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Huntington Branch, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Housing Help, Inc., Mabel Harris, Perrepper Crutchfield and Kenneth L. Cofield v. The Town of Huntington, New York, Kenneth C. Butterfield, Clair Kroft, Kenneth Deegan, Edward Thompson and Joseph Clemente
Citations: 844 F.2d 926; 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 4415Docket: 794
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; April 5, 1988; Federal Appellate Court
The case concerns the Huntington Branch of the NAACP, Housing Help, Inc., and two black residents challenging the Town of Huntington's zoning regulations under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, known as the Fair Housing Act. The plaintiffs argue that the Town's zoning ordinance, which confines multi-family housing projects to a predominantly minority "urban renewal area," and the Town Board's refusal to rezone a predominantly white neighborhood for a subsidized housing project, violates the Fair Housing Act. They sought to build an integrated, subsidized apartment complex in Greenlawn/East Northport, an area with minimal racial diversity. The Town's zoning laws prohibited such construction outside the designated urban renewal zone in Huntington Station, which is 52% minority. The plaintiffs petitioned the Town to amend its zoning code, but their request was denied, prompting them to file a class-action lawsuit. The case previously addressed standing issues; the Second Circuit had ruled that the plaintiffs could not be denied standing due to a lack of HUD Section 8 funds for a specific year and clarified that they were not required to exhaust local remedies before filing their complaint. In Huntington Branch NAACP v. Huntington, 668 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), the district court upheld a zoning restriction, but used an improper intent-based standard in reviewing the disparate impact claim, leading to a reversal and a finding of Title VIII violations. The town of Huntington, with a population of around 200,000 in 1980, was predominantly white (95%), with blacks making up only 3.35%, mainly concentrated in Huntington Station and South Greenlawn. The district court identified a significant shortage of affordable rental housing that disproportionately affected black families, with 24% of black families needing subsidized housing compared to 7% of all families. Existing subsidized projects had a high minority occupancy, with Gateway Gardens and Whitman Village showing significant percentages of minority residents. Despite this need, the Town attempted to impose racial quotas in subsidized housing projects, facing opposition from HUD. After HUD rejected these quotas, the Town Board withdrew support for a proposed project due to an inability to ensure a desired ethnic mix. Multi-family housing in the Town is restricted to the "R-3M Apartment District," where such development is limited to specific uses, including public housing projects by the Housing Authority of the Town of Huntington (HHA) and multi-family dwellings within approved urban renewal areas. Currently, 52% of residents in the urban renewal area are minorities. Although HHA can construct multi-family housing townwide, its sole project, Gateway Gardens, is located in the urban renewal zone. Nearby private housing projects, such as Whitman Village and Lincoln Manor, are also situated in or adjacent to racially impacted areas. The Town’s zoning also includes a special district for senior citizen multi-family housing, with only one such development, Paumanack Village, situated in a predominantly white area with minimal minority occupancy (3%). The only vacant R-3M-zoned land eligible for new development is the MIA site, which has a history of proposed Section 8 housing. In response to urgent housing needs, the Huntington Housing Initiative (HHI) aimed to develop an integrated project for low-income families, excluding the MIA site to foster racial integration by locating the project in a white neighborhood. HHI actively collaborated with Town officials, including the Executive Director Marianne Garvin and board members, who were assured by Michael Miness that zoning amendments would facilitate their project. After exploring existing structures for rehabilitation, HHI identified a 14.8-acre site at Elwood and Pulaski Roads as suitable for a 162-unit project, with a target of 25% minority occupancy. The district court noted a significant percentage of potential tenants would belong to minority groups, and HHI found the property economically feasible and strategically located near essential services and transportation. Garvin requested Miness to evaluate a property before HHI purchased the option to buy it on January 23, 1980. Miness initially hesitated to provide an opinion but suggested that the property's R-40 zoning would not hinder development if the Town Board supported the project. After securing the option, Garvin invited Miness to visit again, to which he responded positively