Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi; December 14, 2009; Mississippi; State Appellate Court
A Lafayette County jury convicted David Jackson Williams of murder, leading to a life sentence from the Lafayette County Circuit Court. Williams appealed, arguing the court erred by: 1) denying his request for an assisted-suicide jury instruction; 2) permitting a priest to invoke the priest-penitent privilege regarding conversations with the victim; 3) allowing Dr. Steven Hayne to testify as a forensic pathology expert; and 4) dismissing his claim of a denied right to a speedy trial. Additionally, Williams claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found no reversible errors and affirmed the circuit court's judgment.
The case involved the death of Demetria Bracey, a University of Mississippi student. Demetria and Williams began a romantic relationship after meeting online in January 2005, but separated when she studied abroad in Paris that summer. Upon her return, they resumed their relationship. In early November 2005, Demetria failed to attend her responsibilities, raising concern from a friend, Jessica Smith, who contacted Williams. He falsely claimed Demetria was with her dying father in Jackson, refused to provide her father’s contact details, but later facilitated a brief phone call in which Demetria appeared upset.
Demetria died in Williams's apartment between late Thursday and early Friday, with a knife wound to her chest. Williams alleged a mutual suicide pact, claiming both had consumed alcohol and Klonopin before she stabbed herself, while he attempted to harm himself but lost consciousness.
Williams regained consciousness hours after Demetria's death and found her dead with a knife in her chest, which he subsequently removed and discarded. He attempted to take his own life again but was unsuccessful. For several days, he isolated himself, consuming alcohol in hopes of finding the courage to commit suicide. When notified of an apartment inspection, he concealed Demetria's body in his closet and slept in another closet to avoid detection.
On November 15, 2005, Williams went to his parents' home in Olive Branch, Mississippi, seeking advice. His parents consulted an attorney and reported the situation to authorities, leading to Williams being admitted to Baptist-DeSoto Hospital. Later that day, police discovered Demetria's body in Williams’s apartment.
The following day, after his release from the hospital, Williams met with law enforcement, accompanied by his attorney. During the interview, he claimed that Demetria had committed suicide and that they had a prior suicide pact. He recounted their last days together, discussing their plan to die together and indicating that both had consumed alcohol and taken pills before the incident. He stated that he attempted to harm himself but could not do so effectively.
Williams was indicted for murder on March 2, 2006, pleaded not guilty, and went to trial on September 24, 2007. The prosecution presented nine witnesses, including friends and family, who testified about Demetria's character, her relationship with Williams, and their discussions about a suicide pact.
Law enforcement witnesses testified about their roles in the investigation, including Lieutenant Hatcher, Investigator Williams, and Agent Marsh from the FBI. Dywana Broughton from the Mississippi Highway Patrol's crime scene unit reported finding twenty-three blood stains in Williams’s apartment. Forensic pathologist Dr. Hayne performed an autopsy on Demetria five days after her death, determining she had been dead for approximately three days, with the cause of death being a stab wound to the heart, classifying it as homicide. He noted signs of strangulation that were not self-inflicted, bruises on her neck, and an abrasion on her right hand indicative of defensive actions. Dr. Hayne clarified that no hesitation marks were found, which would typically suggest suicide, and emphasized the significant force required for a fatal self-inflicted stab wound.
During cross-examination, Dr. Hayne acknowledged that hesitation marks might not always present in suicides and admitted that the abrasion could have occurred in various ways, though he believed it was sustained shortly before her death. Dr. Earnest Lykissi, a toxicology expert, refuted Williams’s assertion that Demetria ingested ten Klonopin tablets by reporting no drugs in her system and a .6 percent blood-alcohol content, indicating severe intoxication levels. He explained that such levels often lead to unconsciousness or death, and while some alcohol could result from decomposition, it would not account for the majority.
After the prosecution rested, Williams called Dr. R.W. Scales, a DNA testing expert, who revealed that most blood stains in the apartment were Williams’s, while Demetria’s blood was found in the closet where she died and in the kitchen sink.
Father Ollie Rencher, Assistant Rector at St. Peter’s Episcopal Church and Episcopal Chaplain, testified as a witness for Williams. He had previously counseled Demetria and, upon learning of her death, contacted the Oxford Police to express his belief, based on personal knowledge, that she may have committed suicide. At trial, he refused to testify about his statement due to priest-penitent privilege.
