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Jones v. State
Citations: 43 So. 3d 1258; 2007 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 156; 2007 WL 2459244Docket: CR-05-0527
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; August 31, 2007; Alabama; State Appellate Court
Jeremy Bryan Jones was convicted of four counts of capital murder for the killing of Lisa Nichols, which was classified as capital murder due to its commission during rape, attempted rape, sexual abuse, attempted sexual abuse, burglary, and kidnapping or attempted kidnapping, as outlined in the Alabama Code. Following a sentencing hearing, the jury recommended a death sentence by a vote of 10-2, which the trial court accepted. Jones's motion for a new trial was denied, leading to this appeal. In his appeal, Jones raised arguments not presented at trial. While a lack of objection does not preclude review in death penalty cases, it may weaken his claims of prejudice. The court noted that it would apply the plain-error rule sparingly, only in cases where justice would otherwise be compromised. Jones did not contest the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, which the court reviewed and found adequate. The trial court provided a summary of the facts: On September 15, 2004, coinciding with Hurricane Ivan's landfall in Mobile, Jones, who had previously worked for the Bentley family under the alias John Paul Chapman, sought shelter and work from them while they evacuated. After the storm, while the Bentley family was working on storm damage, Jones inquired about their neighbor, Lisa Nichols, who had returned home after the hurricane. On the morning of September 17, 2004, Jones and neighbor Chris Hill consumed illegal narcotics. Lisa Nichols went to work around 5:00 a.m., while Mark Bentley, Scooter Coleman, and Jones continued cleanup work at Bentley’s yard. Jones asked Kim Bentley to buy him a six-pack of Bud Light, which she did before leaving with her children. Later, Joel Edge picked up Coleman, and they worked on storm damage until Coleman returned to the Bentleys well after dark. At approximately 5:00 p.m., Nichols returned home, finding Bentley and Jones there. Bentley offered to buy hamburgers at Hardee's, which took about an hour due to long lines. While Bentley was away, Jones took Kim Bentley's .25 caliber handgun and his beer, went to Nichols' home, raped her under threat of violence, and shot her three times in the head, killing her instantly. To conceal his crime, Jones returned to the Bentleys, obtained gasoline, and set Nichols’ body and the bathroom on fire, causing an explosion heard by neighbor Ann Parden. Afterwards, Jones took a shower, and when Bentley returned with hamburgers, he noticed Jones outside with gasoline cans. Jones falsely claimed he was fueling four-wheelers. The following morning, Nichols failed to show up for work or respond to family calls. That Saturday night, her daughters and son-in-law checked on her and discovered her charred remains in the bathroom. They ran to the Bentleys' for help, but upon arrival, found that Nichols was beyond saving, prompting them to call 911. Jones displayed little emotion during the crisis. Jones learned from Mark Bentley that Ms. Nichols’ body was found severely burned. He recounted advice from his uncle, a Vietnam veteran, about disposing of a body by burning. After exhibiting strange behavior, Jones left the Bentley home and was not seen again until his arrest two days later. Upon arrest, he expressed a desire for confrontation with law enforcement. The preliminary autopsy revealed Ms. Nichols died from three gunshot wounds to the head. As detectives investigated, they focused on Jones due to his suspicious actions and presence at the Bentley home. Over the course of his interactions with law enforcement, Jones made multiple confessions to the rape and murder of Ms. Nichols, detailing how he entered her home, assaulted her, shot her with Kim Bentley’s pistol, and subsequently burned her body. Key evidence included Jones' confessions, corroborated by forensic testimony linking the bullets used in the murder to the firearm he admitted to taking, and DNA evidence from a stain on his shirt matching both his and the victim's DNA. Additional circumstantial evidence, such as the discovery of beer cans at the crime scene and Jones purchasing gasoline shortly before the murder, reinforced his guilt. The appellant argued the trial court improperly denied his motion for a change of venue, asserting that the trial court is better positioned to assess the impact of pretrial publicity on the community and jurors. The appellate court will only overturn this decision if there is clear evidence of an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Widespread publicity and media attention alone do not justify a change of venue; the appellant must demonstrate actual prejudice or a community's saturation with prejudicial publicity, as established in Ex parte Grayson and further supported by cases like Slagle v. State and Whisenhant v. State. A change of venue is warranted under two conditions: when jurors show actual prejudice against the accused or when presumed