Arthur v. Arthur

Citations: 54 So. 3d 454; 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 38; 2010 Fla. LEXIS 41; 2010 WL 114532Docket: No. SC08-1675

Court: Supreme Court of Florida; January 13, 2010; Florida; State Supreme Court

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Shawn M. Arthur is seeking review of the Second District Court of Appeal's decision in *Arthur v. Arthur*, 987 So.2d 212 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), claiming it conflicts with three First District Court of Appeal decisions: *Sylvester v. Sylvester*, 992 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), *Janousek v. Janousek*, 616 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), and *Martinez v. Martinez*, 573 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). The Court has jurisdiction under Article V, Section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. The Court quashes the Second District's decision in *Arthur* to the extent it conflicts with this opinion and approves the First District's decisions to the extent they align with the Court's analysis.

In the underlying dissolution of marriage case, the trial court awarded shared parental responsibility, designating Josette A. Arthur (the Wife) as the primary residential parent, while granting Shawn M. Arthur (the Husband) reasonable visitation. The trial court permitted the Wife to relocate with their minor child to Michigan after the child turned three, emphasizing the importance of bonding time with both parents before that age. The Husband contested this decision on the grounds that the trial court's ruling was a prospective determination of the child's best interests, arguing that such a decision should have been made at the time of trial based on current circumstances. The Second District disagreed, asserting that the trial court acted within its authority and supported its decision with detailed findings. The district court found *Janousek* inapplicable, as it involved a prohibition on relocation, thus affirming the trial court's ruling regarding the Wife's relocation request. The Husband subsequently sought discretionary review to address the alleged conflicts between the district court decisions.

Section 61.13001 of the Florida Statutes (2006) outlines the procedures for a parent seeking to relocate with a child, applicable whether the relocation is agreed upon or contested. In contested cases, the statute specifies that there is no presumption for or against the relocation request. The burden of proof lies initially with the relocating parent or party to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the relocation serves the child's best interests. If successful, the burden then shifts to the nonrelocating parent to prove that the relocation is not in the child's best interests.

The statute enumerates several factors the court must consider in its decision-making process regarding relocation requests, including:

1. The child's relationship with both parents and other significant individuals.
2. The child's age, developmental needs, and the impact of the relocation on their overall well-being.
3. The feasibility of maintaining the child's relationship with the nonrelocating parent through alternative arrangements.
4. The child's own preference, factoring in their age and maturity.
5. Potential improvements to the quality of life for both the relocating parent and the child.
6. Each parent's reasons for supporting or opposing the relocation.
7. The economic conditions of both parents and the necessity of relocation for financial improvement.
8. The good faith of the relocating parent and the financial responsibilities met by the objecting parent.
9. Opportunities available to the objecting parent if relocation occurs.
10. Any history of substance abuse or domestic violence by either parent, as well as efforts at rehabilitation.
11. Any other relevant factors affecting the child's best interests. 

These considerations aim to ensure that any decision made regarding the relocation prioritizes the welfare and best interests of the child.

Section 61.13 of the Florida Statutes mandates that trial courts determine custody matters based on the best interests of the child and in accordance with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Under the UCCJEA, a custody determination made by a court with jurisdiction is binding on all parties served or notified, and such determinations are conclusive unless modified. The First District's decision in Martinez emphasized the need for finality in custody judgments, asserting that trial courts must make definitive rulings on primary residential parent designations when evidence supports such a conclusion. The court criticized a trial court order that required a future review, stating it undermined the finality required by law. This reasoning was reiterated in Janousek, where the court invalidated a provision allowing relocation after five years, noting insufficient evidence of a substantial change in circumstances. In the recent case of Sylvester, the First District reversed a trial court’s decision that delayed relocation until the child reached a certain age, finding the trial court erred by not making an immediate determination on the best interests of the child.

