Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; December 29, 2010; Florida; State Appellate Court
General Dynamics Corporation and General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. appeal a non-final order that denied their motion for summary judgment based on immunity from litigation under Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Act. The plaintiffs, former employees or their legal representatives, initiated claims under the Florida Water Quality Assurance Act (WQAA) for injuries or wrongful deaths attributed to hazardous substance exposure at General Dynamics' Lake Mary facility. They allege improper handling of toxic chemicals resulted in contamination, leading to health issues and fatalities.
Under the WQAA, specifically section 376.313, property owners face strict liability for damages from contaminants without the need to establish negligence. The only defenses available are those specified in section 376.308, which does not include employee actions as a defense. In contrast, the Florida Workers’ Compensation Act provides a structured system for compensating work-related injuries, granting employers immunity from civil suits unless there is deliberate intent to harm or conduct that is virtually certain to cause injury.
General Dynamics had valid workers' compensation insurance during the relevant time period and the plaintiffs did not assert an intentional tort claim that would bypass the Act's protections. Florida courts have ruled that the Act covers injuries from toxic workplace exposures, reinforcing the exclusivity of workers' compensation in these scenarios. Consequently, the court determined that General Dynamics is entitled to immunity under the Workers’ Compensation Act and reversed the lower court's decision.
Sections 873.313(3) and 440.11(1) of the Florida Statutes exhibit an apparent conflict. Section 440.11(1) establishes that workers' compensation serves as the exclusive remedy for employee injuries, granting General Dynamics immunity from WQAA claims. Conversely, section 376.313(3) restricts defenses in WQAA claims to those explicitly listed in section 376.308, which does not include workers' compensation immunity. Courts are tasked with reconciling conflicting statutes while giving effect to both. A reasonable interpretation of the WQAA suggests that the "only defenses" clause pertains to strict liability exceptions rather than a blanket exclusion of all legal defenses. This interpretation aligns with federal case law, such as the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Town of Munster v. Sherwin-Williams Co., which stated that the term "defenses" refers to causation elements rather than broadly excluding statutory defenses. Plaintiffs acknowledge that section 376.313(3) does not preclude all legal defenses not listed in section 376.308, allowing for defenses like releases, improper venue, lack of personal jurisdiction, res judicata, and statute of limitations.
Workers' compensation immunity serves as a protective measure that prevents the need for litigation in personal injury cases, similar to other statutory defenses. A more focused interpretation of the "only defenses" language indicates it pertains specifically to exceptions under strict liability rather than encompassing all statutory defenses, effectively reconciling the Workers' Compensation Law (WQAA) with the broader Act. This interpretation is supported by established Florida court rulings, which have consistently applied workers' compensation exclusivity to statutory claims.
In Pacheco v. Florida Power & Light Co., the court dismissed claims that a statute permitting lawsuits for building code violations could override workers' compensation immunity, emphasizing that the Workers' Compensation Act provides comprehensive employer immunity. Similarly, in Crosby v. Regional Utility Bd. of Gainesville, the court upheld workers’ compensation immunity in relation to claims under the Hazardous Occupations Act, despite that statute not mentioning workers' compensation. The courts recognize the foundational role of immunity in the Workers' Compensation Act, affirming its primacy over other legislative remedies.
Additionally, the plaintiffs' reference to Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corporation, which suggested a broader interpretation of the WQAA's language, does not undermine the established precedent that supports the application of workers' compensation immunity in similar contexts.
The Cunningham case involved plaintiffs alleging intentional exposure to toxic substances by defendants, claiming either deliberate intent to injure or knowledge that harm was substantially certain. The court in Cunningham held that the plaintiffs had a valid cause of action for intentional tort, outside the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA). It also indicated that defenses to this action were limited to those outlined in section 376.308, which does not include immunity under the WCA. In contrast, the current case diverges from Cunningham, leading to a certification of conflict. The ruling is based on statutory construction, adhering to a de novo review standard, referencing Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(v). The WQAA and WCA versions cited are from 2008 and 2003, respectively, with no disputes from the plaintiffs regarding these versions. The court applies the canon of statutory construction, suggesting that general phrases following specific lists refer only to similar items. The WQAA is noted to be modeled after federal law (CERCLA), suggesting that state legislation should be interpreted similarly to its federal counterpart. Importantly, while the WQAA includes an exception for intentional torts, the plaintiffs in this case did not assert such a claim in their complaint, and the question of amending the complaint to include an intentional tort is not currently under consideration.
