimately, Van Dyke did not aggressively assert his speedy trial rights, failing to file a motion before the time limit expired and not demonstrating any prejudice.

An eyewitness critical to the defendant's case died, but the defendant did not demonstrate the eyewitness's importance. The court referenced the Supreme Court's ruling in Alfred, emphasizing that incarceration inherently causes prejudice, particularly if it impairs the defense. The defendant faced a lengthy delay: arrested on March 8, 2002, and indicted on June 6, 2002, for first-degree murder, the charge was later reduced to second-degree murder in May 2007, culminating in a conviction for second-degree murder and armed robbery on September 29, 2009, over seven years post-arrest, during which the defendant was incarcerated. The court noted that a five-year delay is considered "extraordinary," and even a twenty-two month delay could be unacceptable under certain conditions. A significant portion of the delay was attributed to a funding crisis in Louisiana, with the state responsible for securing adequate defense funding, especially in capital cases. 

The defendant was arraigned on September 9, 2002, with the trial initially set for February 3, 2003. After filing a motion regarding funding in November 2002, a hearing was not held until August 2003. The defendant's motion to quash was filed on July 7, 2005, just after the three-year statutory limit expired, and was denied in a hearing on November 20, 2006, with the ruling subsequently affirmed. The charges were reduced on May 21, 2007, allowing the case to proceed, leading to a new arraignment for armed robbery. Following multiple motions filed by the defendant regarding discovery, evidentiary issues, and a motion to recuse the judge, several hearings were held, and trial dates were rescheduled, which included appointments for a sanity commission.

On September 9, 2008, the Defendant was deemed incompetent to stand trial, but was later found competent on April 15, 2009. The trial commenced on September 22, 2009, after a seven-year delay primarily attributed to a lack of funding rather than any intentional delay tactics by the Defendant or the State. During the intervening period, the Defendant filed over thirty legitimate motions, including requests to recuse the trial judge and evidentiary motions requiring witness testimony. Although the Defendant confessed to the crime and his brother testified against him, the case was complicated by procedural issues related to funding and the Defendant's temporary incompetency.

The Defendant did not assert his right to a speedy trial until after the three-year statutory limit had lapsed. His first motion regarding this right was filed in July 2005, but he did not raise the issue again until January 2008. His failure to assert the right promptly and his agreement to a continuance suggest he did not anticipate any prejudice to his defense. The Defendant claimed that the lengthy pretrial incarceration caused significant personal hardships, including job loss and mental health issues, and that he was unable to assist in his defense due to these challenges. He also mentioned the loss or disappearance of witnesses, but did not provide details on their expected testimonies during relevant hearings.

Defendant did not disclose the testimonies of unavailable witnesses nor their potential impact on the trial outcome, except for two witnesses, William Gallier and Russell Clement, whose police statements were deemed inadmissible hearsay by the trial court. Defendant claims that his long incarceration led to a mental breakdown. Citing *Alfred*, the court analyzed the Barker factors and concluded that Defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated, noting that while incarceration causes inherent prejudice, it is a necessary outcome of serious charges like first-degree murder. The court emphasized that dismissing an indictment for a speedy trial violation is a serious consequence that should be applied cautiously, as it undermines societal interests in prosecuting alleged crimes. 

Defendant also contends he lost his job due to the prosecution but does not clarify which job this refers to, as there is no evidence he was employed when arrested in Florida after fleeing from Louisiana. He argues that the lengthy delay denied him effective assistance of counsel, particularly in relation to a timely assessment of the crime scene and relevant events. Tom Lorenzi initially represented Defendant from June 2002 until May 2007, followed by James Burks, and subsequently various Public Defender attorneys, including Rachel Jones, Steven Coward, and Christine Lehmann, with Richard Bourke joining in April 2008.

Bourke represented the Defendant from April 15, 2009, through trial and subsequent proceedings. The court determined that the Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated, despite the lengthy period of over seven years from arrest to trial being presumptively prejudicial. The court noted that the factors from Barker v. Wingo were not present to justify quashing the indictment for second-degree murder or the armed robbery charges. The first three years of incarceration were related to a non-bailable first-degree murder charge, and the prosecution's delays were deemed “out of the State’s control.”