about the property's development potential. Throughout 1980, HHI sought to rezone the property from R-40 to R-3M. Tensions arose from an alleged "illegal" closed meeting between HHI and the Town Board on February 22, 1980, although some facts remained undisputed. Robert Ralph of HHI addressed the Town Board on February 26, 1980, seeking a commitment to amend the zoning ordinance for multi-family rental construction. In August 1980, HHI and National Housing Partnership applied for HUD’s Section 8 funding, which required Town input due to Huntington’s approved Housing Assistance Plan. Town Supervisor Kenneth C. Butterfield opposed the project, citing multiple concerns, including the lack of new construction goals in the Housing Assistance Plan, incompatibility with existing zoning, poor site layout, inadequate parking, and insufficient recreation space. Following the project's public exposure, significant community opposition emerged, including a petition with 4,100 signatures and a protest meeting attended by about 2,000 people, with Supervisor Butterfield voicing his opposition. On January 6, 1981, the Town Board rejected a proposal by HOUSING HELP, INC. for a zoning change to construct 162 federally-subsidized apartments for low to moderate-income individuals at Elwood and Pulaski Roads, citing concerns about transportation, traffic hazards, and disruption of the residential area. The district court upheld this rejection on three grounds: 1. Appellants did not formally apply for rezoning; specifically, the court noted that HHI failed to file an application to change the zoning to R-3M status. 2. Even if an application had been made, the appellants did not demonstrate a prima facie case of discriminatory effect. 3. Even with a demonstrated discriminatory effect, the city provided legitimate justifications for its decision. The court clarified that HHI had indeed requested a zoning amendment at a formal meeting in February 1980, and the Town Board recognized this request in its January 1981 resolution. It was concluded that no additional applications were necessary due to the Town's refusal to amend the zoning code, which rendered the zoning request moot. In its second holding, the court applied a four-prong disparate impact test from a previous case, determining that even if an application existed, the appellants did not sufficiently show discriminatory impact or intent. The court evaluated the strength of the plaintiffs' claims, the defendant's interests, and the nature of the plaintiffs' requests regarding housing provision for minority groups. The court determined that the evidence of discriminatory effect was weak, noting a shortage of rental housing and a higher percentage of minority households using subsidized units, but ultimately concluded that the majority of beneficiaries might not disproportionately be from minority groups. Regarding intent, the judge found no proof of segregative intent from the Town in limiting subsidized housing to the urban renewal area, which favored the Town's position. The court acknowledged that the Town's actions were supported by legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, satisfying the third prong of the Arlington Heights II test. Although the fourth factor favored appellants, the first three factors led to the conclusion that appellants did not establish a prima facie case. In addressing Title VII disparate treatment claims, the court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework, which shifts the burden to the defendant to provide legitimate reasons for their actions if plaintiffs establish a prima facie case. The court found that the Town's reasons for rejecting the project were legitimate and not shown to be pretextual. The case required a "disparate impact" analysis rather than a "disparate treatment" analysis, which distinguishes between the effects of neutral policies and the treatment of individuals. Appellees' attempt to combine both analyses was rejected, as it would blur the lines between distinct types of discrimination claims. In Title VIII disparate impact cases involving public defendants, establishing a prima facie case does not require proof of discriminatory intent. This standard, which has not been previously addressed in this circuit, aligns with the disparate impact framework recognized in Title VII cases. Historical context from Boyd v. Lefrak Org. shows that while some doubt existed regarding the relevance of Title VII methodologies to Title VIII, subsequent rulings have affirmed their applicability. Under the disparate impact analysis, a plaintiff can demonstrate a violation by proving that the defendant's practices result in actual or predictable racial discrimination. The legislative history of Title VIII suggests that Congress did not intend to impose an intent requirement, as evidenced by the rejection of an amendment mandating proof of discriminatory intent for Title VIII claims. This rejection highlights Congress's intent to address discrimination arising from neutral policies. The parallel