Dr. Arthur Copeland, a forensic pathologist, served as Williams's final witness. He reviewed Dr. Hayne’s autopsy report and contested Hayne’s conclusion of manual strangulation, noting the absence of key indicators like petechiae and offensive injuries. Dr. Copeland criticized Dr. Hayne for not performing a thorough neck dissection and for not consulting another pathologist or psychological experts regarding Demetria’s mental health history. He stated that the absence of hesitation marks does not exclude suicide and described the possibility of self-inflicted injury as plausible, while also acknowledging that suicide via stabbing is uncommon.
Ultimately, Dr. Copeland could not definitively conclude the manner of death but suggested that the evidence was "consistent with suicide." On cross-examination, he noted that suicide rates among minority groups are low. Following Dr. Copeland's testimony, Williams rested his case. During jury instruction discussions, Williams sought an assisted-suicide instruction, which the court denied, ruling that it is not a lesser-included offense of murder. The jury subsequently found Williams guilty of murder.
Williams argues that the circuit court erred by denying his proposed jury instruction D-3 regarding assisted suicide. The instruction states that if the jury finds him not guilty of murder, they should then consider whether he is guilty of assisting suicide, defined as willfully advising, encouraging, or assisting another in taking their life. Williams contends that he was entitled to this instruction because it aligns with his case theory, is based on factual circumstances shared with the murder charge, and constitutes a lesser non-included offense of murder.
The circuit court, however, refused the instruction, stating that such an instruction is only permitted for lesser-included offenses. Williams is charged with murder under Mississippi law, which prescribes life imprisonment upon conviction. The statute on assisted suicide classifies it as a felony with a maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment or a fine.
The circuit court's rationale aligns with precedent, emphasizing that jury instructions should be comprehensive and that refusal of an instruction does not constitute reversible error if the jury is otherwise adequately instructed. Nonetheless, Mississippi case law supports that a defendant may receive an instruction on a lesser non-included offense when warranted by evidence, a principle reaffirmed in recent rulings.
The Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that a defendant can request a jury instruction for a lesser offense, provided the lesser offense shares a common factual basis with the charged offense. If the evidence supports it, a defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser non-included offense, similar to a lesser-included offense instruction. However, in the case at hand, there was insufficient evidence to warrant an instruction on assisted suicide. The dissent's reliance on facts that could suggest suicide or a suicide pact is misplaced, as those facts do not pertain to whether the defendant assisted in the act of suicide. Merely having facts that might indicate a suicide does not imply assistance, as many suicides occur without aid. The court emphasized that for a finding of assistance in suicide, the actions of the assistor must directly contribute to the act of ending life, which was not demonstrated by the defendant's actions. Additionally, Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-49 defines assisting suicide as willfully advising or aiding another in taking their life, categorizing such actions as a felony. This statute is not applicable in cases of suicide pacts where individuals take their own lives without assistance from others.
Williams did not testify in his defense, exercising his constitutional right, yet he argues that the evidence only supports a charge of assisted suicide. His argument relies on a scripted statement given to law enforcement, which is deemed scripted for two reasons: the presence of his attorney during the statement and an unidentified person prompting Williams to disclose additional information. In his statement, Williams described discussions about committing suicide together but did not claim to have advised or assisted Demetria in taking her life. The Court finds that the statement only indicates they talked about suicide without confirming any encouragement or advice from Williams. Since he did not provide a more detailed account or testify, he cannot assert that the evidence supports a lesser charge. Ultimately, the Court affirms the jury's conclusion that Williams committed murder, not assisted suicide, without implying that Demetria acted alone in her death.
During the interview, Williams's counsel, Jim Franks, sought to clarify details that Williams had not initially provided. This occurred as Investigator Marsh was concluding the session. Investigator Marsh reiterated key points about Williams's state during a prior incident, noting both individuals involved were intoxicated and had self-harmed. When asked if he remembered anything specific, Williams could not recall certain events.
Franks then began his questioning, starting with an incident from six weeks earlier involving a police intervention due to Williams’s suicidal behavior, which a friend, Demetria, had reported. Williams recounted that Demetria had invited a friend over for support and that the police were called, although he was unsure of the reasons behind Demetria’s actions.
Franks also inquired about a bank visit that occurred the day before the interview. Williams explained that Demetria wanted to withdraw her money to ensure her mother could access it. They used an ATM at Trustmark Bank, where Williams entered the PIN provided by Demetria and withdrew all her money, which she subsequently placed in her purse. Williams confirmed that the money should still have been there when they left.