After the delays, the Defendant filed over thirty motions, which further suspended the time limitations until resolved, and was later deemed incompetent to proceed, adding to the interruptions. The court found no evidence suggesting the State sought to delay the trial for advantage. Granting relief to the Defendant would undermine societal interests in prosecuting crime.

Additionally, the Defendant filed a motion in limine to admit videotaped statements from witnesses William Gallier and Russell Clement, asserting their unavailability was due to delays caused by funding issues in capital cases. Gallier had previously alleged involvement by another individual in the victim's shooting but later retracted his statement. Clement claimed knowledge of a gang-related motive for the victim's murder but also did not testify. The Defendant argued these statements were admissible as exceptions to hearsay rules, asserting their reliability. The State countered that the statements were hearsay and lacked corroboration, leading the trial court to define hearsay and note the absence of the declarants.

The statement in question was neither made under oath nor subject to cross-examination, raising concerns about its reliability for the defendant's defense. The Court, after reviewing the statements and hearing counsel's arguments, deemed them unreliable and of minimal value to the defense. The exception for declarations against penal interest, which allows hearsay statements to be admissible if the declarant is unavailable and corroborating evidence supports their reliability, was found not applicable here. Citing State v. Rushing, the Court noted that the defense failed to provide sufficient evidence to justify the statements' reliability and did not qualify as declarations against penal interest.

According to Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 804(B)(3), a statement must be contrary to the declarant's interest and believed to be true to be admissible, particularly if it exposes the declarant to criminal liability. The Court referenced State v. McCullough, affirming the right to present a defense through such statements, and discussed State v. Green, where the defendant was denied the right to introduce a statement when the declarant invoked the Fifth Amendment. The Court reiterated the constitutional rights to present a defense, confront witnesses, and the importance of evidentiary rules not overriding this fundamental right. In State v. Gremillion, a statement made by the victim was ruled inadmissible hearsay, reinforcing the need for statements to meet specific exceptions to be considered in court.

Normally inadmissible hearsay can be permitted if it is reliable, trustworthy, and relevant, especially if its exclusion would infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense, as established in Chambers v. Mississippi. In Gremillion, the exclusion of a statement negatively impacted the defendant’s fundamental rights. The Louisiana Supreme Court has outlined the evolution of rules regarding statements made against penal interest, paralleling Federal Rule of Evidence 804. Historically, common law allowed only statements against pecuniary interests due to concerns about the potential fabrication of penal interest statements. Over time, legal acceptance of such statements evolved, leading to their inclusion in federal rules, which require the declarant to be unavailable and for there to be corroborating evidence of trustworthiness. The Louisiana courts first acknowledged statements against penal interest in State v. Gilmore, where a deceased declarant's testimony about another man’s confession was deemed admissible based on additional corroborative evidence and the declarant's unavailability. The rationale for admitting these statements centers on the necessity due to the declarant's absence and the inherent trustworthiness of statements made against one's own interest.

804(b)(3) establishes that for a statement against interest to be admissible, it must be shown that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless they believed it to be true, particularly when it involves an admission of criminal conduct. Statements that admit sole responsibility for a serious crime are typically considered prima facie against interest, thereby satisfying this requirement. However, if a statement appears self-serving—such as when a declarant seeks leniency in exchange for cooperation—it may be excluded from this exception. Additionally, statements made unknowingly to informants or undercover agents are generally admissible.

When a statement that exposes the declarant to criminal liability is used to exculpate the accused, corroborating circumstances that indicate its trustworthiness are required, placing the burden on the accused to provide such evidence. Corroboration can come from independent proof that supports the assertion made in the statement, with circumstantial evidence often being adequate. Typical corroborating factors include statements that significantly compromise the declarant's interests, consistency in the declarant's statements, or a lack of motivation to falsify their testimony for the benefit of the accused.