prejudice arises from community saturation with inflammatory pretrial publicity, as outlined in Sheppard v. Maxwell and Rideau v. Louisiana. The defendant must prove that the pretrial publicity was both prejudicial and sufficiently pervasive in the community. This burden is notably heavy, and the trial court assesses presumed prejudice based on the totality of the circumstances. Such cases are considered rare and typically require more than mere reporting of charges or trial processes to constitute prejudicial publicity. Excessive publicity does not inherently translate to prejudice. To justify a change of venue due to pretrial publicity, the appellant must demonstrate that the publicity has created a community saturation that makes a fair trial impossible, beyond merely showing widespread publicity. Prior cases establish that newspaper articles alone do not warrant a venue change unless they contain sensational or accusatory content that significantly biases the community. A review of the media coverage indicated that most reports were factual and objective, lacking the pervasive sensationalism required to presume prejudice. Evidence from a telephone poll of 405 Mobile County citizens revealed a majority felt they could set aside prior knowledge of the case if chosen for jury service. Although some media reports mentioned the appellant's past offenses, they did not present the information in a manner that was inflammatory or prejudicial. Thus, the appellant failed to prove that the media coverage created an emotional bias against him, and there was no basis for a presumption of prejudice due to pretrial publicity. To establish 'actual prejudice' against the appellant by the jury, two conditions must be met: (1) at least one juror must have held a pretrial opinion of the defendant's guilt, and (2) that juror must not have been able to set aside this opinion to fairly evaluate the trial evidence. The determination of potential bias from adverse publicity is assessed through voir dire examination. In this case, while many jurors had some knowledge of the case, very few expressed a preformed opinion that would impair their impartiality. The trial court excused those who could not be fair, leading to the conclusion that the appellant failed to demonstrate actual prejudice, thus justifying the trial court's denial of a change of venue. Additionally, the appellant argued that his statements to law enforcement were improperly admitted as evidence. The legal standard requires that a confession be voluntary, meaning it must not be the result of coercion or promises of leniency. Courts assess the voluntariness of a confession by examining the totality of the circumstances to ensure the defendant's free will was not compromised. Alabama courts similarly adhere to this standard, requiring an analysis of whether the defendant's will was overborne by external pressures during the confession process. The determination of the voluntariness of a confession hinges on whether the defendant's will was overborne at the time of the confession, particularly by an implied promise of leniency. Factors influencing this assessment include the conduct of law enforcement, the defendant's capacity to resist pressure, personal characteristics, and prior experiences with the criminal justice system. During a suppression hearing, conflicting evidence presents a credibility issue for the trial court, whose decisions are binding unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Investigator Paul Burch testified about multiple interactions with the appellant regarding a murder investigation. He stated that, during the first statement on September 21, 2004, the appellant was coherent and waived his Miranda rights after confirming he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Burch denied using threats or coercion and did not imply to the appellant that cooperating would result in better outcomes. However, Burch acknowledged the appellant's previous use of methamphetamines and noted that methamphetamines were found on him when taken to jail. The appellant indicated he had been awake for a considerable time and expressed a willingness to agree to a statement if it was documented. In his initial statement, the appellant claimed that the victim had consumed methamphetamines on the day she died and described the circumstances of her death, which occurred after they had consensual sexual intercourse. The appellant admitted to obtaining a gun from the Bentleys’ mobile home, shooting the victim multiple times, and subsequently setting her mobile home on fire. Law enforcement officer Burch testified about four statements made by the appellant, confirming that the appellant was advised of his Miranda rights each time, appeared to understand and waive them, showed no signs of intoxication, and was not threatened or coerced into making statements. In the second statement, the appellant disclosed his drug use, attempted to force sexual intercourse with the victim, and confessed to shooting her three times and later burning her mobile home. The third statement included an admission of rape, though the appellant expressed reluctance to discuss it