Lastly, Williams described a phone call from Jessica Smith, who was concerned about Demetria’s well-being after noticing her absence from work and other activities. Williams facilitated a three-way call with Demetria, who claimed to be at her father's house and mentioned his poor health.
Williams facilitated Demetria’s bank withdrawal by driving her to the bank, entering her PIN, and misleading a caller about her whereabouts. However, these actions do not constitute advising, encouraging, abetting, or assisting in Demetria’s suicide as defined by section 97-3-49, which targets actions directly leading to another’s death. Williams clarified that the decision to withdraw money was Demetria’s idea, without his encouragement. Even if he had suggested the withdrawal, it would not amount to assistance related to suicide, as it did not involve advice or actions leading to her death. Regarding the phone call with Jessica, Williams’s decision to lie about Demetria’s location was his own initiative without Demetria's request, and it appeared aimed at delaying the discovery of impending actions rather than assisting in her suicide. At the time, Demetria was not actively taking her life, and any unsolicited assistance provided by Williams cannot be classified as aiding in her suicide.
Williams made a statement regarding discussions he had with Demetria about committing suicide together over the summer, but he did not provide specific details about those conversations. There is no evidence indicating whether Demetria was hesitant or if Williams persuaded her to proceed with the idea, which raises questions about whether he truly advised, encouraged, or assisted her in committing suicide. The legal principle states that assumptions based on societal stigma surrounding suicide do not provide sufficient grounds for an appellate court to infer guilt or justify jury instructions on assisted suicide, especially since that was not the charge against Williams. For an instruction to be warranted, there must be clear evidence of overt actions by the defendant that contributed to the act of suicide. In this case, no such evidence was presented.
Additionally, the circumstances surrounding Demetria’s death—occurring in Williams’s apartment after several days of heavy drinking—are deemed irrelevant to the question of whether he assisted her in committing suicide. There is no indication that Demetria suggested needing alcohol to carry out her intent, nor is there evidence of any discussions during their time together that would imply encouragement or assistance. Furthermore, a toxicology report contradicts Williams’s claim regarding sharing pills, as no pills were found in Demetria’s system, indicating he misrepresented the situation.
The circuit court's denial of the assisted-suicide instruction was deemed correct, but its reasoning lacked state jurisprudential support. Although the court recognized that assisted suicide is not a lesser-included offense of murder, it misapplied the criteria for granting a lesser non-included-offense instruction. Established jurisprudence allows such an instruction if the non-indicted offense shares a common nucleus of operative facts with the indicted offense, provided there is sufficient evidentiary support for it. In this case, the evidence did not substantiate the request for an assisted-suicide instruction, leading to the affirmation of the circuit judge's decision based on the absence of evidentiary support.
Regarding the priest-penitent privilege, the court addressed Williams' claim of reversible error due to the exclusion of testimony from Father Rencher. The standard of review for such evidentiary decisions is based on an abuse of discretion, and a reversal occurs only if a substantial right is adversely affected. Father Rencher, after learning of Demetria's death, voluntarily provided a statement to police. Williams contended that by doing so, Father Rencher waived the privilege. The court determined that Father Rencher could not waive the privilege on behalf of Demetria, as it belonged to her or her representative. Thus, the court permitted Father Rencher to assert the privilege selectively during questioning. In front of the jury, Father Rencher acknowledged his familiarity with Demetria but hesitated on whether he had advised her to seek medication, prompting a discussion about the applicability of the priest-penitent privilege in that context.
The exchange involves testimony from Father Rencher regarding his interactions with Demetria, where he clarifies that their encounter at the church was not a confidential counseling session. He acknowledges seeing her on that day but emphasizes that their interaction did not constitute a priest-penitent privilege. When questioned, he confirms he suggested she might consider medication after noticing her anxiety, but he states his comments were informal and not professional advice. The court intervenes to protect the confidentiality of their relationship and limits further questioning on this matter.
Father Rencher also mentions advising Demetria to seek counseling services and notes her stressed demeanor during their encounter. He expresses his opinion that Demetria has low self-esteem and is in a controlling relationship with Williams, which contributes to her uncertainty. Williams argues that the court erred by not allowing full questioning of Father Rencher's statement. However, the record indicates no transcript of the statement was presented, nor is it included in the exhibits.