In the case of Hammons, a man under investigation for another crime admitted to a pharmacy robbery, implicating himself and his partner. His account included details about the robbery and the physical resemblance of his partner to Hammons. Notably, a fingerprint from the crime scene did not match Hammons'. The court ruled that the man's admissions were made under circumstances against his penal interest, as he acknowledged his criminal actions to an informant without any intent to negotiate with law enforcement, reinforcing the trustworthiness of his statements.

Circumstantial evidence supports the reliability of Stanford's statements regarding his involvement in the robbery of the Lakewood Pharmacy. He shared details with an acquaintance, Brown, whom he believed would keep the information confidential, especially after another individual was arrested. Stanford did not know the defendant or his father, eliminating any motive to lie for their benefit. His repeated admissions further bolster their credibility. 

The defendant claimed that witnesses Gallier and Clement were unavailable for testimony, submitting affidavits from his investigator detailing efforts to locate them. The State countered that these affidavits did not sufficiently prove unavailability and asserted the right to cross-examine the investigator. The State also contended that the defendant failed to provide adequate evidence of the reliability of Gallier and Clement’s statements, which included claims about another person being present during the victim's murder and a drug dealer wanting the victim harmed. The court noted that these statements were not made against penal interest and were not corroborated by independent evidence, leading to the trial court's decision to deny the introduction of their statements to the jury.

Regarding the conviction, the defendant argued that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated due to a majority verdict instead of a unanimous one. Although acknowledging the constitutionality of non-unanimous verdicts as established in State v. Bertrand, he sought relief based on McDonald v. Chicago, which pertains to individual rights to possess handguns, without specifying its relevance to his case. The court found this argument abandoned due to lack of briefing. Additionally, the defendant claimed double jeopardy violations concerning his convictions for second degree murder and armed robbery under State and Federal Constitutional clauses.

The defendant argues that the state used evidence of his killing of Bradlee Marsh, allegedly to steal money, as grounds for both armed robbery and murder charges, claiming this constitutes double jeopardy, which prohibits being tried twice for the same offense. The legal framework for double jeopardy is outlined in La.Code Crim. P. art. 591 and is protected under both the U.S. and Louisiana Constitutions. It applies in three scenarios: subsequent prosecutions after acquittal, after conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense. 

Second degree murder involves killing with intent or during the commission of certain felonies, including armed robbery, as per La.R.S. 14:30.1(A). Armed robbery is defined as taking property from another through force while armed with a dangerous weapon (La.R.S. 14:64(A)). The defendant claims his second degree murder charge was effectively a "felony murder" linked to the armed robbery, arguing he faced double punishment for the same act. However, it is established that a defendant can be convicted of both second degree murder (with intent) and armed robbery (using force) as these offenses do not share the same elements. This distinction is illustrated in case law, including State v. Davies, where it was noted that differing elements of the crimes do not constitute the "same offense" under double jeopardy principles. The U.S. Supreme Court's Blockburger test is referenced to clarify the definition of "same offense."

When evaluating whether two statutory provisions constitute separate offenses or a single offense, the key test is whether each statute requires proof of a distinct fact that the other does not. If one statute necessitates proof of an additional fact, successive prosecutions are permissible under the double jeopardy clause. This principle, known as the Blockburger test, is mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court and is incorporated in Louisiana law. Additionally, Louisiana employs a "same evidence" analysis, determining that offenses are identical for double jeopardy if the evidence needed to convict on one charge is also sufficient for the other, focusing on the proof necessary for conviction rather than the actual evidence presented.

In this case, the crimes of second degree murder, second degree kidnapping, and attempted aggravated rape do not share identical elements, which means they are not the same offenses under Blockburger. However, the assessment under the "same evidence" test requires examining whether the evidence for a conviction in one crime is the same for the others, even if the elements differ. 