further. In the fourth statement, he reiterated the rape, confirmed shooting the victim in the head multiple times, and admitted to pouring gasoline on her body and setting it on fire. During a suppression hearing, psychiatrist Dr. Charles E. Smith testified about the appellant's mental health treatment at the Mobile Metro Jail, noting that he prescribed antidepressants in May 2005 and discussed concerns for the appellant's potential suicide risk. Although Smith did not prescribe the antipsychotic drug Risperdal, he noted that the appellant had received it, which was intended to calm him. He stated that the appellant was able to communicate effectively and did not exhibit abnormal behavior during treatment, despite instances of refusal to take medications and a hoard of unconsumed medication found in his cell later. Smith also clarified his medical decision-making was independent of jail personnel. Anna Christine Eaton, a psychiatric nurse at Mobile Metro Jail, testified about her interactions with the appellant, noting that he appeared to have received Risperdal in error in November 2004 and had been placed in a suicide wedge due to his behavior. Dr. Steve Bethea, a pharmacology expert, explained that Risperdal is an anti-psychotic for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, stating it can slow brain function but did not indicate it caused loss of reality at the dosage the appellant received. Dr. Daniel L. Koch, a clinical psychology expert, stated that while Risperdal could disrupt cognitive abilities in non-schizophrenic or bipolar patients, it is generally safe at higher dosages with minor side effects. He highlighted that the appellant felt compelled to cooperate with officers to gain privileges, suggesting a potentially coercive environment. The appellant argued that his initial statement was involuntary due to prolonged wakefulness and prior methamphetamine use. However, he appeared lucid and provided detailed accounts of the incident. The court noted that physical exhaustion is only one factor in assessing the credibility of a confession. Under Alabama law, intoxication must substantially impair the mind to render a confession inadmissible. Historical precedents establish that intoxication alone, unless severe enough to render a person unconscious of their words, does not invalidate a confession. The trial court determines the voluntariness of a confession, and its decision is upheld unless it contradicts the evidence or is clearly erroneous. Ultimately, the degree of intoxication affecting voluntariness is a factual issue for the court and then the jury to consider. The appellant's prior use of methamphetamines did not significantly impair his mental state at the time of his statements, as he demonstrated coherence and understanding during his first statement. The court found no evidence of intoxication affecting his comprehension, allowing the jury to consider his drug use as a contextual factor, not a barrier to admissibility. The trial court correctly admitted the first statement into evidence. Regarding subsequent statements (second, third, and fourth), the appellant argued they were involuntary due to law enforcement providing better food and allowing phone calls, which he claimed positioned the officers as controllers of his resources. While the appellant's vulnerability was noted, it was not determinative of the voluntariness of his statements. The court referenced prior rulings emphasizing that age, intellect, and situational factors are important but do not alone render a confession inadmissible. The appellant's claims of being treated with antidepressants and being placed on suicide watch were deemed relevant to the weight of the statements but not their admissibility. After reviewing the relevant transcripts and recordings, the court concluded that the appellant understood his rights and voluntarily made the second, third, and fourth statements, affirming that the trial court did not err in admitting these statements. Additionally, the appellant challenged the admissibility of testimony from Deputy State Fire Marshal Gary Cartee, arguing it constituted the unauthorized practice of engineering due to its reliance on specialized scientific knowledge. Testimony related to the practice of engineering requires the witness to hold a proper license, as outlined in Ala. Code 1975, § 34-11-1(7). The Alabama Supreme Court's decision in Hunter clarified that the 1997 amendment expanded the definition of “practice of engineering” to include various forms of professional services and creative work necessitating engineering expertise. Under § 34-11-2(a), individuals must demonstrate their qualifications and obtain a license to practice engineering legally. Violation of this requirement is classified as a Class A misdemeanor per § 34-11-15. The Supreme Court emphasized that the amendment is specific to engineering and does not impose licensing requirements for unrelated activities. Moreover, individuals uncertain if their testimony falls under the engineering practice can seek an advisory opinion from the Licensure Board, as permitted by Regulation 330-X-1-.12. An advisory opinion issued by the Board on