between Title VII and Title VIII further supports the notion that discriminatory impact is sufficient for establishing a violation. Practical considerations also favor this approach, as intent can be concealed, and requiring intent could distract from examining the actual impact of the policies in question. Consequently, no proof of discriminatory intent is required to establish a prima facie case under Title VIII. Confusion has arisen in interpreting prima facie disparate impact cases under Title VIII due to some courts incorporating defendant justifications into the assessment of whether a prima facie case is established. Judge Glasser's analysis of the Arlington Heights II factors in this case exemplifies this issue, as it misapplies those factors as prerequisites rather than considerations for a final merits determination. The Arlington Heights II case does not suggest that its factors are meant to establish a prima facie case, and such a requirement imposes an excessive burden on plaintiffs. Legislative history of the Fair Housing Act indicates a need for a less rigorous standard to promote integrated living patterns, as emphasized by Senator Mondale. The Supreme Court in Trafficante reinforced the broad interpretation of Title VIII to fulfill congressional intent towards residential integration. Once a prima facie case of adverse impact is established, the focus shifts to whether the defendant can avoid liability. Both the Third and Seventh Circuits recognize the necessity of weighing the adverse impact against the defendant’s justifications. The Third Circuit posits that defendants must demonstrate that their actions serve a legitimate governmental interest without discriminatory alternatives. Additionally, evidence of discriminatory intent, while not required for a prima facie case, would significantly impact the plaintiff's position if present. Another consideration is the nature of the plaintiff’s lawsuit—whether it seeks to compel a government entity to create housing or simply to remove barriers to housing the plaintiff intends to develop. In this case, the standard for evaluating a Title VIII defendant's justification needs refinement, as prior cases did not adequately provide substantial justifications for adverse decisions. The Rizzo case revealed defendants with no credible justification, while Arlington Heights II's analysis was limited to zoning authority compliance. The analysis begins with Title VII, which addresses the implications of a racially disproportionate effect caused by a seemingly neutral employer rule. In zoning cases, such a rule can negatively impact minority applicants by restricting their opportunities. Unlike Title VII, Title VIII does not provide a singular benchmark like job performance to evaluate the legitimacy of zoning rules; instead, towns may have varied justifications for their zoning decisions. Courts must scrutinize these justifications against the adverse effects on minorities demonstrated by plaintiffs. Although towns have legitimate interests in zoning, these cannot outweigh significant disparate impacts under Title VIII. The district court's findings cannot be overturned unless clearly erroneous, but appellate courts can rectify legal errors. In reviewing Judge Glasser's findings concerning Huntington's zoning, the court noted that while the discriminatory impact on the black community was assessed, the broader segregative effects of zoning restrictions were overlooked. This oversight conflicts with Title VIII's goal of fostering integrated housing. Specifically, a substantial portion of Huntington's black population resides in areas with high minority concentrations, and proposed developments like Matinecock Court could help desegregate predominantly white neighborhoods. The district court also recognized a lack of affordable rental housing and a disproportionate representation of minorities among those needing subsidized housing, yet it failed to connect the zoning restrictions to the reinforcement of racial segregation. This omission is deemed erroneous, highlighting the need for a more comprehensive analysis of the implications of zoning laws on racial integration and housing opportunities for minorities. Huntington's zoning ordinance, which confines private multi-family housing construction to a predominantly minority urban renewal area, obstructs integration by concentrating low-income housing in an area where 52% of residents are minorities. The refusal to amend this ordinance exacerbates segregation within the Town. The district court noted that 22,160 whites and 3,671 minorities live below 200% of the poverty line but failed to evaluate the disproportionate impact on minorities as mandated by Griggs v. Duke Power Co. Instead of considering proportional statistics, it relied on absolute numbers, thereby underestimating the adverse effects of the Town's policy. The stipulated statistics reveal that 28% of minorities and 11% of whites in Huntington have incomes below 200% of the poverty line. Judge Glasser concluded there was no discriminatory effect due to the majority of affected individuals being white, a position the court disagrees with based on similar reasoning to Griggs, which identified discriminatory practices despite the racial demographics of impacted individuals. Evidence shows that a higher percentage of black families need subsidized housing compared to white families, and minorities represent a disproportionate share of those in subsidized housing and on waiting lists. The refusal to rezone the Matinecock Court site has a significant adverse effect on minorities, establishing a strong prima facie case of discriminatory impact, warranting scrutiny of the Town's justifications. Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide legitimate justifications for its actions and demonstrate the absence of less discriminatory alternatives. Judge Glasser, following the McDonnell Douglas framework for disparate treatment cases, determined that if appellees provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their actions, appellants must demonstrate that this reason is a pretext. He identified seven legitimate reasons from Butterfield's October 14, 1980, letter to HUD, concluding they had not been shown to be pretextual. However, he noted that the McDonnell Douglas test is not applicable to disparate impact claims, where no circuit mandates that plaintiffs prove pretext. Instead, in Black Jack, the court required defendants to demonstrate that their actions served a compelling governmental interest. The Third Circuit's Rizzo framework introduces a two-pronged test: first, assessing whether the reasons are bona fide and legitimate; second, examining if less discriminatory alternatives exist. Concerns can be categorized as "plan-specific," which may be remedied by reasonable design modifications, or "site-specific," which typically withstand scrutiny. The inquiry focuses on whether the justification is substantial enough to warrant an official's decision, acknowledging that non-frivolous concerns may still lack adequate record support. Appellants challenged an ordinance limiting multi-family housing to an urban renewal area and the Town Board's denial of a rezoning request. The district court and parties concentrated on the latter, with appellees citing the Housing Assistance Plan and zoning ordinance without substantial evidence of a significant interest in restricting development to the urban renewal area. On appeal, the Town argued that the ordinance aims to promote development in Huntington Station's deteriorated area, but this argument was not raised previously, limiting its consideration. The Town suggested that restricting multi-family housing encourages neighborhood restoration, yet the court noted that less discriminatory alternatives, such as tax incentives, could achieve the same goal more effectively. The court criticized the assumption that developers would choose to build solely within political boundaries, emphasizing that their decisions are influenced by more complex economic factors. To promote growth in the urban renewal area, the Town should provide incentives that are less discriminatory. The Town Supervisor's 1980 letter outlined seven reasons for rejecting the rezoning of the Elwood-Pulaski site: 1) inconsistency with the Housing Assistance Plan (HAP); 2) inconsistency with zoning; 3) traffic concerns; 4) parking and fire protection issues; 5) proximity to a railroad and a Long Island Lighting Company substation; 6) inadequate recreational areas; and 7) undersized housing units. The judge noted that the first two points were problematic since the appellants were challenging the zoning ordinance. The Town failed to offer substantial evidence demonstrating how preventing the multi-family housing project would harm interests promoted by the HAP and zoning ordinance. Issues regarding parking, recreation, and unit size were deemed “plan-specific” and potentially resolvable through design changes. The traffic concern and health risks from the substation were the only site-specific issues raised. However, Town officials did not substantiate these objections at trial, with Supervisor Butterfield expressing concern that the project would disrupt plans for another urban renewal site. The Town's expert, planner David Portman, introduced different issues, such as sewage and neighborhood density, without addressing health risks from the substation. The sewage concern was raised late in the litigation and was not considered by the district court. The court determined that post hoc rationalizations from the Town lacked credibility and that the Town's justifications for rejecting the rezoning were insufficient, with the only legitimate factor being its zoning authority. The court emphasizes that when evaluating claims of discriminatory effects versus the justifications provided by a municipality, a stronger consideration should favor plaintiffs seeking to prevent municipal interference with their development plans rather than compelling the municipality to build housing. The case at hand reveals