The defendant's criminal actions spanned multiple locations and involved distinct offenses arising from a single episode. Specifically, second degree kidnapping involved the forcible abduction of two girls, who were physically harmed while the defendant was armed. The attempted aggravated rape was a separate act, where the defendant threatened the victims with death to compel them into sexual acts. The jury received instructions on two theories of second degree murder, supported by evidence indicating the defendant had the specific intent to kill, as demonstrated by threats made to the victims and his actions to increase the risk of harm when they attempted to escape.

S.J.’s death, along with the trial court's instructions regarding the second degree murder statute, supports a conviction under the specific intent provision. The relevant statutes serve distinct purposes and violations result in separate penalties, thus double jeopardy does not apply. The offenses are not identical under the Blockburger test, as each contains unique elements. Key evidence for the convictions includes Anthony Boyer’s testimony, the Defendant’s confession, and statements to family members. Boyer recounted a ride with Marsh that ended in a fatal shooting, stating he heard shots after getting out of the truck and found Defendant with Marsh's body afterward. In his confession, Defendant claimed he attempted to rob Marsh, engaged in a struggle for the gun, and accidentally shot Marsh. However, forensic testimony indicated that Marsh was shot three times, with two shots being contact wounds to the head, suggesting intentionality rather than an accident. The jury had to determine that Defendant exhibited specific intent to kill, defined as a desire for the consequences of one’s actions. The circumstances, including the proximity of the shots, supported a finding of specific intent, leading to the conviction. Each offense required proof of distinct elements, reinforcing that the convictions were justified and not mutually exclusive.

A second degree murder conviction necessitates proof of specific intent to kill or cause serious injury, while an armed robbery conviction requires evidence of taking something of value by force or intimidation while armed. The trial evidence supported the jury’s determination that the two offenses resulted from separate conduct, negating any double jeopardy claims. The defendant contended that the trial court improperly allowed the State to join the two counts for trial, asserting that only he could request such joinder. However, Louisiana law, specifically La.C.Cr.P. art. 706, permits the consolidation of multiple criminal cases if they could have been joined in a single indictment. This provision has remained consistent since its introduction in 1966, despite subsequent expansions of joinder rules. The defendant did not formally object to the State’s motion for joinder, which resulted in waiving any claims of improper consolidation. Additionally, he failed to demonstrate any prejudice arising from the consolidation. 

After trial, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the verdict was contrary to law and evidence, citing prejudicial errors and improper comments by the State regarding his failure to testify. He also claimed the trial court erred by denying a request for an accomplice warning instruction to the jury. La.Code Crim.P. art. 851 states that a new trial is warranted only if it is shown that injustice has occurred; thus, the motion must be denied unless such injustice is established.

The verdict was deemed inconsistent with both the law and the evidence presented. The court identified prejudicial error in its ruling on a written motion and objections raised during the trial. Although the defendant may not have a strict legal right to a new trial, the court believed that justice would be served by granting one. The motion for a new trial was denied on the scheduled sentencing date, October 14, 2009. 

A new trial's grant or denial is subject to an abuse of discretion standard, as established in *State v. Viree*. The defendant claimed his confession was coerced due to prior intimidation, but the record offered no reasonable doubt regarding its voluntariness, supported by *State v. Hills*. The convictions primarily relied on the defendant's confession, which included admissions of shooting the victim, Marsh, and taking his belongings. Testimonies from detectives and an audiotape of the confession confirmed its clarity and coherence.

Additionally, the defendant's brother testified to being present with Marsh before the shooting, and the defendant's statements to family members on the night of the incident indicated admission of guilt. The manner of the shooting suggested specific intent to kill. The trial court affirmed that the evidence supported the defendant's responsibility for the victim's death, stating that jurors received proper instructions and rendered their verdict based on the evidence. The trial court applied the "thirteenth juror" standard in reviewing the evidence, concluding that the verdict was not contrary to the law and evidence. The defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence during the trial or on appeal. The court also clarified the distinctions between claims in a motion for a new trial versus a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal.