August 28, 2006, affirmed this process. The recent opinion from the Alabama Supreme Court in *Board of Water and Sewer Commissioners of the City of Mobile v. Hunter* was addressed in a meeting where the Board issued an advisory opinion to guide Alabama courts, the Attorney General's Office, the Department of Public Safety, the State Fire Marshal's Office, and attorneys in the state. The advisory opinion clarified the definition of the practice of engineering, which is limited to areas requiring specific engineering education, training, and experience as defined in Ala.Code §34-11-1(7) (2002). The Board noted that certain areas, such as ballistics, crime scene analysis, blood spatter analysis, vehicular accident investigation, human factors, biomedical/biomechanics, and fire investigation, do not necessitate engineering qualifications and are not categorized as 'engineering' unless the expert explicitly claims their analysis is based on engineering education and experience. Additionally, the practice of engineering is restricted to acts related to utilities, structures, buildings, machines, equipment, processes, work systems, projects, and products. Areas like fire analysis and chemical structure analysis also do not inherently require an engineering background. The Board’s interpretation of the statute is given significant weight, though it is not legally binding. In the case, expert testimony by Cartee regarding fire investigation was scrutinized. Cartee stated that he investigated a fire involving a victim's body and gasoline as an accelerant. However, he did not claim his analysis was based on engineering expertise. Consequently, the Board concluded that his testimony did not require engineering qualifications, and he was not obligated to be licensed as an engineer. The court found no error in allowing Cartee's testimony based on these interpretations. The appellant argues that Alabama's failure to adhere to the American Bar Association (ABA) Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in death penalty cases infringes on his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. He claims his attorneys provided ineffective assistance solely due to this non-adherence. However, he does not present specific facts demonstrating that his rights have been negatively impacted; rather, he offers speculative assertions. Citing Strickland v. Washington, the document emphasizes that to prove ineffective assistance, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced the defense, resulting in an unreliable trial outcome. The standard for attorney performance is "reasonably effective assistance," and while ABA standards serve as guidelines, they do not impose strict rules that could undermine the independence of counsel and their tactical decision-making. The inquiry into counsel's performance must consider the totality of circumstances, reflecting prevailing professional norms. Detailed guidelines for legal representation may hinder attorneys from fully advocating for their defendants. The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is primarily aimed at ensuring fair trials, not necessarily at improving the quality of representation. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, clarified that prevailing norms and American Bar Association (ABA) standards serve merely as guides and that imposing strict guidelines is inappropriate. While states can establish rules for legal representation, the Constitution requires counsel to make objectively reasonable choices. Subsequent Supreme Court rulings have continued to reference ABA standards as guides for evaluating reasonableness in legal representation. In Torres v. State, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged that customs for capital defense lawyers have evolved but emphasized that deviations from these standards do not automatically equate to ineffective assistance. A defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice stemming from counsel's performance. The court also clarified that Alabama's lack of adoption of ABA guidelines does not imply per se ineffectiveness of counsel. The Strickland two-pronged analysis remains the standard for assessing ineffective-assistance claims, ensuring sufficient protection of defendants' rights. Regarding the appellant's fifth argument, he contends that the trial court erred in allowing a mental evaluation prior to entering a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. He argues that without raising the issue of sanity, the State should not conduct evaluations or access psychotherapy records. This is related to Rule 11.2(a) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure concerning competency to stand trial. A defendant in a circuit court may undergo a mental examination to assess their competency to stand trial, initiated either by the defendant, their attorney, the district attorney, or at the court's discretion. If a defense of "not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect" is timely raised, the court may order an examination of the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense. According to Alabama Code § 15-16-22(a), if there are reasonable