A transcript of Father Rencher’s statement exists in Williams's record excerpts but was not introduced during the trial, which does not integrate it into the record per Qualls v. State. Williams did not question Father Rencher on all aspects of his statement, so only trial-related matters and those considered under the priest-penitent privilege are addressed. This privilege allows individuals to refuse disclosure of confidential communications with a clergyman. The circuit court permitted Father Rencher to invoke this privilege concerning two inquiries: his advice to Demetria on Good Friday 2005 and whether she had mentioned suicidal thoughts.
Williams argued that the circuit court erred in allowing the priest-penitent privilege, claiming the encounter was not confidential. The court disagreed but noted that any potential error was harmless. For a communication to be deemed confidential under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 505, it must be made privately and not intended for broader disclosure. Father Rencher acknowledged that their conversation was not confidential, yet the court found it reasonable to consider the communication confidential given the context of counseling after a service. Even accepting Father Rencher's view, any privilege error was deemed harmless.
The court maintains that it will not overturn a circuit court's decision on evidence admissibility unless there is a prejudicial abuse of discretion. The proffer of Father Rencher's testimony did not indicate that Demetria expressed suicidal thoughts during their encounter; he only noted she appeared stressed and subsequently advised her to seek counseling and medical treatment.
Evidence presented did not support the likelihood of Demetria's suicide occurring more than six months later. The court found that Williams was not prejudiced by the circuit court’s decision to allow Father Reneher to invoke the priest-penitent privilege regarding discussions on Good Friday 2005, rendering any error harmless. When questioned about whether Demetria had ever considered suicide, Father Reneher cited the privilege and did not disclose details, leading to uncertainty about the confidentiality and context of their discussion. The appellant is responsible for providing a sufficient record on appeal, and Williams failed to meet this obligation, resulting in no merit to his claims of error.
Williams also contended that the circuit court erred in permitting Dr. Hayne to testify as an expert witness. Since there was no objection raised at trial, any alleged error must be deemed as plain error. Williams referenced a concurring opinion in Edmonds v. State that criticized Dr. Hayne's qualifications, but the majority affirmed his certification to testify in forensic pathology. Thus, Williams' argument regarding Dr. Hayne's qualification lacked merit.
Furthermore, Williams argued that his expert contradicted Dr. Hayne's findings related to Demetria's death. Dr. Hayne excluded suicide based on four factors: the angle and depth of the fatal wound, the presence of neck injuries, the absence of hesitation marks, and an abrasion on the back of her hand. Dr. Copeland disputed Dr. Hayne’s conclusions about the angle of the wound, asserting it was consistent with suicide, and indicated that self-infliction could account for the type of injury sustained.
Dr. Hayne testified that significant force was necessary to inflict the fatal injury on Demetria, while Dr. Copeland contested this, explaining that the wound passed through cartilaginous tissue, which is relatively easy to penetrate. Dr. Hayne identified bruising and hemorrhaging in Demetria’s neck as indicative of non-self-inflicted strangulation, but Dr. Copeland disagreed, asserting that Dr. Hayne's failure to dissect the neck tissues and the potential for the observed hemorrhaging to be related to decomposition undermined this conclusion. Dr. Copeland pointed out the absence of typical signs of strangulation, such as petechiae or defensive injuries, arguing that the evidence could be misattributed to decomposition.
Regarding the absence of hesitation marks on Demetria’s body, which Dr. Hayne claimed contradicted the possibility of suicide, both doctors agreed that such marks are not always present in suicides. Dr. Hayne suggested that an abrasion on Demetria’s hand might indicate a defensive wound, although he conceded that it was not definitively so, and Dr. Copeland noted that the injury could have occurred through other means.
The document also references the plain-error doctrine, stating that appellate courts may identify unraised obvious errors impacting a defendant's substantive rights. It concludes that the disagreement between Dr. Hayne and Dr. Copeland about their methodologies and conclusions did not affect the fairness or integrity of Williams’s trial.
Dr. Copeland's testimony did not invalidate Dr. Hayne's testimony, and any claims to the contrary are unfounded. Williams, arrested on November 17, 2005, was indicted on March 2, 2006, and waived his arraignment that same day. The circuit court scheduled his trial for September 24, 2007. Five days prior to the trial, Williams filed a motion to dismiss based on the alleged violation of the 270-day rule under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-17-1, arguing that the State failed to try him within the specified timeframe. Williams did not assert his constitutional right to a speedy trial at this stage. After jury selection, the circuit judge denied the motion to dismiss, with Williams going to trial approximately 571 days post-arraignment. Although he mentioned his constitutional right to a speedy trial in his appeal, it was not raised earlier, leading to a procedural bar against the appellate consideration of this claim. Citing precedents, the court noted that delays might benefit the defendant, and failing to raise the issue at trial precludes its review on appeal. Thus, Williams's constitutional claim regarding his right to a speedy trial is procedurally barred.
Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-17-1 mandates that offenses must be tried within 270 days of arraignment unless good cause for a continuance is shown. If a defendant does not assert their right to a speedy trial within this timeframe, they are considered to have acquiesced to any delay. In this case, Williams filed a motion to dismiss 566 days after waiving arraignment, thus waiving his right to complain about the delay.
Williams also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, citing several deficiencies, including the failure to move for a change of venue, call a specific witness (Michael Presnell), introduce an online chat transcript, obtain mental health records, object to a death certificate's admission, and fully develop his medical history in defense. To establish ineffective assistance, a two-part test is applied: the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced the defense, impacting the trial's fairness.
Regarding the change of venue, Williams argued that pretrial publicity warranted a request. However, during voir dire, jurors who had prior knowledge were dismissed after questioning. Williams's attorney, Franks, testified that the venue was discussed with Williams and his family, who did not object to proceeding in Oxford, which Franks believed had a more educated and liberal jury pool. The court found no deficiency in counsel's decision not to request a change of venue, as the attorney provided valid reasons and consulted with Williams and his family beforehand.
Franks was questioned regarding his decision not to call Michael Presnell as a witness during the trial. He noted that Presnell had made a statement to police that was somewhat antagonistic towards David but also revealed that Demetria had confided in him about considering suicide two years prior. Franks acknowledged potential issues with the remoteness of this information but was prepared to address them. Despite efforts to locate Presnell, including an internet search and a review of a 911 tape that yielded a phone number for Presnell, he was unreachable before the trial. During the trial, a witness named Jessica Smith indicated that Presnell was back at school, prompting Franks to discuss locating him with David’s father, Charles Williams. Williams suggested that he and a contact could find Presnell that night. However, on Wednesday morning, Williams informed Franks that they no longer needed Presnell as a witness, a decision Franks found peculiar but did not question. Franks believed the only potentially useful testimony from Presnell was regarding Demetria's previous suicidal thoughts. The sheriff's department had issued subpoenas for Presnell but could not locate him. At a post-trial hearing, Williams’s father testified that he found Presnell two weeks after the trial but did not disclose what Presnell could have contributed to the defense. Ultimately, it was concluded that Williams did not demonstrate that his trial counsel was deficient.
Williams did not demonstrate any prejudice to his case due to alleged deficiencies in his trial representation. After contacting Presnell post-trial, no evidence suggested Presnell could have aided Williams's defense. Regarding the online chat transcript, it included a statement by Williams about suicide and Demetria's response expressing a wish to kill herself, followed by Williams inviting her to join in suicide, which she declined. Franks, the defense attorney, decided against introducing the transcript, believing it could harm the defense more than help. He had consulted with Williams and his family about this decision and determined that, based on the evidence, he was not deficient in his choice.
Franks also explained his decision not to obtain Demetria’s mental health records, stating that both Williams and his family indicated she had not undergone psychiatric treatment. They chose to allocate resources to hire a forensic pathologist instead, which they deemed more beneficial. There were no medical records presented to support the claim that they would have been useful to Williams.
Additionally, Williams claimed his counsel erred by allowing a death certificate to be admitted; however, Franks could not recall such a document being entered into evidence and the court found no record of a death certificate being admitted either. Consequently, this claim of error was deemed without merit.
Franks, the attorney representing Baptist DeSoto, explained his decision not to pursue further evidence of Williams's medical history, indicating that he had access to the defendant’s medical records and could have introduced them if necessary. He argued that Williams's medical history was irrelevant to the case, emphasizing that the trial focused on whether Williams killed Demetria, not on issues of insanity. Franks noted that there had been no compelling evidence suggesting that Williams's suicide attempts were anything but genuine. The court agreed with Franks, stating that there was no evidence introduced to demonstrate how Williams's medical records would support his defense. Consequently, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was deemed without merit. The Lafayette County Circuit Court's conviction of murder and life sentence for Williams was affirmed, with all appeal costs assigned to him. Dissenting opinions were noted from King, C.J., and Roberts, J., with Roberts's dissent joined by Griffis, J. Notably, there was a significant detail regarding the autopsy revealing the force used in the stabbing, and a procedural note about Father Rencher's statement, which was intended to be submitted but ultimately was not included in the trial exhibits.