A motion for a new trial focuses on the weight of the evidence rather than its sufficiency, as established in Tibbs v. Florida. The trial judge applies the thirteenth juror standard, re-evaluating the evidence. Issues of sufficiency should be raised through a post-verdict judgment of acquittal per La.C.Cr. P. art. 821. The trial judge has a duty to assess evidence sufficiency under Article 851 when a related ground is raised. In this case, assignment of error number 1 addresses the constitutional sufficiency issue, noting that denials of new trial motions based on La.C.Cr. P. art. 851(1) are not appealable. Louisiana case law consistently holds that assignments of error related to the denial of new trial motions alleging verdicts contrary to law and evidence are not subject to appellate review.

The defendant's motion for a new trial included juror affidavits expressing a desire to hear additional testimony regarding the violent tendencies of Anthony Boyer and expert testimony on false confessions. However, the trial evidence was not contrary to the verdicts, and juror opinions on undisclosed testimony were deemed irrelevant, with inquiries into jurors' mental processes being improper absent claims of misconduct. Article 858 of La.Code Crim. P. restricts the review of new trial motions to legal errors. The defendant identified specific alleged prejudicial errors in the trial court's rulings, including the exclusion of defense evidence on confessions, unprosecuted violence, misrepresentation in reports, alternative suspects, and the admission of certain testimony.

Improper comments made by the state regarding the defendant’s silence and the trial court's failure to provide an accomplice warning are highlighted among the defendant's claims of error. However, the court found no prejudicial errors in prior rulings. The defendant filed for a jury instruction on accomplice testimony, asserting that Anthony Boyer was an accomplice and that jurors should be warned to treat uncorroborated testimony with caution. The trial court denied this request, citing sufficient corroborating evidence, particularly the defendant's confession, and referenced State v. Hollins regarding jury instructions. 

Under Louisiana law, a special jury charge must be given if it is correct and pertinent, but it need not be given if included in a general charge. The failure to provide such an instruction constitutes reversible error only in cases of a miscarriage of justice or violation of substantial rights. Louisiana law permits convictions based on uncorroborated accomplice testimony, but cautionary instructions are not necessary when there is corroboration. The determination of whether to provide an accomplice instruction lies within the trial court's discretion. In this case, the defendant's conviction relied on Fields' testimony, and while the jury received general instructions on witness credibility, the specific instruction on accomplice testimony was not given. To assess the trial court's discretion, it must be established whether Fields qualifies as an accomplice and if his testimony lacked corroboration. In Louisiana, accomplices are categorized as either principals or accessories after the fact, without a statutory definition of "accomplice."

An accomplice is defined as someone associated with others in committing a crime, as established in *State v. Gunter* (1945), which aligns with Louisiana Revised Statutes (La. R.S. 14:24) defining a principal in a crime. Under this statute, all individuals involved in a crime, whether present or absent, are considered principals. Importantly, a person can be deemed an accomplice regardless of a conviction or guilty plea. The trial court provided jurors with instructions emphasizing their role in determining the credibility and weight of witness testimonies, indicating that special instructions on accomplice testimony were unnecessary due to adequate general instructions. The court found no error in denying the defendant's request for an accomplice warning, citing sufficient corroborating evidence and the potential for confusion from such an instruction.

The defendant claimed that the prosecutor made improper comments during closing arguments that highlighted the defendant's choice not to testify. The prosecutor suggested that the defendant was attempting to cover for his brother, prompting an immediate objection from the defendant. However, the trial court later ruled that the comments did not violate the defendant’s constitutional right to remain silent. Under Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 770(3), a mistrial is mandated when a prosecutor refers, directly or indirectly, to a defendant's failure to testify, to protect the rights against self-incrimination. The court noted that any direct reference necessitates a mistrial regardless of intent, while indirect references require analysis of their intended effect on the jury to determine permissibility.

To grant a mistrial based on a remark regarding a defendant's failure to testify, it must be clearly inferred that the remark was intended to draw the jury’s attention to that failure. References that imply the defendant’s non-testimony can warrant a mistrial, especially if the defendant is the only one capable of countering the state's evidence. However, indirect references that do not focus on the defendant’s failure to testify—such as emphasizing unrebutted evidence when other witnesses could have testified for the defense—do not constitute grounds for a mistrial. In defense counsel's closing argument, he claimed another individual was likely the shooter, prompting a rebuttal from the prosecutor that was a natural response and did not focus on the defendant's failure to testify.