grounds to believe a defendant lacks the capacity to proceed to trial or if the defense may be based on mental disease or defect, the presiding judge must order the defendant's commitment to the Department of Mental Health for evaluation by appointed mental health professionals. In the case at hand, the appellant entered pleas of not guilty by reason of insanity and related defenses. Concerns regarding the appellant's mental state led the circuit judge to order a psychological examination after discussions with the district judge. When arraigned, the appellant pled not guilty and requested additional time to file special pleas, including a potential plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. A subsequent request for a mental examination by the State was viewed by the defense as premature. The court expressed a desire to ensure the defendant's competency, emphasizing the importance of thoroughness in protecting the defendant's rights. The defense indicated that the district court had not addressed competency issues, but the circuit court had provided for a psychological evaluation, which concluded the defendant was competent. Judge Wood authorized both a psychologist and a psychiatrist to evaluate a defendant's mental state, acknowledging that the psychologist's role is limited to behavioral analysis. The defense counsel confirmed receipt of the psychologist's report and expressed the need for a psychiatrist, which had also been granted by the judge. The court encouraged the defense to find a psychiatrist, noting the importance of the mental evaluation in light of the defendant's pleas of not guilty by reason of insanity. Furthermore, the excerpt discusses procedural rules regarding mental evaluations, stating that Rule 11.2(a)(2) applies when a defendant raises a defense of mental disease or defect. Given that the defendant had previously indicated such defenses in district court, the State's request for a mental examination was deemed appropriate by the circuit court. Lastly, the appellant argued against the trial court's decision to grant the State's challenges for cause against potential jurors J.B. and R.J., who expressed views opposing capital punishment. The law allows the State to challenge jurors who would refuse to impose the death penalty, and the trial judge has significant discretion in these determinations. A prospective juror may be excused from service if they are challenged for cause or if it appears they cannot render a fair and impartial verdict. This decision can be initiated by the court or a party involved in the case. The court evaluates the trial judge's discretion based on the voir dire questions and the juror's responses. The trial judge, having direct observation of the juror, is best positioned to assess their demeanor and ability to serve. The standard for a challenge for cause is whether a juror can set aside personal opinions and fairly try the case based on law and evidence. The trial court has broad discretion in these determinations, and its decisions carry significant weight, only to be overturned if clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. In a specific instance, a juror (Veniremember J.B.) initially stated he could not impose the death penalty under any circumstances. However, during individual questioning, he clarified that while he believed he might not impose it in this case, he could consider doing so under certain circumstances in general. This exchange revealed a shift in his position, indicating that he could potentially impose the death penalty based on the evidence presented, emphasizing the importance of context in assessing juror qualifications. The document details a discussion between defense counsel, the court, and potential jurors regarding the sentencing phase of a trial where the jury must decide between the death penalty and life without parole. Defense counsel explains that the State will present aggravating factors to support a death sentence, while the defense will offer mitigating factors for a life sentence. Veniremember J.B. acknowledges understanding and indicates he could consider the death penalty as a possible sentence, although he struggles to specify circumstances under which he would impose it, ultimately expressing skepticism about the death penalty as a concept. The court then queries J.B. about hypothetical situations, including one involving Osama Bin Laden, to which J.B. responds he could consider the death penalty in that scenario but hesitates about voting for it based on evidence of only one victim. Veniremember R.J. firmly states he does not agree with the death penalty and would not impose it under any circumstances, despite the court's attempts to explore potential exceptions based on evidence presented. Venire-member R.J. expressed a firm disapproval of the death penalty, stating unequivocally that he could not impose it under any circumstances, regardless of the severity of the case. During the jury selection process, the court and defense counsel clarified the structure of a capital trial, which involves a two-part procedure: determining guilt and then deciding on sentencing. R.J. indicated that while he could