The district court, referencing its decision in Janousek, established that the appropriate action is to assess the suitability of relocation based on current circumstances rather than making speculative future determinations, as critiqued in the Second District’s Arthur decision. The court highlighted the challenges of assessing a child's future emotional and psychological needs, emphasizing the impracticality of predictions in this context.

The Husband raised two main errors regarding the trial court’s judgment. First, he contended that the trial court lacked evidence to determine the child's best interests twenty months post-hearing and should have focused solely on the child's situation at the time of the final hearing. He argued this was inconsistent with the court's own findings about the impact of relocation on the child's bond with him. Second, he claimed that the trial court’s prospective best interests finding improperly shifted the burden of proof to him in any future opposition to relocation.

Upon reviewing these arguments alongside relevant case law from the First District, it was concluded that determinations of best interests in relocation cases must occur at the final hearing, supported by substantial evidence. The trial court's reliance on a future-oriented analysis was deemed inappropriate, as it cannot accurately predict changes in relevant factors over time. The court's order indicated that while it might support relocation in the future, it did not find it to be in the child's best interests at the time of the hearing. Consequently, the petition for relocation should have been denied.

The trial court's prospective best interest determination regarding the Wife's relocation was deemed erroneous, rendering it unnecessary to address the Husband's claim of trial court error. The court quashed the Second District’s decision in Arthur to the extent it conflicted with this opinion and approved the First District's decisions in Martinez, Janousek, and Sylvester as consistent with the analysis. The provision in the final judgment allowing the Wife to relocate after twenty months was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Second District with instructions to deny the Wife’s relocation request. The court directed that the Wife’s motion for appellate attorneys’ fees be remanded to the trial court for evaluation under section 61.16, Florida Statutes (2006), and Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So.2d 697 (Fla.1997). The Wife's motion for appellate court costs was denied without prejudice, instructing that it be filed with the appropriate trial court. The court clarified that its ruling aligned with Janousek, countering the Second District's characterization of the case. It emphasized the difficulty in determining a child's future emotional needs, asserting that the trial court exceeded its authority by making a finding based on the child's best interests twenty months in advance instead of at the time of the final hearing.

The trial court's conclusion regarding the Wife's relocation was found to be inconsistent with its own determination that such relocation could not occur until twenty months after the final hearing. The Husband argued that this ruling improperly shifted the burden of proof onto him for any future attempts to prevent the relocation. Upon review, it was determined that a best interests analysis for relocation petitions must occur at the final hearing and be supported by competent, substantial evidence. The court's reliance on a prospective determination of the child's best interests, twenty months post-hearing, was deemed unsound. It emphasized that trial courts cannot predict future circumstances affecting the child's welfare, necessitating a "present-based" analysis at the time of the hearing. The trial court indicated that, but for concerns about the Husband’s bond with the child, it would have allowed relocation, but ultimately found that relocation was not in the child's best interests at the time of the hearing. Consequently, the petition for relocation should have been denied. The decision of the Second District in Arthur was quashed to the extent it was inconsistent with these findings, while the First District's decisions in Martinez, Janousek, and Sylvester were approved. The conclusion also noted that it was unnecessary to address the Husband's claim regarding the burden of proof, given the trial court's erroneous prospective determination.

The provision in the final judgment allowing the Wife to relocate after twenty months is vacated, and the case is remanded to deny her request for relocation. The Wife's motion for appellate attorneys' fees is to be remanded to the trial court to assess her entitlement under section 61.16, Florida Statutes 2006, and the case of Rosen v. Rosen. If entitlement is established, the trial court may award her reasonable appellate attorneys' fees incurred for representation before this Court. The Wife's motion for appellate court costs is denied without prejudice, as it should be filed in the trial court per Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400a. The ruling aligns with the precedent set in Janousek, which the Husband cited arguing for a definitive trial court ruling at the hearing. The Second District's interpretation that the trial court's findings favored the Wife's relocation was deemed incorrect, as the Janousek court allowed relocation after a defined period. The decision does not preclude the Wife from filing a future petition for relocation.