The defendant also claimed a violation of his constitutional right to choose and maintain continuity with his counsel, specifically regarding Rachel Jones, who was pregnant and due around the trial date. Despite objections, the trial date was set, and the defendant argued that this deprived him of his chosen counsel. However, the record shows that Richard Bourke, his current attorney, had been involved in the case prior to the trial date, ensuring continuous representation. It is noted that an indigent defendant lacks the right to a specific court-appointed counsel. Finally, the defendant argued that the sentences imposed were excessively harsh under the circumstances.

The punishment for second degree murder is life imprisonment without the possibility of suspension, probation, or parole, as outlined in La.R.S. 14:30.1(B). The defendant received a maximum sentence of ninety-nine years for armed robbery, with an additional five years for using a firearm, totaling one hundred and four years at hard labor, also without the possibility of suspension, probation, or parole (La.R.S. 14:64(B) and 14:64.3(A)). These sentences are to be served concurrently. The defendant contends that the trial court did not adequately consider mitigating factors.

The legal standard for assessing excessive sentences, as established in *State v. Office*, requires that a penalty must be grossly disproportionate to the crime to be deemed excessive, violating Louisiana Constitution Article I, Section 20, which prohibits cruel or unusual punishment. The trial court has broad discretion in sentencing within statutory limits, and a sentence will not be overturned unless there is a clear abuse of that discretion (State v. Etienne).

Factors considered in appeals regarding sentence excessiveness include the nature of the offense, offender circumstances, legislative intent behind the punishment, and comparisons to similar sentences (State v. Smith). However, sentences must be individualized to the offender and the offense (State v. Batiste), with the trial judge best positioned to assess aggravating and mitigating factors (State v. Cook).

During the sentencing hearing, the court heard victim impact statements and arguments for leniency based on the defendant's challenging upbringing and mental health issues, which were detailed in a sentencing memorandum filed by the defense. This memorandum highlighted the defendant's abusive childhood and the involvement of Child Protection Services. Following the sentencing, the defendant expressed an objection based on the points raised in the memorandum.

Defendant, who was raised in a dysfunctional family and possessed only a fifth-grade education, argued that the mandatory life sentence for second-degree murder was excessive. Louisiana law requires that a defendant must demonstrate exceptional circumstances to prove that a mandatory life sentence is constitutionally excessive. The burden is on the defendant to provide clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of constitutionality. In this case, Defendant failed to demonstrate that he was exceptional or that the life sentence was excessive, as the evidence indicated he was aware of right and wrong when he intentionally killed Marsh. The Defendant's claim of excessiveness was limited, as he did not file a motion to reconsider the ninety-nine-year sentence for armed robbery, which included an additional five years for using a firearm, totaling one hundred and four years at hard labor. The trial court imposed the maximum sentence, which is typically reserved for the most serious offenses. The court found no abuse of discretion in sentencing, emphasizing that Defendant intentionally killed Marsh, unlike other cases where victims survived. Additionally, the court noted that while Defendant's prior criminal history was not addressed, he had faced charges for property damage and introducing contraband while incarcerated.

During his detention, the Defendant engaged in attempted aggravated escape and battery against a police officer, accumulating over forty disciplinary actions. In determining an appropriate sentence, the trial judge reviewed not only the Defendant’s prior convictions but also all past criminal conduct, as established in relevant case law. The sentencing court may consider information typically excluded at trial, such as hearsay and arrest records, even without proof of additional offenses. Jail disciplinary records are also pertinent in this context. In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion; the Defendant's only mitigating factor was a difficult childhood, which the court acknowledged but deemed insufficient compared to the seriousness of the offense. The sentence was found appropriate when considering the case facts, comparable offenders, and the offense's severity, not constituting excessive punishment or a shock to the sense of justice. Consequently, the convictions and sentences of the Defendant were affirmed.