decide on guilt without issue, he would struggle with the sentencing phase. He acknowledged understanding that the prosecution would present evidence advocating for the death penalty, while the defense would offer mitigating factors against it. Despite this understanding, R.J. maintained that he personally could not choose the death penalty, indicating a consistent preference for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The prosecutor confirmed that R.J. could not envision any scenario leading him to impose the death penalty, to which R.J. reiterated his position. Defense counsel emphasized that no evidence had yet been presented in the current case, suggesting that the decision should not be based on hypothetical scenarios but rather on the specifics of the case at hand. The trial court found that veniremembers R.J. and J.B. were ineligible to serve due to their expressed opposition to the death penalty, as they indicated a preference for life without parole regardless of the law. Despite potential errors in removing these jurors, the appellant failed to demonstrate that the jury was biased or unfair, rendering any such error harmless. The appellant faced four counts of capital murder, connected to crimes including rape, sexual abuse, burglary, and kidnapping, as per Alabama Code. The trial court determined that the death sentence was not influenced by passion or prejudice and concluded that aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating factors. Specifically, the aggravating circumstances included the appellant's involvement in a burglary, rape, and kidnapping during the commission of the capital offenses. The court found no statutory mitigating circumstances, and its findings on non-statutory mitigating circumstances were noted under Section 13A-5-47(d). The Court analyzed non-statutory mitigating circumstances presented by Jones under Section 13A-5-52, which allows for consideration of various factors including the defendant's character, background, and circumstances surrounding the crime. The Court noted the broad nature of non-statutory mitigators and based its evaluation on Jones' jury instructions and additional evidence from the sentencing phase. Each mitigating factor was considered, even if it did not fit neatly into predefined categories. 1. **Childhood Problems**: Testimony from Jones' mother and stepfather revealed a challenging upbringing marked by financial struggles and familial conflict, including untreated attention deficit disorder and alcohol abuse by the stepfather. Although this mitigator was acknowledged, the Court assigned it minor weight due to evidence of familial love and support, including the family's presence during the trial. 2. **Mercy**: Jones' family and attorneys requested mercy, highlighting the emotional impact of a death sentence on Jones' family. The Court recognized this plea as a valid non-statutory mitigator and assigned it some weight, despite its intangible nature. 3. **Drug Abuse**: Evidence indicated Jones had a long history of substance abuse, which the State did not dispute. However, the Court assigned only minor weight to this factor, noting that Jones' drug use was voluntary and did not impair his understanding of right and wrong, thus not excusing his criminal actions. 4. **Capacity for Love and Care**: Testimony from Jones' family suggested he possesses the ability to love and care for others, further contributing to the Court's considerations. Overall, while the Court acknowledged the presence of these mitigating factors, it emphasized that the weight assigned to them varied significantly based on the evidence presented. Testimony indicated that Jones was a caring role model for his younger brother, a point unchallenged by the State, which the Court deemed worthy of some weight as a non-statutory mitigator. Jones was diagnosed with attention deficit disorder and schizo-affective disorder by his psychological expert, while the State's expert attributed his issues to voluntary drug use, self-centeredness, and antisocial behavior. Both experts acknowledged Jones had mental and emotional problems but agreed that these did not impair his understanding of right and wrong or lead him to commit the crimes in question. Consequently, the Court assigned minimal weight to this mitigator. The trial court appropriately assessed both aggravating and mitigating circumstances in sentencing Jones to death, a decision supported by the record. Under Alabama Code § 13A-5-53(b)(2), the Court independently weighed these circumstances, concluding that the death sentence was fitting, particularly given that the murder occurred in the context of multiple violent crimes, which have similarly warranted death sentences in the state. The Court found no errors affecting Jones' rights during the trial, affirming his convictions and death sentence. Additionally, a survey regarding public perception of Jones revealed varied opinions on his character, but the trial court questioned the reliability of this data due to its leading nature. Although Jones initially contested the credibility of various witnesses, he later withdrew objections to all but one during oral arguments.