a significant discriminatory effect due to the Town's insistence on maintaining its R-3M zoning and refusal to rezone the Matinecock Court site, which outweighs the Town's justifications. Consequently, the court finds that the Town violated Title VIII by denying amendments to the zoning ordinance that would allow private developers to create multi-family housing outside the urban renewal area, specifically reversing the district court's ruling in favor of the appellants. The Town's argument against site-specific relief is dismissed, as it cites the availability of 64 "community development" sites for low-cost multi-family housing, which is misleading. An analysis shows that many of these sites are not zoned for such housing, and most are under-developed rather than vacant. Ultimately, only one site is appropriately zoned for private low-cost multi-family housing. Moreover, this site is deemed unsuitable for federally subsidized housing due to its high minority concentration, as determined by HUD. The court acknowledges that while the Town may have legitimate preferences for alternative sites, it cannot impose undue hardships, such as poor accessibility to services, on applicants when making those preferences. Remand to the district court is typically warranted for the appellees to propose an alternative site outside the urban renewal area for HHI's project, eligible for the same financial assistance as the Matinecock Court site. However, this case is exceptional due to its lengthy litigation of over seven years, which risks jeopardizing the developer's plans. The Town has shown insufficient good faith in promoting low-income housing, evidenced by its minimal actions since 1987 and ongoing pressure from HUD to commit to subsidized housing. Although HUD's concerns do not indicate discriminatory intent, they illustrate a consistent pattern of delays in housing development. Additionally, the 63 parcels outside the urban renewal area are not zoned for multi-family housing, and the current zoning ordinance prohibits rezoning. Unlike the Arlington Heights II case, where suitable multi-family zoned sites were available, the Town has refused to amend its ordinance to allow such developments outside the urban renewal area. Thus, remanding for site evaluation is deemed inappropriate. Instead, the district court is directed to issue a judgment mandating the Town to rezone the 14.8-acre Matinecock Court site to R-3M status and to amend its zoning ordinance to eliminate the restriction on multi-family housing projects to the urban renewal area. The appellants have withdrawn their equal protection and related claims, while the district court has certified a class of individuals in need of affordable housing in Huntington. Section 8 pertains to a federal program offering subsidies for newly-constructed and significantly-rehabilitated housing, as outlined in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1437f (1982 and Supp. III 1985). Although HUD was initially named in the complaint alongside the Huntington defendants, the appellants did not contest the dismissal of HUD. The Town asserts that its 1978 rezoning of the Lincoln Manor site was based on an expansive interpretation of the R-3M provision, supported by a legal opinion from Town Attorney Ronald Glickman, which stated that community development programs superseded prior urban renewal designations. This interpretation was reportedly communicated to HHI but was only made public in 1984 during the litigation. Despite pre-approval for the project, delays arose due to community opposition and an attempt by Butterfield to set aside 30 units for the elderly, along with limiting black participation to 10%. In June 1981, HUD's Area Manager suspended the pre-approval. The court noted a prior finding in Yonkers, where the Town was found to have intentionally maintained housing and educational segregation, violating the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. The court clarified that discriminatory intent is no longer necessary to prove Title VIII disparate impact claims, rendering Judge Glasser's findings on intent irrelevant. The court acknowledged a likely desegregative impact from the project on Huntington Township compared to the regional context, despite appellees arguing no statistical disparity existed with the surrounding Nassau-Suffolk area. However, the court found sufficient evidence of desegregative effects within Huntington itself. The lower court's mention of the zoning ordinance's role in perpetuating segregation was limited to its consideration of the Town's intent. The court referenced decisions that examined the disproportionate impact of zoning decisions on nonwhite populations, and noted the district court established that a significant percentage of Matinecock Court tenants would be minorities. Finally, the Town's proposal for new subsidized housing in December 1987 was deemed speculative and unaddressed of the appellants' primary concern regarding the zoning code's perpetuation of racial segregation in housing.